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'his book is the result of  a project developed by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for  Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with support from  the Ford Foun-
dation. The text encompasses five  articles analyzing emerging economies 
that were generally rated as successful  by international financial  institu-
tions and the financial  press during episodes characterized by a broad sup-
ply of  external funds.  We include the cases of  Chile, Korea, and Mexico in 
the critical years of  the 1990s and Chile in the deep crisis of  the 1970s. All 
of  these economies were praised for  their efficient  public policies. They 
all experienced episodes of  an abundant supply of  financial  capital, and 
they all suffered  macroecoriomic disequilibria as a result. We contrast these 
cases with the positive experiences of  Chile during the Tequila crisis and 
of  Taiwan during the Asian crisis. 
Three of  the articles are country studies, undertaken from  a compara-
tive perspective. The paper by Manuel Agosin, professor  at the University 
of  Chile, draws parallels between Korea and Taiwan. These two countries 
achieved a similar performance  from  the mid-1960s through the early 
1990s, but their paths then diverged. The study analyzes the national poli-
cies adopted in each case and the underlying motives. 
The article by Ricardo Ffrench-Davis  and Heriberto Tapia, both econ-
omists at ECLAC, compares three positive financial  shocks experienced in 
Chile: the liberalization of  the capital account in the 1970s, which exploded 
in a massive crisis in 1982; a substantial policy shift  in 1991-94 in the di-
rection of  a prudential  macroeconomic management of  the capital account, 
Vll 
which kept Chile immune to the tequila crisis in 1995; and the capital surge 
of  1995-97, which culminated in a rather severe adjustment in 1999. 
The third study is by Dr. Jaime Ros, Mexican economist and profes-
sor at Notre Dame University, who addresses the contrasting experiences 
of  Mexico in 1991-94 and 1996-97. The paper examines the different  do-
mestic and external variables that explain the marked differences  in the 
two episodes, and it evaluates the depth of  the economic and social effects. 
The fourth  article, by Dr. Stephany Griffith-Jones  of  the University of 
Sussex, analyzes the current architecture of  the international financial  sys-
tem and its incapacity for  preventing crises or moderating the disequilibria 
that generally lead to crises. The article analyzes several recent proposals, in-
cluding those of  the author herself. 
Finally, the paper by José Antonio Ocampo, Executive Secretary of 
ECLAC, and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis,  which opens the book, examines 
why countries that were considered successful  before  the explosion of  a cri-
sis incurred a level of  macroeconomic disequilibria that made them vul-
nerable to a financial  run. We start by considering the nature of  supply, 
focusing  on investors who specialize in short-term, highly liquid opera-
tions. We then trace the evolution of  the prices of  financial  assets, foreign 
exchange, and stock markets in the receiving countries, and we identify 
links with paths that culminate in unsustainable macroeconomic disequi-
libria. On the basis of  this analysis, we expose five  misconceptions that are 
commonly held among proponents of  full  liberalization of  the capital ac-
count. 
Heriberto Tapia provided highly professional  support in preparing the 
final  manuscript, verifying  the technical content, and ensuring agreement 
between the Spanish and English versions. Lenka Arriagada was excep-
tionally efficient  in assisting with the presentation of  the final  manuscript. 
We thank ECLAC for  providing a stimulating environment for 
policy-oriented research and the opportunity for  independent analysis on 
a most relevant issue today. Our deepest thanks also go to the Ford Foun-
dation for  its support. Naturally, all the opinions presented here are the re-
sponsibility of  the respective authors. 
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JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO* 
The  Globalization  of 
Financial  Volatility: 
Challenges  for  Emerging 
Economies 
One of  the outstanding features  of  modern financial crises is that they occurred in emerging economies 
that were generally viewed as very successful  until the crises exploded. 
Moreover, recent crises have been radically different  from  those typical 
from  the 1940s to the 1970s, which, in Latin America, displayed three 
major features  that have been absent or relatively less important in recent 
experiences. First, past crises involved large fiscal  deficits  that were fi-
nanced with external loans or, in the absence of  such financing,  by central 
banks. Second, domestic financial  systems were repressed, a fact  that was 
generally accompanied by private sector access to rediscount or bank loans 
at negative real interest rates. Finally, balance of  payments crises were fre-
quently associated with a sharp worsening in the terms of  trade or explicit 
domestic policy decisions to overvalue exchange rates. 
Over the past quarter century, a new variety of  crises has gradually de-
veloped in Asia and Latin America. Four features  differentiate  them from 
the previous type. First, the international capital market has been the major 
source of  shocks, whether positive or negative. Second, flows  have largely 
originated from  and been received by the private sector. Fiscal deficits,  in 
contrast, have played a secondary role, and in most cases public finances 
have been sound. Third, these financial  crises have mostly hit emerging 
*We appreciate the assistance of  Angela Parra and Heriberto Tapia. 
economies that were considered to be highly credible and successful.  In 
fact,  the bulk of  private flows  has been concentrated on a small number of 
relatively affluent  and well-organized developing nations. Fourth, these 
flows  have been characterized by a lack of  regulation, on both the supply 
and demand sides. Domestic financial  systems have often  been liberalized 
without the parallel development of  a significant  degree of  domestic pru-
dential regulation and supervision. 
In practice, the differentiation  between old- and new-style crises is 
naturally somewhat less clear-cut than the above description would sug-
gest. An early example of  the new variety was the Chilean experience of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, but the old type of  crisis was still prevalent in 
the rest of  Latin America during that period, with other Southern Cone 
countries in an intermediate position. In the 1990s, the new type gener-
ally predominated in both Latin America and Asia, but there were some 
mixed episodes in which features  of  both new and old crises were inter-
mingled, with budget deficits  and terms-of-trade  fluctuations. 
The evolution of  private capital flows  over the past three decades is well 
known. During the 1970s, a large supply of  funds  was made available to 
many developing nations. The 1980s brought a severe and widespread 
shortage of  financing,  particularly for  the Latin American countries. In 
contrast, the Asian countries that were affected  by the disturbances in the 
international financial  markets adjusted rapidly (with the exception of  the 
Philippines) and were able to leave the contagion effects  behind. External 
financing  returned to Latin America in the 1990s, but it was volatile. The 
resurgence of  capital flows  between 1991 and 1994 was followed  by a sharp 
scarcity, especially in Mexico and Argentina, with a rather generalized port-
folio  outflow  in late 1994 and early 1995. The so-called tequila crisis gave 
way to renewed access in 1996-97, but in 1998-2000 external financing 
was again in short supply as a result of  contagion from  the crisis detonated 
in Asia in 1997. Worsening terms of  trade aggravated the recession. On all 
those occasions, changes in external financing  were supply-led.1 They had 
a strong impact on the national economies on both sides of  the cycle, with 
contagion first  of  overoptimism and then of  overpessimism. 
Through 1996, the successful  emerging economies of  Asia appeared 
to be immune to the instability associated with capital surges, as illustrated 
by their performance  during the tequila crisis. In reality, part of  the out-
flows  from  Latin American countries were reallocated to Asia during that 
1. Evidence shows that these changes have originated, to a large extent, in the sources of  supply. See 
Calvo (1998); Culpeper (1995); Griffith-Jones  (1998); I.arrain (2000). 
episode. The subsequent events show that immunity was no longer a fea-
ture of  the East Asian economies, and the two regions now faced  common 
destabilizing external forces. 
The following  section outlines the three capital surges experienced by 
Latin American countries since the 1970s. Subsequently, the paper reviews 
the main macroeconomic effects  generated by capital surges and their pol-
icy implications. We then compare the specific  experiences of  the emerg-
ing economies covered by rhis research project: Korea and Mexico in the 
1990s and Chile in the 1970s were all regarded as highly successful  until 
the sudden outbreak of  severe crises. The study contrasts these experiences 
with Chile in the early 1990s and Taiwan throughout the last decade, 
which provide examples of  economies that deployed a set of  prudential 
macroeconomic policies and thereby avoided domestic disequilibria and 
mitigated contagion. The paper then addresses five  misconceptions that 
are currently in fashion.  The final  section summarizes some robust lessons 
for  domestic policies and reform  of  the international financial  architecture. 
Three Financial Capital Surges to Emerging Economies 
since the 1970s 
Purely financial  factors  have been changing in the world at a much 
faster  pace than international trade and the globalization of  production. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, many countries began to liberalize their fi-
nancial sectors and to relax or eliminate foreign  exchange regulations.2 
This contributed to a boom in international flows,  which was facilitated 
by the revolutionary innovations in data management and telecommuni-
cations technology and the emergence of  increasingly sophisticated finan-
cial techniques. The financial  booms generally occurred within a 
framework  of  lax or nonexistent regulations and supervision, and most ex-
isting regulations were in fact  procyclical.3 
Net capital inflows  to I ,atin America averaged nearly 5 percent of  gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1977-81, 1991-94, and 1996-97. Exchange 
rates appreciated in all three periods, which naturally led to a rapid in-
crease of  imports relative to exports, with the corresponding current ac-
count deficit  being financed  (indeed, overfinanced)  by a sharp rise in the 
2. Diaz-Alejandro (1985); Devlin i 1989). 
3. Ocampo (1999, 2001); Griffith-Jones  (in this volume); United Nations (1999); Turner (2000). 
stock of  external liabilities.4 All these macroeconomic variables experi-
enced some overshooting.5 Adjustment was frequently  anchored to one 
dominant balance, which generated imbalances in other macroeconomic 
variables, as in a falling  inflation  rate associated with real exchange rate ap-
preciation and climbing external deficits.  Such adjustment was obviously 
facilitated  by access to external financing,  which most probably would 
have been absent in a dry foreign  supply. 
The increased supply of  external funding  in those three episodes gener-
ated a greater demand for  such financing.  Recipient countries that adopted 
procyclical or passive domestic policies experienced real exchange revalua-
tion and large current account deficits.  Because these were heavily financed 
by volatile flows  of  mostly short-term, liquid capital, the economies tended 
to become increasingly vulnerable to changes in the mood of  external cred-
itors; the outstanding case was Mexico in 1991-94 (see Ros, in this volume). 
Creditors with financial  assets placed in the region became more sensitive to 
bad news as their exposure increased. The sensitivity rose steeply with the 
size of  net short-term liabilities.6 
The dramatic increase of  international financial  flows  was more diver-
sified  in the 1990s than in the 1970s. The situation is potentially more un-
stable, however, inasmuch as the trend has shifted  from  long-term bank 
credit, which was the predominant source of  financing  in the 1970s, to 
portfolio  flows;  medium- and short-term bank financing;  time deposits; 
and foreign  direct investment (FDI; including acquisitions and other than 
greenfield  investment). A very high share of  the newer supply of  financing  is 
short term or liquid or both. The region thus saw a paradoxical diversifica-
tion  toward  volatility  in the 1990s. The relative improvement after  the te-
quila crisis, with a rising share of  FDI, still included a significant  proportion 
of  volatile flows.7  The foundations  of  a broad liquid market for  portfolio  in-
vestment were laid down in the late 1980s through the Brady bonds and de-
veloped vigorously in the 1990s, with Latin America as a major destination 
for  both bond and stock financing.  This market offered  the expectation of 
high rates of  return during the upswings of  the two cycles in the 1990s. 
4. ECLAC (1995, 1998, 2000a). 
5. When significant  macroeconomic disequilibria persists despite repeated statements on the need 
to maintain equilibria, it reveals an inadequate understanding of  how to achieve sustainable equilib-
ria that are consistent with development. See Ffrench-Davis  (2000, ch. 6). 
6. Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
7. The positive link between FDI and productive investment is well documented (see Ffrench-Davis 
and Reisen, 1 998, chap. 1). The link was weakened, however, by the fact  that about 40 percent of  FDI 
inflows  in 1997-99 corresponded to acquisitions of  Latin American firms  rather than the creation of 
new capacity (ECLAC, 2000b, chap. 1). 
In 1991 the stock of  assets invested in Latin America by the new in-
vestors that had discovered  the emerging markets was evidently below their 
desired stock level, but by 1994 it had become considerably larger. Net 
capital inflows  were used to finance  rising current account deficits,  and ex-
ternal liabilities accumulated through time. This was sometimes accompa-
nied by significant  mismatches in the maturity structure of  the balance 
sheets of  domestic financial  intermediaries, when short-term external 
funds  were used to finance  longer-term domestic credits. This issue was 
particularly severe in the dollarized segment of  the domestic financial  sys-
tem and in those cases in which external interbank credit lines were used 
as a major source of  domestic financing.  Consequently, the region moved 
into a vulnerability  zone,  with the economy becoming increasingly sensi-
tive to adverse political or economic news and "hostage to the whims and 
fancies  of  a few  country analysts in London, Frankfurt  and New York."8 
This situation was likely to "put the economy at the mercy of  the capital 
markets' occasionally whimsical moods."9 The longer and deeper the econ-
omy's incursion into that zone, the more severe was the financierist  trap  in 
which authorities could get caught, and the lower the probability of  leav-
ing it without undergoing a crisis.10 
Mexico and Argentina, were particularly vulnerable in 1994, while 
Chile had deliberately avoided venturing into the vulnerability zone. 
Meanwhile, East and Southeast Asian countries were just starting to take 
that risk in the first  half  of  che 1990s, and the resulting mismatches in the 
maturity structure of  the balance sheets of  domestic financial  intermedi-
aries proved to be even more severe than a worsening net debt position. 
By the next cycle, several economies in both Asia and Latin America had 
penetrated deep into the vulnerability zone. Both regions suffered  severe 
crises when the mood of  the external market changed. 
Worsening of  Macroeconomic Fundamentals Led by Inflows 
The economic activity of  Latin American countries exhibited signifi-
cant vulnerability to changes in international financial  markets over the 
last three decades, which worked as an intensely procyclical factor  for  the 
8. Rodrik (1998). 
9. Calvo (1998). 
10. The financierist  trap refers  to a macroeconomic policy approach that leads to an extreme pre-
dominance of  or dependency on agents specializing in microfinance,  positioned in the short-term and 
liquid segments of  the market. 
emerging economies. This vulnerability was associated with the volatility 
of  international markets since the 1970s, as well as with the procyclical 
macroeconomic policies adopted by recipient countries. Several Asian 
emerging economies followed  suit in the 1990s. 
Annual GDP growth rose in Latin American countries from  1.3 per-
cent in the 1980s to 4.1 percent between 1991 and 1994 and 4.5 percent 
in 1996 and 1997. Recessive adjustments took place in 1995 and 1998-99 
(see table 1-1). Overall, GDP rose by a mere 3.3 percent in the decade 
(1991-2000). Given that GDP was highly unstable, however, the precise 
figure  depends on the period chosen. For 1990-99 the growth rate was 2.8 
percent, because the period starts and ends with a recession. From peak to 
peak (between 1989 and 2000), average growth was 2.9 percent. 
A growth of  productive capacity of  around 3 percent (1.3 percent per 
capita) is remarkably low compared with the expectations generated by the 
structural reforms.  Comparison with the previous golden age is striking. 
During the three decades from  1950 and 1980, GDP growth averaged 5.5 
percent a year (2.7 percent per capita), with rather high domestic invest-
ment ratios sustaining these vigorous rates. In the 1980s, gross domestic 
investment dropped sharply, by 7 percentage points of  GDP. The recovery 
in the 1990s was weak (see figure  1-1). In fact,  investment grew much less 
during this decade than did capital inflows;  a significant  proportion of  ex-
ternal flows  thus financed  increased consumption, crowding out domestic 
savings.11 
Recovery  from  Recession 
The domestic conjuncture has crucial implications for  the link be-
tween capital flows  and economic activity. When there is a binding exter-
nal constraint, any inflow  will contribute to relaxing it, thus facilitating  a 
recovery of  economic activity. Binding external constraints predominated 
during several episodes in many Latin American countries, and they were 
particularly widespread from  the early 1980s up to 1990, in 1995 and in 
1998-2000. 
In the early 1990s, renewed capital inflows  thus contributed to a recov-
ery of  economic activity, and they facilitated  the adoption of  successful 
anti-inflationary  adjustments. Argentina and Peru, for  example, both fea-
tured huge underutilization of  capacity and hyperinflation;  the disappear-
11. See Ffrench-Davis  (2000, chap. 1 and 5); Uthoff  and Titelman (1998). 
Table 1-1. Latin  America  and  East  Asia:  Gross  Domestic  Product,  1971—2000 
Annual growth rate (percent) 
Region  and 
country 1971-80 1981-89 1990 1991-94 1995 1996-97 1998-99 1991-2000 
Latin America 
(19 countries)3 5.6 1.3 -0 .6 4.1 1.1 4.5 1.2 3.3 
Argentina 2.8 -0 .7 -2 .0 8.0 -2 .9 6.7 0.4 4.2 
Brazil 8.6 2.3 -4 .6 2.8 4.2 3.0 0.5 2.7 
Chile 2.5 3.0 3.3 7.5 9.1 6.9 1.5 6.1 
Colombia 5.4 3.7 4.3 4.3 5.2 2.8 -2 .1 2.6 
Mexico 6.7 1.5 5.1 3.5 -6 .1 6.1 4.3 3.5 
Peru 3.9 - 0 . 7 -6 .0 5.1 8.6 5.4 1.0 4.5 
Venezuela 1.8 - 1 .5 5.5 3.2 - 1 . 9 3.4 -3 .6 2.1 
1971-80 1981-90 1991-92 1993-96 1997 1998 1999 1991-2000 
East Asia 
(6 countries)1* 8.1 7.0 7.3 7.3 4.8 -4 .2 6.5 5.6 
Indonesia 7.7 5.5 8.1 7.7 4.7 - 13 .2 0.2 4.2 
Korea 9.0 8.8 7.3 7.3 5.0 -6 .7 10.7 6.1 
Malaysia 7.8 5.2 9.2 9.7 7.5 -7 .5 5.4 7.1 
Philippines 5.9 1.7 -0 .1 4.2 5.2 -0 .6 3.3 2.8 
Taiwan 9.3 8.5 7.5 6.7 6.7 4.6 5.7 6.5 
Thailand 7.9 7.9 8.3 8.0 - 1 . 7 -10 .2 4.2 4.5 
Source: For Latin America, the United Nations Economic Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean (F.CLAC). For East Asia, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International  Financial  Statistics,  November 2000; Asian Development Bank; J.P. Morgan. 
a. National accounts expressed in U.S. dollars at 1980 prices for  1971-80, at 1990 prices for  1981-89, and at 1995 prices for  1990-2000. 
b. In each period, each country's GDP was weighted by its average share in the regional output, expressed in current dollars. 
Figure 1 -1. Latin  America:  Gross  Fixed  Investment,  1977—2000 







Source: Author's calculations, based on KCLAC figures,  scaled ro constant 1995 prices, 
ance of  the binding external constraint and the reintroduction of  macroec-
onomic discipline to combat hyperinflation  were strongly complementary. 
The monetary effects  of  reserve accumulation and the wealth effects  of  ex-
change rate appreciation tended to push up aggregate demand, which facil-
itated the recovery of  economic activity. At the other end of  the spectrum, 
capacity underutilization was not significant  in Chile and Mexico. Conse-
quently, the positive link between capital flows  and GDP growth was not 
automatic, but rather was contingent on the capacity to transform  addi-
tional external financing  into increased productive investment. 
On average, Latin American GDP rose faster  in 1991-94 than the ex-
pansion of  the production frontier  thanks to increased capacity utilization. 
An estimated one-third of  the 4.1 percent annual GDP growth in 
1991-94 was based on this factor.  In 1995, the binding external constraint 
again became a crucial variable, with GDP growth lagging behind capac-
ity growth. Renewed capital inflows  in the following  years contributed to 
a recovery of  economic activity, based to some extent on the excess capac-
ity generated in 1995. However, the return of  a binding external constraint 
in 1998-99, particularly in South America, led to a new recession. 
One implication of  this analysis is that any serious research should 
control for  the huge swings in the rate of  capacity utilization when meas-
uring productivity and the performance  of  policies and reforms.  In the 
25.9 
n 23.7 
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presence of  excess capacity, recovery naturally yields high private and so-
cial returns, but they are built on preexisting disequilibria, that is, on for-
gone profits,  wages, taxes, and employment that exist whenever the 
economy is operating below its productive frontier  or economically poten-
tial GDP. Whether economic recovery opens the way to more sustained 
growth depends crucially on two dimensions. First, the speed at which ca-
pacity is expanded—through physical investment, investment in people, 
and productivity gains—determines future  potential growth. Second, the 
sustainability of  the macroeconomic environment that develops during 
the recovery—namely, exchange and interest rates, current account defi-
cit, domestic financial  vulnerability, fiscal  accounts, and asset prices—de-
termines whether growth in aggregate demand can be sustained or 
whether it will be subject to corrections associated with imbalances accu-
mulated during recovery. 
Overshooting  in  Emerging  Asia  and  Latin  America 
The increased availabil ity of  financing  in the 1990s removed the bind-
ing external constraint that had been responsible for  the decade-long re-
cession in Latin America. The bases for  growth were not laid down, 
however, as investment did not increase rapidly and macroeconomic im-
balances built up. Effective  output thus approached the production fron-
tier, while exchange rate appreciation led to overvaluation.12 Asset markets 
also overshot, and a large stock of  mostly liquid external liabilities accu-
mulated (see figure  1-2). The region's economies therefore  became more 
vulnerable to future  negative external shocks. With some variation, this 
story applies to both 1991-94 and 1995-97, reproducing the path toward 
the crisis of  1976-81. 
In 1995, the tequila crisis had negligible effects  on the Asian region, 
even in economies with large current account deficits,  such as Malaysia 
and Thailand. Many outstanding researchers and observers therefore  as-
serted in 1996 that such deficits  were not relevant if  investment ratios and 
economic growth were high. Several Asian countries had successfully  reg-
ulated capital inflows  and foreign  exchange markets for  long periods.13 Ec-
onomic growth was actually sustained and extremely high. From 1970 to 
12. Several Latin American countries implemented sharp import liberalization at the same time that 
the exchange rate was appreciating. See Ffrench-Davis  (2000, chap. 3) and F.CLAC (1998, chap. 5; 
for  an English version, see ECI.AC 1995). The average import tariff  was cut from  45 percent in the 
mid-1980s to 13 percent in the mid-1990s; nontariff  restrictions were also reduced significantly. 
13. On Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, see Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996); on Korea and 
Taiwan, see Agosin (in this volume). 
Figure 1-2. Latin  America  and  East  Asia:  Current  Account  Balance, 
1990-2000» 









Source: EC.LAC; IMF. 
a. Ease Asia includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Lacin America includes nineteen 
countries. 
1996, yearly GDP growth averaged 8 percent in Korea, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Taiwan, and Thailand (see table 1-1 above). The investment ratio fre-
quently exceeded 33 percent, with domestic savings ratios at a similar level. 
Inflation  was low (in the range of  5 percent a year), and fiscal  budgets were 
generally balanced or in surplus (with the exception of  Taiwan). Mean-
while, average GDP growth in Latin America was 2 percent and the in-
vestment ratio fluctuated  around 20 percent. 
What is the explanation for  the sudden worsening in Asia? First, export 
performance  in several Asian economies weakened. Export sectors that had 
been experiencing notably dynamic demand suddenly faced  tightening 
markets, either as a result of  a temporary excess supply or because specific 
markets were reaching maturity.14 The long Japanese crisis contributed to 
the intensity of  these problems. 
Second, the global drive toward financial  liberalization had also per-
meated several Asian economies in the 1990s.15 China, India, and Taiwan 
were three notable exceptions. Capital inflows  and current account deficits 
increased substantially in Korea and Thailand from  1993 on. External im-
14. Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
15. Agosin (in this volume); Ariff  and Fan (2000); Akyüz (1998); Furman and Stiglitz (1998); Jomo 
(1998); Wang (2000). 
balances were not associated with public deficits  and did not imply losses of 
international reserves: in fact,  in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, 
international reserves, fed  by capital inflows,  accumulated consistently be-
tween 1992 and early 1997, more than doubling in the period. All the data 
indicate that the cause of  disequilibria was a rise in private expenditure led 
by capital inflows,  which allowed liquidity constraints to be relaxed. The 
induced domestic lending boom was accompanied by bubbles in real estate 
and stock market prices. In some cases, real exchange rate appreciation and 
import liberalization led to cheaper imports, which further  fed  the import 
boom. 
Third, most inflows  were short term or liquid, including a large pro-
portion of  interbank lending.16 Domestic balance sheets became quite vul-
nerable as a result of  maturity and currency mismatches and the rapid rise 
of  firms'  leverage.17 Weak prudential supervision of  the financial  system, 
which had not been a real threat in the previously repressed domestic mar-
kets, became evident with financial  liberalization and the lending boom. 
In these Asian economies, vulnerability was thus associated with wors-
ening macroeconomic fundamentals  led by a capital surge, which carried 
over to an exchange rate appreciation (moderate compared to that in Latin 
America), a boom in aggregate private demand (with a significant  enlarge-
ment of  the current account deficit  by 5 percentage points of  GDP in 
Korea, 2 points in Indonesia, and 3 points in Thailand), and an increased 
vulnerability of  the balance sheets of  domestic financial  intermediaries. 
The disequilibrium was recognized by financial  markets only in 1997 and 
resulted in a weighty bill in 1998. The policy failure  was an error shared 
with the rather similar financial  reforms  conducted in Chile in the 1970s 
and in Mexico in the 1990s.18 
Why  the  Market  Fails  to  Avoid  Overshooting 
On the whole, the authorities took a procyclical approach in both 
Latin America and Asia, allowing capital surges to be transmitted domesti-
cally. They therefore  fell  into a fmancierist  trap,  from  which it is extremely 
difficult  to escape without a traumatic adjustment, involving outlier ex-
change or interest rates and considerable liquidity constraints that together 
generate a very unfriendly  macroeconomic environment for  firms  and 
16. IMF (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
17. Sec Krugman (1999). 
18. FfrenclvDavis  and Tapia (in this volume); Ros (in this volume). 
labor. Most authorities (as well as observers) took the view that nothing 
could or should be done during the expansive stages, or they preferred  to 
benefit  a little longer from  the capital boom. The ex post consensus among 
observers, however, was that disequilibria had accumulated. 
Given that voluntary flows  cannot take place without the willing con-
sent of  both debtors and creditors, why did neither agent act in due time 
to curb the inflows  well before  a crisis? Some specialists recognized and 
warned of  the growing vulnerability in all three episodes examined. Why, 
then, did the market fail  to avoid major crises? 1 9 Asymmetries of  informa-
tion among creditors, lack of  adequate internalization of  the negative ex-
ternalities that each agent generates (through growing vulnerability), and 
other imperfections  of  international capital underlie the cycles of  abun-
dance and shortage of  external financing.20  These factors  contribute to 
herd behavior, cross-border contagion, and multiple equilibria. 
Over and above these features,  however, the particular nature of  the 
agents acting on the creditor side is crucially important. Short-term hori-
zons were a significant  factor  in the 1990s, as reflected  in the volatility of 
flows  that characterized the boom-bust cycles. The gradual spread of  in-
formation  on investment opportunities is another key influence.  Investors 
from  different  segments of  the financial  market were steadily drawn into 
international markets as they took notice of  the profitable  opportunities 
offered  by emerging economies. This explains why the three surges of 
flows  to emerging economies were processes  that went on for  several years, 
rather than one-shot changes in supply. 
On the domestic side, many Latin American economies were experi-
encing recession, depressed stock and real estate markets, high interest rates, 
and initially undervalued exchange rates; capital surges directed to these 
economies therefore  could expect potentially high rates of  return.21 Indeed, 
in the early 1990s, prices of  equity stocks and real estate were extremely 
depressed in Latin America. That allowed for  a 300 percent average capital 
gain in the Latin American stock markets between late 1990 and September 
1994, with rapidly rising price-to-earnings ratios (see table 1-2).22 Average 
19. For instance, see a warning advice on Latin America, as early as in mid-1992, reproduced in 
Ffrench-Davis  (2000, chap. 9). 
20. McKinnon (1991); Rodrik (1998); Stiglitz (2000); Wyplosz (1998). 
21. A similar outcome tends to result in an emerging economy moving from  a closed to an open 
capital account. The rate of  return is naturally higher in the productive sectors of  capital-scarce emerg-
ing economies than in mature markets that are capital rich. 
22. Figures in current dollars; the real rate of  return is obtained by adding distributed profits  and 
subtracting dollar inflation. 
Table 1-2. Latin  America  and  East  Asia:  Stock  Exchange  Prices,  1990-200017 
Indexes (July 1997 = 100) 
Region  and 
country Dec  1990 Sep  1992 Sep  1994 Mar  1995 July  1997 Aug  1998 Dec  1999 Nov  2000 
Latin America 
(7 countries) 21.7 44.6 92.5 52.3 100.0 47.2 84.0 67.9 
Argentina 13.4 46.9 78.2 53.5 100.0 53.4 86.7 64.6 
Brazil 8.0 22.1 71.8 42.8 100.0 44.4 73.5 61.0 
Chile 1/ C ¿.-t. ! C 1 Á ? 1 n 1 
yj. i 
no /• O V."i 100.0 48.0 75.3 64.6 
Colombia 16.6 65.0 113.1 96.3 100.0 49.9 44.9 26.0 
Mexico 38.6 72.7 132.1 45.9 100.0 49.7 110.8 93.0 
Peru n.a. n.a. 72.9 56.4 100.0 57.3 66.0 47.7 
Venezuela 84.9 82.2 50.8 37.9 100.0 26.2 37.4 44.7 
East Asia 
(6 countries) n.a. 49.9 110.0 97.9 100.0 37.0 101.6 59.5 
Indonesia n.a. 53.7 84.2 71.6 100.0 11.1 37.0 15.8 
Korea n.a. 87.6 187.2 161.9 100.0 30.2 135.5 62.9 
Malaysia n.a. 63.7 119.0 103.5 100.0 16.8 49.9 42.1 
Philippines n.a. 67.1 134.6 108.6 100.0 30.4 61.0 32.9 
Taiwan n.a. 37.1 80.9 73.5 100.0 47.6 84.1 50.0 
Thailand n.a. 133.9 279.8 236.3 100.0 19.0 59.1 27.5 
Source: Authors' calculations, based on data from  the International Financial Corporation and Standard & Poor's, Emerging  Stock  Market  Review,  several 
issues. 
a. The averages for  Latin America and Hast Asia are weighted by amount of  transactions. Values correspond ro the end of  each period, expressed in current 
dollars, excluding distributed earnings. Selecred dates correspond to peaks and minimum levels for  the Latin American average. 
prices dropped sharply around the time of  the tequila crisis, which produced 
contagion to all Latin American stock markets, and then nearly doubled 
between March 1995 and June 1997, pushed up directly by portfolio  in-
flows. 
Domestic interest rates tended to be high at the outset of  surge epi-
sodes, reflecting  the binding external constraint faced  by most countries 
during periods of  sharp reductions in capital inflows,  the restrictive mon-
etary policies then in place, and the short-term bias of  the financial  re-
forms  implemented in Latin America.23 Finally, the increased supply of 
external financing  generated a process of  exchange rate appreciation in 
most Latin American countries (see table 1-3). This encouraged additional 
inflows  from  dealers operating with maturity horizons within the expected 
appreciation of  the domestic currency. 
The interaction between the two sets of  factors—the  nature of  inves-
tors and the adjustment process—explains the dynamics of  capital flows 
over time. When creditors discover an emerging market, their initial expo-
sure is nonexistent. They then generate a series of  consecutive flows,  which 
result in rapidly increasing stocks of  financial  assets in the emerging mar-
ket. The creditor's sensitivity to negative news, at some point, is likely to 
suddenly increase remarkably with the stock of  assets held in a country (or 
region) and with the debtor's degree of  dependence on additional flows, 
which is associated with the magnitude of  the current account deficit,  the 
refinancing  of  maturing liabilities, and the amount of  liquid liabilities 
likely to flow  out of  the country in the face  of  a crisis. The probability of 
a reversal of  expectations about future  trends therefore  grows steeply after 
a significant  increase in asset prices and exchange rates accompanied by ris-
ing stocks of  external liabilities. 
The accumulation of  stocks and a subsequent reversal of  flows  can 
both be considered to be rational responses on the part of  individual sup-
pliers, given the short-term horizon of  the principal agents on the supply 
side. Investors with short horizons are little concerned with whether cap-
ital surges improve or worsen long-term fundamentals  while they continue 
to bring inflows.  What is relevant to these investors is whether the crucial 
indicators from  their point of  view—exchange rates and real estate, bond, 
and stock prices—can continue providing them with profits  in the near 
term and, obviously, that liquid markets allow them to quickly reverse 
decisions. They will continue pouring money in until expectations of  an 
23. See Ffrench-Davis  (2000, chap. 2). 
Table 1-3. Latin  America:  Real  Exchange  Rate,  1987—2000a 
Indexes (1987-90 = 100) 
Country 1987-90 1994:4 1995:1 1997:3 1999:1 2000:3 
Argentina 100.0 63.1 63.8 65.6 56.6 56.9 
Brazil 100.0 74.3 71.5 64.4 102.8 91.4 
Chile 100.0 96.4 97.1 80.2 85.8 91.7 
Colombia 100.0 80.4 79.7 71.2 80.3 97.4 
Mexico 100.0 75.9 116.3 81.4 81.9 69.2 
Peru LOO.O 59.3 59.9 56.0 64.5 62.0 
Weighted average 
(18 countries) 100.0 75.9 83.9 71.3 85.3 78.7 
Source: Authors' calculations, based on official  ECLAC figures. 
a. Quarterly averages of  real exchange rate indexes for  each country with respect to the currencies 
of  their main trading partners, weighted by the share of  exports to those countries; inflated  by 
external CPI and deflated  bv domestic CPI. For Brazil we weighted the Rio CPI index (two-thirds) 
and the new official  series of  inflation  (one-third). Selected quarters correspond to peaks and 
minimum levels for  the Latin American average. 
imminent near reversal start to build. For the most influential  financial 
operators, the more relevant variables are not related to long-term funda-
mentals at all, but rather to short-term profitability.  This explains why 
they may suddenly display a radical change of  opinion about the economic 
situation of  a country whose fundamentals,  other than liquidity in foreign 
currency, remain essentially unchanged during a shift  from  overoptimism 
to overpessimism. 
The widespread belief  that withholding of  information  prevented the 
Mexican crisis of  1994 being foreseen  is therefore  mistaken. While the 
provision of  official  information  on international reserves was admittedly 
only sporadic, the key data—namely, real exchange rate appreciation, the 
high current account deficit  and its financing  with volatile resources, and 
low GDP growth despite booming flows—were  available on a regular 
basis. Data were also available on the significant  crowding out of  domes-
tic savings. However, Mexican policies were widely praised in 1993 by 
financial  institutions, the media, and risk evaluators.24 The incorporation 
of  Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
the Organization for  Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
in 1994 served to intensify  the trend. The crucial problem was that nei-
24. Gurria (1995, p. 281). 
ther those on the supply side nor those on the demand side paid sufficient 
attention to the available information  until after  the crisis erupted. 
It is no coincidence that in all three surges, loan spreads underwent a 
sustained fall  while the stock of  liabilities rose sharply, lasting for  five  to 
six years in the 1970s, for  three to four  years before  the tequila crisis, and 
for  over a couple of  years after  that crisis. This implies a downward slop-
ing medium-run supply during the expansive phase of  the cycle, which is 
a highly destabilizing feature  indeed (see figure  1-3). 
One particularly relevant issue is that firms  specializing in microfi-
nance, which may be highly efficient  in their field  but which are short-
sighted by training and by reward, have come to play a determining role in 
generating macroeconomic conditions and policy design. This leads, unsur-
prisingly, to unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances, outlier macroeco-
nomic prices, and an undermined environment for  productive investment, 
particularly in tradables. Authorities should obviously be making decisions 
with a long-term view, yet they become seduced by the lobbying and policy 
recipes of  microfinance  experts and the financial  press, which leads to irra-
tional exuberance (to use Alan Greenspan's expression) despite evidence of 
inefficiency  in resource allocation and total factor  productivity. Macroeco-
nomic authorities need to undertake the responsibility of  giving priority to 
fundamentals  in order to achieve macroeconomic balances that are both 
sustainable and functional  for  long-term growth. This requires that they 
avoid entering vulnerability  zones  during economic booms based on capital 
surges, since policy design is otherwise prone to being caught in ú\c  finan-
cier  is  t  trap. 
The Economic and Social Costs of  the Tequila and Asian 
Crises in Selected Countries 
The economic literature commonly asserts that the only correct way to 
conduct policy is with an open capital account, as Mexico and Korea did in 
the 1990s. In reality, however, there is significant  room for  policy diversity. 
Chile and Taiwan provide two striking examples of  policy diversity and suc-
cessful  prudential macroeconomic management of  the capital account. 
Mexico  and  the  Tequila  Crisis 
The Mexican crisis that exploded in 1994 illustrates the harm that can 
be caused when the absorption of  an excessive volume of  capital inflows 
Figure 1-3. Latin  America:  International  Bond  Issues,  1992—2000 
Issues 
Billions of  dollars per quarter 
1992:1 1992:3 1993:1 1993:3 1994:1 1994:3 995:1 1995:3 1996:1 1996:3 1997:1 1997:3 1998:1 1998:3 1999:1 1999:3 2000:1 2000:3 
Costs and Maturities 
Cost (percent) Maturity (no. of  years) 
1992:1 1992:3 1993:1 1993:3 1994:1 1994:3 1995:1 1995:3 1996:1 1996:3 1997:1 1997:3 1998:1 1998:3 1999:1 1999:3 2000:1 2000:3 
Source: ECLAC: World Bank; IMF. 
a. Total annualized cosr is equal to average differential  on bond issues plus long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. 
leads to the accumulation of  a large stock of  mostly short-term or liquid ex-
ternal liabilities and to a domestic credit boom.25 Between 1990 and 1994, 
producers and consumers accommodated to a level of  overall expenditure 
that rapidly outstripped potential GDP: expenditures exceeded effective 
25. Ros (in this volume); Sachs, 'lornell, and Velasco (1996). 
GDP by 8 percent in 1992-94. The real exchange rate appreciated signifi-
cantly, contributing to the sharp rise of  the external deficit.  Since the public 
sector was in balance, the disequilibrium was located in the private sector. 
When expectations of  profitability  were reversed, the amounts involved be-
came unsustainable. Creditors cut financing  sharply, forcing  Mexico into a 
highly contractionary adjustment and a huge devaluation after  the author-
ities adopted the flexible  exchange rate. Despite the large package of  inter-
national support that Mexico received in 1995,26 GDP dropped that year by 
6.1 percent and capital formation  by nearly 30 percent. 
GDP recovered strongly shortly thereafter,  but the overall rise in GDP 
averaged only 3-5 percent in 1995-2000. The growth trend continued to be 
slow despite the fact  that Mexico received a positive shock from  the U.S. 
boom: export volume expanded vigorously by 17 percent a year in 1995-
2000, four-fifths  ofwhich  was dircctcd to the U.S. markets. The investment 
ratio, which dropped sharply in 1995, did not fully  recover until 1998. Real 
wages decreased substantially during the crisis and had not recovered by 
2000. This was also true of  poverty, which increased from  45 to 52 percent 
of  the population between 1994 and 1996. Though the indicator fell  back 
to 47 percent in 1998, it had still not returned to pre-crisis levels by 2000.27 
The Mexican crisis did not trigger a widespread contagion effect 
throughout the region in 1995, in contrast to 1982. The most notable ex-
ception was Argentina, which experienced significant  drops in GDP, em-
ployment, and investment in 1995- Nonetheless, many countries recorded 
negative flows  in several segments of  the supply of  financing,  particularly 
bonds, deposits, and flows  to stock markets. Subsequently, the flow  of  funds 
became extremely abundant again. GDP recovery in Argentina and Mexico 
was particularly vigorous, since the sharp drop in both countries in 1995 
had generated a large gap between effective  GDP and productive capacity. 
This facilitated  a significant  degree of  reactivation, which led to compla-
cency—not only in those countries, but also in international financing  in-
stitutions and elsewhere—regarding the effects  of  crises and the capacity to 
recover from  them. However, as said above, growth in Mexico was slow for 
the six-year period 1995-2000 as a whole, and it was even slower in Argen-
tina (1.7 percent), which entered into another severe recession in 
1999-2000. 
Significant  differences  also emerged between Argentina and Mexico. 
Mexico moved from  a quasi-fixed  nominal exchange rate to a flexible  rate in 
26. Lustig (1997). 
27. ECLAC (2000c). 
1995, which facilitated  the adjustment to the financial  shocks generated by 
the Asian crisis. Also, the country experienced a sizable positive shock 
associated with the rapid growth of  the U.S. economy in 1998-2000. Ar-
gentina, meanwhile, was tied to the currency board; this limited the coun-
try's ability to confront  the negative shocks from  Asia, from  the devaluation 
of  the Brazilian currency, and from  the revaluation of  the dollar. Argentina's 
inability to facilitate  the correction of  relative prices through the active use 
of  the nominal exchange rate was intensified  by the strong international ap-
preciation of  the dollar and the persistent dryness in the supply of  external 
funding.  Indeed, the international capital markets underwent lengthy dry 
periods during the recent crisis, despite the boom in the U.S. economy and 
the acceleration in Europe in 2000. This indicates that financial  markets 
may tend to recover slowly and incompletely, as was clearly the case in the 
1980s. 
Korea  and  the  Asian  Crisis 
The East Asian countries suffered  deep recessions in 1998, after 
decades of  sustained annual GDP growth of  around 8 percent. Indonesia 
exhibited a 13 percent recession, similar to the spectacular drop of  Chi-
lean GDP during the 1982 recession. Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand re-
corded reductions of  7 to 10 percent. The nature of  the crises varied across 
countries in Asia. The Korean and Thai experiences, however, appeared to 
be associated with the capital surge of  the 1990s and the resulting liquid-
ity. During 1999-2000, Korea (and Malaysia) recovered faster  than the 
other countries of  the region. Notwithstanding Korea's impressive GDP 
growth in 1999 and 2000, the costs have been significant:  in the period 
1998-2000, GDP was about 12 percent below what it would have been 
had the historical trend continued, and investment fell  by over one-fifth 
in 1998-99 as compared to 1993-96 (28.9 percent and 36.4 percent, re-
spectively). Since the country also achieved an impressive external surplus 
of  9 percent of  GDP in 1998-99, versus a deficit  of  almost 5 percent in 
1996, disposable income was well below output. 
The recessions in East Asia are comparable to those of  Latin America in 
1982-83, with drops in productive investment, banking crises, and social 
regression.28 Apart from  the intrinsic strengths of  the Korean economic 
28. For interpretations of  the Asia i crisis, see Krugman (1999); Akyiiz (1998); Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998); Perry and Lederman (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Reisen (1998); Stiglitz (1998); Wang 
(2000); Wyplosz (1998). 
structure and of  several other Asian economies (excluding Indonesia), four 
features  of  the international economic environment largely explain why the 
shift  from  recession to recovery came sooner in Asia than in the Latin 
American debt crisis: the plentiful  supply of  official  external financing; 
rapid action spearheaded by the United States to refinance  private credits, 
particularly interbank lending; significantly  lower interest rates in the ad-
vanced economies; and higher growth rates, especially in the United States. 
The countercyclical policy implemented by the Korean public sector also 
played a significant  role in the recovery; consequently, the fiscal  balance 
swung from  a surplus of  0.3 percent of  GDP in the period 1993-96 to a 
deficit  of  4.7 percent in 1998-99. 
Until the early 1990s, Korea had extensive capital account regulations, 
based on a combination of  market forces  and state guidance.29 In 1991, the 
country began implementing a broad range of  measures aimed at liberaliz-
ing the capital account. Contrary to what is commonly assumed by observ-
ers, greenfield  FDI—not acquisitions—was deregulated. Local firms  and 
banks were allowed to issue securities abroad, and foreigners  were author-
ized to purchase stocks in Korean companies subject to limits that were 
raised progressively starting in 1992. Foreign currency loans to local firms, 
trade credit, and short-term financing  were also liberalized. Only long-
term borrowing and acquisitions remained restricted. Under the new regu-
lations, Korean banks and firms  were permitted to engage in arbitrage 
between international lenders and local markets by borrowing short abroad 
and, in some cases, lending long at home. This practice would not have 
been allowed under the regulations prevailing before  the liberalization drive 
in the early 1990s. In addition, Korea's sound creditworthiness afforded 
local firms  lower spreads and more expeditious access to funding,  which 
they used, in part, to borrow for  financing  investment and lending in other 
Asian markets.30 
Capital inflows  expanded hugely after  liberalization and included pur-
chases of  stock shares, bond issues, and private loans to banks and nonfi-
nancial firms.  Liabilities became highly liquid, with short-term debt 
reaching twice the level of  international reserves in 1996. This was not ac-
companied, however, by strengthened prudential regulation and supervi-
sion, in a replication of  the negative Latin American experience.31 
29. See Agosin (in this volume); Furman and Stiglitz (1998); Wang (2000). 
30. In May 1995, one of  the large international risk-rating agencies upgraded the sovereign credit 
rating of  Korea (see Wang, 2000). In june 1997, the World Economic Forum classified  Korea as the 
fifth  most secure place to invest in the world (see Dean, 1998). 
31. See ECLAC (1998, chap. 12). For an English version, see ECLAC (1995). 
The process of  liberalizing the capital account caused the exchange 
rate to appreciate with respect to the currencies in which borrowing took 
place, which encouraged further  borrowing. Korea accommodated the 
capital surplus through import liberalization and currency appreciation, 
together with a relaxation of  domestic liquidity constraints. The combined 
effect  of  increased imports and worsening export prices explain the rise in 
the current account deficit  to 5 percent of  GDP in 1996. Net inflows  rose 
from  U.S.$7 billion in 1992 to U.S.$24 billion in 1996, but gross inflows 
amounted to U.S.$49 billion. 
The opening of  the capital account represented a source of  vulnerabil-
ity, exacerbated by poor bank regulation and supervision. It left  Korea 
prone to contagion, even chough the fundamentals  were generally sound. 
In fact,  Agosin (in this volume) concludes that "the main factor  behind the 
Korean debacle was the liberalization of  the capital account, without the 
concurrent adoption of  adequate bank regulation and prudential macro-
economic measures to discourage excessive capital inflow." 
Chile  and  Taiwan:  Going  against  the  Fashion 
Is it possible to forge  ahead with policies that go against contempo-
rary economic ideology? Two cases—Chile in the first  half  of  the 1990s 
and Taiwan throughout the decade—provide evidence that it is indeed 
possible and can be an efficient  and cheap way to avoid costly crises. 
Chile deployed three types of  capital account policy in the last quar-
ter of  a century.32 The first  was the plain neoliberal experiment of  the 
1 970s, which culminated in a major crisis in 1982. That episode featured 
a drop in GDP of  14 percent, followed  by an increase in open unemploy-
ment to 30 percent in 1983. The second approach was that taken from 
1990 to 1995. In that period, authorities went against prevailing fashion 
by pursuing a set of  active macroeconomic policies that included the pru-
dential regulation of  financial  inflows.  As a result, Chile was practically un-
affected  by contagion from  the tequila crisis. The third type of  policy, 
which was implemented after  1995, involved a relative relaxation of  mac-
roeconomic prudential policies. This gave way to a significant  appreciation 
and allowed the external deficit  to double from  2.5 percent of  GDP in 
1990-95 to 5.7 percent in 1996-97. 
Chile's performance  in 1995 was diametrically opposed to that of 
Mexico, despite numerous similarities in the two economies in the preced-
32. tfrvruh-[  ):tvis and Tapia (in this volume). 
ing years. The difference  in results is attributable to the distinct divergence 
in macroeconomic policies in the first  half  of  the 1990s. Toward the end 
of  the 1980s, both countries had already liberalized their trade consider-
ably, they had substantially improved their fiscal  budgets, privatization was 
well underway, the annual rate of  inflation  was around 20-30 percent, and 
they showed similar domestic savings rates. In 1990—94, however, Chile 
and Mexico chose divergent approaches with respect to the management 
of  capital inflows,  exchange rate policy, and the prudential regulation and 
supervision of  the domestic financial  system. Chile's main advantage over 
Mexico in 1995 is that it responded to the abundance of  external funds 
from  1990 to 1994 with a deliberate policy of  active prudential macroec-
onomic regulation. 
Instead of  allowing in and spending all the available external supply, 
which would have led to significant  appreciation of  the peso and a ris-
ing current account deficit,  the Chilean authorities chose to discourage 
short-term capital inflows.  In 1991 a tax was imposed, and substantial 
non-interest-bearing reserves were required for  external credit. The reserve 
requirement was subsequently extended to foreign  currency deposits and 
investment in second-hand stocks, while primary issues of  American de-
pository receipts (ADRs) and FDI venture capital were kept exempted. 
FDI had to be held in Chile for  at least one year. The financial  system was 
subject to relatively strict prudential regulation, including a selective 
supervision of  bank assets and required provisioning, as well as restrictions 
and drastic penalties on operations with related parties. This set of  meas-
ures effectively  discouraged speculative capital inflows.33  Most empirical 
research shows that these regulations had a significant  effect  on the vol-
ume of  short-term inflows,  and, contrary to common belief,  several stud-
ies also show an effect  on total inflows.34 
The smooth transition to democracy, an increasing international ap-
proval of  Chilean economic policies, and high domestic interest rates com-
bined to boost capital inflows  to Chile after  mid-1990; the process was 
earlier and relatively stronger than in other emerging economies. As a con-
sequence of  its prudential macroeconomic policies, however, Chile had 
only a moderate external deficit  by late 1994, with high international re-
serves, a manageable short-term debt, a domestic savings rate that was ris-
33. Agosin and Ffrench-Davis  (2001); Le Fort and Lehmann (2000). 
34. See several references  in the case of  Chile in this volume. The classical paper arguing against 
the effectiveness  of  the Chilean reserve requirement is Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998). 
ing instead of  falling  (whereas the opposite was the case in Mexico), and a 
level of  domestic investmeni: that far  exceeded historical records from  1993 
onward. The exchange rate in 1990—94 was comparatively closer to equi-
librium than in most Latin American countries, as reflected  by a moder-
ate current account deficit  over that period. 
Policy was effective  in achieving its targets for  most of  the 1990s, but 
in 1996-97 the policy mix and the intensity with which it was applied re-
mained unchanged despite a new vigorous capital surge to most countries 
in the region. Chile, in particular, was a target of  these flows,  since it had 
remained immune to the tequila contagion. This surge should have been 
met with increased restrictions on rising inflows.  In the absence of  such 
measures, inflows  became excessive as investors were willing to pay the in-
sufficiently  restrictive cost of  the reserve requirement, with no evidence of 
significant  evasion; also, as Le Fort and Lehmann emphasize, some inflows 
that ought to have been made subject to regulation remained exempt. 
Although the Central Bank intervened heavily in foreign  exchange 
markets, a sharp real exchange rate appreciation and a rise of  the current ac-
count deficit  were observed over the two-year period, which pushed Chile 
into a vulnerability  zone.  Nonetheless, the active regulation implemented 
up to the mid-1990s had left  large international reserves, a low stock of  for-
eign liabilities, and a small share of  volatile flows.  Unfortunately,  those 
strengths were partially undermined by the excessive exchange rate appreci-
ation and high current account deficit  recorded in 1996—97, as well as the 
Central Bank's delay in reacting to the deterioration of  the external envi-
ronment. In particular, the Bank resisted market pressures for  devaluation, 
concerned that exchange rate depreciation would increase inflation  and 
worsen the balance sheets of  the large domestic firms  that became highly 
indebted in foreign  currency liabilities in the period. The outcome was a 
sort of  automatic adjustment featuring  a sharp loss of  reserves, a 10 percent 
fall  in aggregate demand, a I percent drop in GDP, a 3.5 percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate, and a marked drop in capital formation 
in 1999. Despite this recent recession, however, Chile achieved an average 
growth rate of  over 6 percent for  the 1990s, which was its best performance 
ever recorded in a decade. 
The case ofTaiwan  is more straightforward.  Taiwan similarly pursued 
a policy that went against the global trend, but its policy was notably 
tougher than Chile's. It kept in place a variety of  direct capital controls that 
35. Le Fort and Lehmann (2000). 
had been initiated in previous years.36 The Taiwanese dollar remained non-
convertible. The authorities restricted inflows  to banks, firms,  and the 
stock market. Acquisitions remained forbidden  (as they were in Korea until 
the crisis). Taiwan held quantitative restrictions on the stock shares that for-
eign persons and institutional investors could own. Domestic banks were 
also strictly supervised by the Central Bank. Consequently, external liabil-
ities were low at the outbreak of  the Asian crisis, because they had been re-
stricted during the preceding boom in financing  to emerging economies. 
The Taiwanese economy exhibited a notably stable dynamism, simi-
lar to that experienced in Korea for  three decades. Data on Taiwan are 
rather limited, but the available information  is quite revealing. For the 
years immediately before  the crisis (1993—96), the available information 
shows a GDP growth of  6.7 percent, with negligible capital inflows  and a 
current account surplus. Taiwan was clearly outside the capital surge. An-
other remarkable feature  of  Taiwan is that its fiscal  performance  was not-
ably different  from  that of  most emerging economies: the government ran 
a significant  budget deficit,  with public investment financed  in the domes-
tic private market. In all, domestic private savings financed  a fiscal  deficit 
of  2.7 percent of  GDP and an external surplus of  3.2 percent in 1992—96. 
The fiscal  deficit  coexisted with a stable real exchange rate and an infla-
tion rate that was lower than in Chile, Korea, or Mexico. 
Taiwan experienced some contagion and a few  attacks on the Taiwa-
nese dollar despite the palpably safe  macroeconomic environment, which 
was further  bolstered by huge international reserves (U.S.$88 billion in 
1996). The attack quickly receded, however, and an initial devaluation of 
20 percent quickly recovered by half.  In 1998—2000 only a slight down-
ward adjustment took place in economic growth, which fell  to 5.9 percent 
(as compared to 4.2 percent in Korea). The strong adherence to real mac-
roeconomic sustainability appears to have been extremely rewarding for 
Taiwan. 
Misleading Recipes and Misconceptions in Fashion 
A series of  widely accepted hypothesis or beliefs  form  part of  the con-
ventional wisdom of  the financial  world, including international financial 
institutions, although these have undergone some positive changes in their 
36. Agosin (in this volume). 
perceptions in the wake of  the Asian crisis. This section reviews five  com-
mon assertions that we believe have significant  policy and welfare  implica-
tions. These beliefs  are not validated by the actual performance  of 
international financial  markets and still less by the behavior of  domestic 
markets in emerging economies. 
Recovery  from  Recent  Crises  Has  Been  Rapid 
A first,  common assertion is that the recovery from  crises has proved 
to be fast.  This is fundamental  for  claims that authorities should allow the 
free,  self-correcting  operation of  markets, since it is assumed that attempts 
to adopt policies to counter booms or accelerate recoveries tend to gener-
ate additional instability. Given that financial  markets are the major source 
of  economic instability for  emerging economies, this line of  reasoning im-
plies that instability is inevitable but not excessively costly. 
This assumption is inconsistent with the evidence. Crises generate 
medium- and long-term effects  on financial  markets. The most significant 
case in recent decades was the effect  of  the Latin American debt crisis on 
long-term syndicated bank loans, which were then the principal mecha-
nism of  financing.  This form  of  lending disappeared after  the crisis, and 
bank lending never returned to being a major source of  financing  for  Latin 
American countries in the 1990s. Equally important, the Asian crisis had 
negative effects  on bond financing,  which have still not been surmounted. 
Issues have remained volatile, costs high, and average maturities low. The 
usual assertion that markers have recovered rapidly is based on a very par-
tial view of  external market conditions, which takes into account the abil-
ity of  emerging economies to return to the market, but not the conditions 
of  such access in terms of  stability, costs, and maturity of  financing. 
As shown above, a rapid return to positive GDP growth rates is by no 
means a good basis for  asserting that the effects  of  crises are short-lived. All 
countries that have undergone severe crises—including Korea, where re-
covery was very strong—display evidence that they were pushed into a 
lower GDP path. Three channels through which these medium-term or 
even permanent effects  on GDP are transmitted are particularly important. 
First, investment falls  sharply during a crisis, which affects  the path of  pro-
ductive capacity. Second, the bankruptcy of  firms  generates a loss of  capac-
ity, as well as a permanent loss of  the goodwill, productive and commercial 
networks, and social capital of  those firms.  Even firms  that do not go bank-
rupt may pass through a long period of  debt restructuring, in which prop-
erty rights are indeterminate; this uncertainty may affect  their perfor-
mance. Finally, domestic financial  crises may ensue if  the portfolios  of  do-
mestic financial  institutions deteriorate severely. The experience of 
emerging economies (and Japan) indicates that restoring a healthy financial 
system takes several years and generates adverse effects  throughout the pe-
riod in which it is rebuilt. 
A growing body of  evidence indicates that boom-bust cycles also have 
ratchet effects  on social variables.37 The deterioration of  the labor market 
(through open unemployment, a worsening in the quality of  jobs, or a fall 
in real wages) is generally very rapid, whereas the recovery is painfully  slow 
and incomplete. This is reflected  in the long-lasting worsening of  Argen-
tine unemployment and Mexican real wages after  the tequila crisis. It is 
also reflected  in Brazilian and Chilean joblessness following  the 1999 re-
cession, despite a fairly  positive recovery in both cases.38 The evidence on 
poverty similarly indicates that a ratchet effect  is present. As mentioned 
above, poverty in Mexico had not abated to 1994 levels despite economic 
recovery. 
Opening  the  Capital  Account  Discourages  Macroeconomic  Disequilibria 
It is commonly argued that fully  opening the capital account deters 
domestic macroeconomic mismanagement and encourages good macroec-
onomic fundamentals.  This is partly true for  domestic sources of  instabil-
ity, such as large fiscal  deficits,  permissive monetary policy, and arbitrary 
exchange rate overvaluation. The volatility in market perceptions makes 
this type of  control highly unreliable, however: financial  markets tend to 
encourage lax demand policies and exchange rate overvaluation during 
booms, whereas excessive punishment during crises may actually force 
authorities to adopt overly contractionary policies (so-called irrational 
overkill). Contrary to the usual argument, this is not associated with inap-
propriate information.  Even well-informed  market actors, such as credit 
rating agencies or investment banks, usually operate procyclically.39 
The opening of  the capital account may actually lead emerging econo-
mies to import external financial  instability, with capital inflows  engender-
37. Lustig (2000); Rodrik (2001). 
38. ECLAC (2000a). 
39. O n raring agenc ies , see I arrain, Reisen, and von Maltzan (2000). Marker discipline can also 
pose obstacles to necessary social reform  (for  instance, to higher taxes to finance  efficient  human cap-
ital investment) or to the ability to capture economic rents from  natural resources. 
ing a worsening in macroeconomic fundamentals.  Thus while market disci-
pline can serve as a check on domestic sources of  instability—albeit not a 
very efficient  one, given the whims of  opinion and expectations charac-
teristic of  financial  markets—it is a source of  externally generated instabil-
ity. Not only will the market inaccurately perceive some domestic policies as 
inadequate, it may actually induce key variables to deviate from  sustainable 
levels. In other words, it is the market itself  that generates incentives for 
emerging economies to enter a vulnerability zone during the booms. 
Financial operators evidently fulfill  a useful  microeconomic function 
as intermediaries between savers and users of  funds,  as hedgers of  risk, and 
as providers of  liquidity. In practice, however, they have perhaps unwit-
tingly come to play a role that has significant  macroeconomic implications. 
Their herd-prone expectations have contributed to intensifying  financial 
flows  toward successful  countries during capital surges, thus facilitating 
rapid increases in financial  assets and real estate prices and sharp exchange 
rate appreciation in the recipient markets. Apart from  the poor quality of 
prudential regulation and supervision in these markets, these macroeco-
nomic signals contribute to prolonging a process that appears, mislead-
ingly, to be efficient  and sustainable (with good profits  and loan guarantees, 
supported by high stock prices and the low value in domestic currency of 
dollar-denominated debt). In fact,  bubbles are being generated with outlier 
macroeconomic prices, and sooner or later the bubbles tend to burst. 
The general practice has been to encourage the recipient countries to 
accept the increasing supply of  resources from  the international financial 
institutions and financial  specialists, and to praise them for  doing so. The 
cost of  external financing  typically falls  during boom periods, which im-
plies that the market actually operates with a downward-sloping mid-run 
supply of  funds.  Excessive indebtedness and periods of  massive outflows 
ensue, often  prompting admonishment by the very agents who praised the 
economic performance  of  the emerging economies during the boom. 
There is an obvious contradiction between these two attitudes. 
Fundamentals are clearly essential. There is wide misunderstanding, 
however, about what constitutes sound fundamentals.  The inappropriate 
conventional definition,  together with irrational exuberance, led to high 
positive grades being given to Chile just before  the crisis of  1982, to Korea 
and Thailand in 1996, and to Mexico and Argentina in 1994. Something 
fundamental  was thus missing in markets' evaluation of  market fundamen-
tals! The severe crises of  these five  countries cannot all be due to bad luck or 
contagion alone. Rather, certain crucial components of  a comprehensive 
set of  fundamentals  deteriorated, led by massive capital inflows.  A satisfac-
tory definition  of  fundamentals  should thus include not only low inflation, 
sound fiscal  accounts, and dynamic exports, but also sustainable external 
deficit  and net debt, low net liquid liabilities, non-outlier real exchange 
rate, and strong prudential regulation, supervision, and transparency of  the 
financial  system. 
Corner  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  Are  the  Only  Right  Policy 
Alternatives  Today 
In today's open developing countries, the exchange rate regime is sub-
ject to two conflicting  demands, which reflect  the limited degrees of  free-
dom that authorities face  in a world of  weaker policy instruments and 
reduced policy effectiveness.  The first  demand comes from  trade: with the 
dismantling of  traditional trade policies, the real exchange rate has become 
a key determinant of  international competitiveness. The second is from 
the capital account. Boom-bust cycles in international financial  markets 
generate a demand for  flexible  macroeconomic variables to absorb, in the 
short run, the positive and negative shocks generated during the cycles. 
Given the reduced effectiveness  of  traditional policy instruments, par-
ticularly monetary policy, the exchange rate can play an essential role in 
helping to absorb these shocks. This objective, which is associated with 
short-term macroeconomic management, is not easily reconcilable with 
the trade-related goals of  exchange rate policy. 
Many analysts call for  limiting the alternatives to the two polar ex-
change rate regimes of  a totally flexible  exchange rate versus a currency 
board (or outright dollarization). The relevance of  the dual demand is not 
captured in this approach, however, whereas intermediate regimes featur-
ing managed exchange rate flexibility,  such as crawling pegs and bands and 
dirty floats,  attempt to reconcile these conflicting  demands.40 
Currency boards certainly introduce built-in institutional arrange-
ments that provide for  fiscal  and monetary discipline, but they reduce or 
even eliminate any room for  stabilizing monetary, credit, and fiscal  poli-
cies, which are all necessary for  preventing a crisis and facilitating  recov-
ery in a post-crisis environment. Currency boards thus allow the domestic 
transmission of  shocks originating in international capital markets. In so 
doing, they generate strong swings in economic activity and asset prices, 
with the corresponding accumulation of  domestic financial  vulnerability. 
40. See Frankel (1999) and Williamson (2000) on intermediate exchange rate policies. 
Ar rhe other extreme, the volatility that is characteristic of  freely  float-
ing exchange rate regimes is not a problem when market fluctuations  are 
short-lived, but it becomes a major concern when there are longer waves, 
as has been typical of  the access of  emerging economies to capital markets 
in recent decades. In this case, volatility tends to generate perverse effects 
on resource allocation. Moreover, under freely  floating  regimes with open 
capital accounts, anticyclical monetary or credit policies exacerbate cycli-
cal exchange rate fluctuations,  with their associated allocative, wealth, and 
income effects.  In fact,  authorities have to adopt procyclical monetary and 
credit policies if  they want to smooth out real exchange fluctuations  under 
these conditions. 
The ability of  a flexible  exchange rate regime to smooth out the effects 
of  externally induced boom-bust cycles thus depends on the authorities' ca-
pacity to effectively  manage a countercyclical monetary and credit policy 
without enhancing procyclical exchange rate patterns. This is only possible 
under intermediate exchange rate regimes with capital account regulation. 
Because these intermediate regimes of  managed flexibility  grant a degree of 
effective,  albeit limited, monetary autonomy, they provide the best oppor-
tunity to respond to the dual demands on exchange rate policy. Such 
regimes obviously have shortcomings and may generate costs. First, all 
intermediate regimes are subject to speculative pressures if  they do not gen-
erate credibility in markets. The costs of  defending  the exchange rate under 
these conditions are very high; at critical conjunctures it may be advisable 
to move temporarily to full  flexibility.  Second, sterilized reserve accumula-
tion during booms may also be costly. Finally, the capital account regula-
tions that are necessary for  managing intermediate regimes efficiently  are 
only partially effective.  All things considered, however, intermediate re-
gimes offer  a sound alternative to costly volatility. 
External  Savings  Tend  to  Complement  Domestic  Savings 
There is a strong correlation between investment and growth rates, 
with a significant  interaction between capital accumulation and technical 
progress.41 The Latin American experience in recent decades also provides 
compelling evidence that the way investment is financed  is not irrelevant, 
because external savings are unstable and may crowd out domestic savings. 
Moreover, the induced real exchange rate effects  of  unsustainable external 
financing  may lead to a misallocation of  resources. 
41. Schmidt-Hcbbel, Servé», and Solimano (1996). 
In the 1950s and 1960s capital flows  to developing countries were 
mostly tied to particular investments and to public users, financing  real as-
sets mostly through direct investment and official  project lending. The na-
ture of  financing  tended to generate strong complementarities between 
external and domestic savings. Commercial bank lending in the 1970s and 
private portfolio  investments in the 1990s, however, made the link between 
foreign  savings and domestic investment weaker and less direct.42 This dis-
association between capital flows  and actual investment has three implica-
tions: inflows  may increase consumption rather than investment; inflows 
do not necessarily enhance the recipient country's ability to earn foreign  ex-
change through expansion of  capacity in the tradables sector; and foreign 
investment is easily reversed, insofar  as the acquisition of  securities is essen-
tially a short-term commitment. The first  of  these effects  is associated with 
the empirical fact  that consumers and financial  asset markets tend to re-
spond more quickly to released liquidity constraints than do productive in-
vestors, who have a longer response lag because of  the irreversibility and 
long maturity of  their decisions. Nonetheless, construction generally re-
sponds faster  than other forms  of  capital formation  and is more prone to in-
vestment overshooting, given the effects  of  liquidity on asset prices. 
The diverse behavior of  markets and participants explains why the 
stability of  flows  has a significant  effect  on the relation between foreign  and 
domestic savings. Uthoff  and Titelman distinguished between the trend 
and deviations from  the trend for  foreign  and domestic savings.43 They find 
a strong crowding out of  domestic by foreign  savings when capital inflows 
are temporary (above or below the trend). Moreover, the effects  of  flows  on 
the real exchange rate distort the allocation of  investment. Real apprecia-
tion during booms may lead to a suboptimal allocation of  funds  to the ex-
pansion of  productive capacity in tradables sectors (that is, it may generate 
so-called Dutch disease effects).  This seriously weakens the mid-term ob-
jective of  penetrating external markets with new exports and strengthens 
the negative vis-à-vis the positive effects  of  trade reform.44 
Prudential  Regulation  and  Supervision  of  Banks  is  Sufficient  for  Facing 
External  Volatility 
Lax or poor prudential regulation and supervision of  domestic finan-
cial institutions obviously reinforces  disequilibria. Strong regulation and 
42. Turner (1996). 
43. Uthoff  and Titelman (1998). 
44. ECLAC (1995, 1998, 2000b); Ffrench-Davis  (2000, chap. 3); World Bank (1998). 
supervision per se does not solve the problem, however. First, a significant 
share of  capital inflows  usually is not intermediated by domestic financial 
institutions; cases in point include Chile before  the 1982 crisis and Korea 
and Mexico in the 1990s. Nonbank to nonbank flows  have become increas-
ingly important as a result of  the type of  diversification  that has taken place 
in supply. Second, expectations are in themselves volatile. This applies not 
only to expectations of  financial  intermediaries, but also to those of  na-
tional authorities and international financial  institutions. Regulation and 
supervision may influence  the transmission mechanism, but it can hardly 
affect  the source of  instability (volatility  in expectations). Third, normal 
regulatory practices (including Basel Committee criteria) have procyclical 
features.4"'  In particular, there is a lag between loan-loss provisions and over-
due loans; and in turn, these lag behind the level of  economic activity. Reg-
ulations are generally ineffective  in dampening the strong incentive to lend 
during booms because overdue loans and provisions are low, prices and 
guarantees are biased upward, and high profit  levels facilitate  meeting the 
capital requirements necessary to increase lending. During crises, the level 
of  overdue loans increases, and provisions must therefore  be increased as 
well. This reduces the capacity to expand lending by biting into capital re-
quirements, at the same time that low profits  also reduce the funds  available 
to increase the capital base of  financial  intermediaries. 
Robust Policy Lessons 
Several of  the policy lessons that we developed in earlier works are re-
inforced  by the research in this volume on the recent experiences in Asia 
and Latin America.46 We group these lessons into five  areas of  action. 
Maintain  a Sustainable  Volume,  Composition,  and  Use  of 
Capital  Inflows 
The volume of  inflows  must be consistent with the absorptive capac-
ity of  the host country. The failure  to address this point is at the core of 
recent macroeconomic instability in emerging economies. Absorption 
capacity refers,  of  course, to both the use of  existing productive capacity 
and the creation of  new capacity. The composition of  flows  is relevant for 
three reasons. First, FDI (excluding acquisitions of  existing assets) feeds  di-
45. Griffith-Jones  (in this volume): Ocampo (2001). 
46. See also Ffrench-Davis  (2000): Ocampo (1999). 
rectly into capital formation,  as do long-term loans to importers of  capi-
tal goods. Second, volatile flows  tend to have a direct impact on foreign 
exchange and stock markets and a relatively weak impact on capital for-
mation, which requires long-term financing.  Third, temporary capital 
surges tend to leak into consumption, since consumers can respond faster 
than firms  undertaking irreversible productive investment. 
Allowing an excessively large share of  capital inflows  to drain off  into 
the stock exchange and the consumption of  imported goods will usually 
create bubbles in asset markets and imbalances in the external sector, which 
tend to be unsustainable. Fast rising stocks of  net liquid foreign  liabilities, 
in particular, generate deep vulnerabilities. Consequently, higher ratios of 
long-term flows  and productive investment imply a higher capacity for 
efficient  absorption. This means not only that the economy will efficiently 
absorb a higher volume of  capital flows,  but that a higher flow  will be sus-
tainable. 
Recent experience offers  a dramatic demonstration that recipient 
emerging economies can pay a high cost for  allowing the volume and com-
position of  capital flows  to be determined by the markets dominated by 
agents with short horizons. The microeconomic costs associated with the 
use of  regulations on capital inflows  should therefore  be balanced against 
the social benefits  in terms of  macroeconomic stability, investment, and 
growth. Effective  and efficient  regulation can result in higher and sus-
tained GDP growth, as occurred in Chile and Taiwan in the 1990s. 
Avoid  Outlier  Prices  and  Ratios 
Economic authorities must ensure that capital flows  do not generate 
outlier prices or significant  distortions of  basic macroeconomic indicators, 
such as interest rates, exchange rates, aggregate demand, the composition 
of  expenditure in terms of  consumption and investment, and the produc-
tion of  tradables. An artificial  increase in absorptive capacity characterized 
by outlier appreciation and reduced interest rates usually leads to costly ad-
justment. First, real appreciation during booms tends to distort the allo-
cation of  investment, seriously weakening the structural goal of  increasing 
competitive export capacity. Second, if  productive investment capacity re-
acts with a lag and domestic financial  markets remain incomplete and 
poorly supervised, capital surges cannot be absorbed efficiently  in the do-
mestic economy and instead either leak to inefficient  investment or crowd 
out domestic savings. 
Capital surges should not be used to target a single domestic economic 
variable, such as inflation.  This tends to throw other major variables off 
balance. It is risky to remain bound to a fixed  nominal rate or to dollarize 
permanently, unless the economy shares an optimum currency area with 
the United States. As discussed above, intermediate exchange rate regimes, 
which cover a broad diversity, are generally preferable,  as they are better 
adapted to managing the dual demands they face  in emerging economies. 
Adopt  Flexible  and  Comprehensive  Macroeconomic  Regulation 
Across-the-board opening-up of  the capital account was premature. 
Countries should have postponed the process, proceeding selectively until 
other major reforms  had been consolidated and new equilibrium prices es-
tablished.47 During structural adjustment, open capital accounts tend to 
allow capital flows  to increase too fast,  especially when international fi-
nancing is abundant. This produces destabilizing macroeconomic and sec-
toral effects. 
It is therefore  unwise to make an inflexible  commitment to fully  open-
ing the capital account, particularly in the light of  the crucial importance of 
macroeconomic stability and the disproportionate volume of  the interna-
tional capital markets compared to the small size of  emerging economies. 
As long as flows  depend on short-term horizons and domestic securities 
markets remain shallow, this new modality of  linkages with the global 
economy will carry the risk of  severe instability. The recent experiences of 
Mexico, Korea, and Thailand attest to the wisdom of  discouraging the ac-
cumulation of  large short-term financial  liabilities. Domestic prudential 
macroeconomic regulations offer  the best defense  given the present inter-
national financial  architecture. If  this approach makes use of  a market-
based set of  policies, including, for  instance, the Chilean-style reserve 
requirement, its level must be adjusted to the intensity of  the supply of 
funds. 
Sustaining economic growth in the face  of  volatile capital flows  re-
quires the deployment of  a battery of  policy instruments, including pru-
dential price-based capital account regulations to deter speculative inflows 
and improve their maturity structure; an exchange rate regime based on a 
crawling band with intramarginal intervention or managed flexibility;  the 
sterilization of  the monetary effects  of  capital inflows;  strong prudential 
47. Williamson (1993). 
regulation and supervision of  the financial  system, with countercyclical de-
vices; and strong fiscal  accounts, also with countercyclical mechanisms. 
Reserve requirements alone (or any other policy that increases the cost of 
external borrowing), while clearly useful,  are insufficient  for  deterring 
speculative attacks when large exchange rate fluctuations  are anticipated. 
Obviously, this implies that authorities must make an effort  to avoid cu-
mulative exchange rate disequilibria and sharp changes in the macroeco-
nomic environment. 
Reform  the  International  Environment  for  a More  Efficient  and 
Balanced  Globalization 
The governance of  domestic and international financial  markets is key 
to the future  of  the world economy. A common factor  in recent crises has 
been the great volatility of  the most rapidly growing segment of  interna-
tional financial  markets: namely, short-term and speculative funds.  Succes-
sive waves of  overexpansion, followed  by financial  panic, indicate that the 
market tends first  to grow and then to contract more than is justified  by 
economic fundamentals.  These features  are inconsistent with a balanced 
and efficient  globalization. More energy is being spent on resolving crises 
than on avoiding them. While appropriate prudential regulation of  do-
mestic financial  markets has obviously been lacking in most of  the emerg-
ing economies affected  by the crises, the lack of  appropriate international 
and regional institutions to monitor such a sophisticated, but unstable, fi-
nancial market is even more notorious.48 
Focus  on Crisis-Prevention  Policy,  Based  on Prudential  Management 
of  Booms 
The focus  of  attention for  international and domestic institutions 
should be the management of  booms, rather than the resolution of  crises, 
which are usually the consequence of  badly managed booms. Given that 
existing international institutions and instruments have been ineffective  in 
warning of  impending turbulence and instead have actually encouraged 
unsustainable booms, it is particularly relevant to design domestic pruden-
tial macroeconomic policies and appropriate domestic regulatory frame-
works, aimed at controlling booms before  they become unsustainable. 
48. United Nations (1999); Griffith-Jones  (in this volume); Ocampo (1999, 2001). 
This principle also applies, to the design of  the international institutions 
required for  a more balanced and stable globalization. 
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MANUEL R. AGOSIN* 
2 Korea  and  Taiwan  in the  Financial  Crisis 
Korea and Taiwan fared  very differently  in the in-ternational financial  crisis that started in July 1997 
with the crash of  the Thai baht. While Taiwan came through the crisis rel-
atively unscathed, Korea experienced a major economic downturn bor-
dering on a depression, the country's first  since entering a period of  fast 
growth following  the Korean War. Prior to the onset of  the crisis, both of 
these economies were viewed by commentators, international financial  in-
stitutions, and academics as among the most successful  developing coun-
tries in the postwar era. The crisis in Korea was certainly unexpected, 
perhaps more so than in most other stricken East Asian countries. As late 
as June 1997, the World Economic Forum had classified  Korea as the fifth 
most secure place to invest in the world.1 
The similarities between Taiwan and Korea prior to Korea's descent into 
financial  distress in November 1997 are striking. Both economies had man-
aged to sustain per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates of 
*I wish to thank the many people in Korea and Taiwan who helped with research for  the prepara-
tion of  this paper, especially Inkyo Cheong, Yophy Huang, Shin-Yuan Lai. Kenneth Lin, Chao-C.hen 
Mai, Jae-Joon Park, Yung Chul Park, Julius Caesar Parrcñas, Shi Schive, James Tsuen-Hua Shih, Sang-
dal Shim, Lee-Rong Wang, Yunjong Wang, and Rong-I Wu. Thanks also to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis 
and Jaime Ros for  extensive comments on earlier drafts. 
1. Dean (1998). 
around 7 percent a year for  over three decades.2 Both started out at similarly 
low levels of  income per capita in the mid-1950s. Both based their almost 
miraculous growth rates on export-oriented industrialization and the cre-
ation of  new comparative advantages. Saving rates were high in both 
economies and especially so in Korea, whose domestic saving-to-GDP ratio 
was above 30 percent. Neither country relied on foreign  capital: both had 
repeatedly recorded current account surpluses or negligible deficits  (in 
Korea, up to 1995). Furthermore, both countries had a track record of  ex-
cellent macroeconomic management, emphasizing prudent monetary poli-
cies, stable real exchange rates, and low inflation  rates. Until the early 1990s, 
both economies had extensive controls over the capital account.3 In sum, 
both Korea and Taiwan had achieved strong, sustained economic growth 
through the harmonious blending of  market forces  and state guidance. 
The two economies also demonstrate important differences,  of  course. 
While Korean policy favored  the formation  of  large conglomerates (the 
chaebol),  Taiwanese development relied on small- and medium-size com-
panies. Korean investment rates were consistently higher than Taiwanese 
rates, but the growth of  Korean output was concentrated in more capital-
intensive sectors than Taiwan's. 
What is surprising, then, is the sudden unraveling of  the Korean mir-
acle. Korea was devastated by the financial  crisis that engulfed  the 
economies of  the clearly more troubled countries of  Southeast Asia such 
as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. In Taiwan, in contrast, the main 
manifestations  of  the crisis were a marked slowdown in export volume 
growth, a mild deceleration of  the country's fast  growth rate, and a tem-
porary depreciation of  the real exchange rate of  about 20 percent. 
This paper tries to explain the disparity in economic performance 
since the onset of  the financial  crisis in mid-1997. It finds  that the main 
factor  behind the Korean debacle was the liberalization of  the capital ac-
count, without the concurrent adoption of  adequate bank regulation and 
prudential macroeconomic measures to discourage excessive capital inflow. 
In Taiwan, the currency is still nonconvertible, and the monetary author-
ities continue to impose a variety of  capital controls, which were very suc-
cessful  in preventing a build-up of  external debt or a large inflow  of 
2. See World Bank (1993). 
3. There is extensive literature o 1 the development of  these economies and the causes of  their suc-
cess. The two classic texts arc Amscen (1989) and Wade (1990). 
portfolio  capital. Other factors  include major differences  in the structure 
of  the economy, industrial organization, and bank regulation. 
Economic Performance  up to 1997 
From 1992 to 1997, both economies grew rapidly, Korea at an aver-
age annual rate of  6.6 percent and Taiwan at 6.8 percent. Both countries 
recorded investment rates in line with their historical performance.  The 
growth rates of  export volumes were considerably higher in Korea, but 
Taiwan's export growth figures  were nonetheless quite respectable (see 
table 2-1). 
These economies were also similar in other respects. Inflation  was low 
in both countries. With regard to the public budget, Korea had a more fa-
vorable performance  than Taiwan. Korea was able to maintain its public 
finances  practically in balance, while Taiwan ran deficits.  The red ink in 
Taiwan, however, was due exclusively to investment expenditures. Taiwan 
also consistently ran public surpluses in current expenditure and income. 
The deficit  on the capital account was financed  largely with recourse to 
domestic borrowing. 
Where these economies differ  is in the balance of  payments (see table 
2-2). Korea tended to run current account deficits  in the 1990s until the 
onset of  the crisis, while Taiwan had a current account surplus equivalent 
to a couple of  points of  GDP. Up to 1996, however, the Korean deficit  was 
very moderate. In 1996, the worst year, the deficit  was almost 5 percent 
of  GDP, declining to less than 2 percent in 1997. 
The behavior of  the real exchange rate also differed  (see table 2-3). 
Korea's real exchange rate appreciated consistently but moderately during 
the period 1993-96, owing to large capital inflows.  In contrast, Taiwan's 
real exchange rate was fairly  steady in this period.4 
It would thus have been difficult  to predict the depth of  the crisis by 
looking only at real exchange rate appreciation or the cumulative current 
4. The degree of  real effective  overvaluation in both Taiwan and Korea was much greater than sug-
gested by the calculation in terms of  the U.S. dollar. The 32 percent depreciation of  the yen vis-à-vis 
the U.S. dollar between the second quarter of  1995 and the first  quarter of  1997 spelled overvalua-
tion for  all the currencies in East Asia, which were either pegged or quasi-pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
Taiwan and Korea both employed a quasi-peg. Prior to the crisis, Korea operated a crawling band ex-
change rate regime whose reference  currency was the U.S. dollar, whereas Taiwan allowed the N.T. 
dollar to fluctuate  within a narrow band around a reference  price for  the U.S. dollar. 
Table 2-1. Korea  and  Taiwan:  Indicators  of  Economic  Performance, 
1992-99 
Percent, except as indicated 
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Growth rate of  GDP 
Korea 5.4 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.7 5.0 - 6 . 7 10.7 
Taiwan 7.5 7.0 7.1 6.4 6.1 6.7 4.6 5.7 
Gross fixed  investment 
(% of  GDP) 
Korea 37.0 36.2 36.0 36.7 36.8 35.1 29.8 28.0 
Taiwan 24.1 25.2 24.6 24.9 22.5 22.8 23.5 22.9 
Export volume growth 
Korea 8.3 6.7 14.9 23.9 19.8 24.9 16.9 9.2 
Taiwan 5.3 7.2 5.5 12.8 7.1 8.7 2.4 9.6 
Export price changes 
Korea 4.8 3.2 1.8 0.9 9.7 — -16 .9 - 2 . 2 
Taiwan - 5 . 4 5.2 0.6 6.9 1.7 2.1 5.6 1.1 
Inflation  (CP1) 
Korea 6.2 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.4 7.5 0.9 
Taiwan 4.4 3.0 4.1 3.6 3.1 0.9 1.7 0.2 
Fiscal surplus 
(% of  GDP) 
Korea - 0 . 5 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 - 1 . 5 - 3 . 8 - 4 . 6 
Taiwan - 5 . 4 - 3 . 9 - 1 . 7 - 1 . 1 - 1 . 3 - 1 . 6 0.1 - 1 . 3 
Source: For Korea: Asian Development Bank, Asian  Development  Outlook,  various issues; 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International  Financial  Statistics,  Washington, various issues; 
Korea Development Institute, Major  Indicators  of  the  Korean  Economy,  Seoul, various issues; The 
European Union Chamber of  Commerce in Korea, EU  Chamber  Monthly  Bulletin,  Seoul, various 
issues; Sangdal Shim, "Recent Trends and Macroeconomic Forecast for  1998/1999," Korea 
Development Institute, Seoul, 15 December 1998, unpublished. For Taiwan: Chung-Hua 
Institution for  Economic Research, Major  Economic  Indicators  for  Taiwan,  Taipei, February 1999; 
Asian Development Bank, Asian  Development  Outlook,  various issues; Central Bank of  Taiwan, 
Balance  of  Payments  Quarterly,  Taipei, various issues; Central Bank of  Taiwan, Financial  Statistics 
Monthly,  Taipei, various issues; Council for  Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan 
Statistical  Data  Book 1997,  Taipei; Central Bank of  Taiwan, "Domestic Key Economic and Financial 
Indicators," Taipei, 1 March 1999. Data for  1998 and 1999 for  both economies were partly drawn 
from  Pacific  Economic Cooperation Council, Pacific  Economic  Outlook,  2000-01, Asia Pacific  Press 
at the Australia National University, Canberra, 2000. 
account deficit.  However, Korea did experience large capital inflows  over 
a short period of  time (1993-96). Net capital inflows  were consistently 
larger than the current account deficit  during this period, and the Bank of 
Korea accumulated considerable reserves (see table 2-4). By 1997 there 
were signs of  increasing financial  fragility.  Short-term debt was rising very 
Table 2-2. Korea  and  Taiwan:  Current  Account  Balance,  1992—99 
Current 
account  balance 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Billions of  dollars 
Korea - 3 . 9 1.0 - 3 . 9 - 8 . 5 - 2 3 . 0 - 8 . 2 40.4 24.5 
Taiwan 8.6 7.0 6.5 5.5 10.0 7.1 3.4 5.9 
Percent of  GDP 
Korea - 1 . 3 0.3 - 1 . 0 - 1 . 7 - 4 . 7 - 1 . 7 12.7 6.0 
Taiwan 4.0 3.1 2.7 2.1 3.9 2.4 1.3 2.0 
Source: See table 2-1. 
rapidly: at more than twice the value of  reserves, it had reached a level that 
made the economy very vulnerable to a change in investor and creditor 
sentiment. As shown in table 2-5, up to 1996 the rise in the short-term 
debt-to-reserves ratio was due not to a fall  in reserves, which doubled be-
tween 1992 and 1996, but rather to the much faster  increase in debt. In 
the second half  of  1997, as the economy began to look increasingly frag-
ile, capital outflows  led to rapidly falling  reserves.3 
The Impact of  the Crisis on the Real Economy, 1997-98 
Economic performance  was very dissimilar in the aftermath  of  the cri-
sis. In Korea, the withdrawal of  external capital that began in October 
1997 caused a contraction in GDP of  6.7 percent in 1998. Unemploy-
ment, which had typically held at about 2 percent of  the labor force, 
jumped to 8.6 percent by February 1999 and remained at over 5 percent 
at the end of  that year.6 Although inflation  was originally forecast  to rise 
well above 10 percent, the slowdown in the economy kept the rate of  in-
crease in consumer prices at 7.5 percent in 1998. A sharp correction in the 
won (which had initially overshot in the direction of  depreciation) inten-
sified  the effects  of  the slow economy, resulting in an inflation  rate of  just 
0.9 percent in 1999, far  below its historical average (see table 2-1). 
5. The first  signs of  trouble in the real economy appeared in early 1997 with the bankruptcy of 
Hanbo Steel and Kia Motors. While growth was still fairly  strong in 1997, it was due mostly to over-
expansion of  exports by chaebol  attempting to beat back the increased competitiveness of  Japanese 
firms,  which had benefited  from  the sharp fall  in the yen beginning in mid-1995. 
6. PECC (2000, p. 31); see also Shim (1998). 
Table 2-3. Korea  and  Taiwan:  Behavior  of  the  Exchange  Rate  and  Short-Term  Interest  Rates,  1992—99 
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Short-term interest rates (lending) 
Korea 10.0 8.6 8.5 9.0 8.8 11.8 15.3 9.4 
Taiwan 8.3 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.7 7.6 8.0 n.a. 
Nominal exchange rate" 
(national currency per U.S. dollar) 
Korea 781 803 803 771 804 952 1,401 1,189 
Taiwan 25.2 26.4 26.5 26.5 27.5 28.7 33.5 32.3 
Real exchange rate (1992 = 100)b 
Korea 100 100 95 90 92 104 139 118 
Taiwan 100 103 101 101 104 109 120 n.a. 
Source: See table 1. 
a. Period average. 
b. Nominal price for  the U.S. dollar, deflated  by consumer price index, multiplied by the U.S. producer price index. 
Table 2-4. Korea:  Capital  Inflow,  Current  Account  Balance,  and  Change 
in  Reserves,  1992—99 
Billions of  U.S. dollars 
Current  account Change  in Errors  and 
Year Capital  inflow surplus reservei1 omissions 
1992 6.4 -3 .9 -3 .7 1.1 
1993 2.7 1.0 -3 .0 -0 .7 
1994 10.7 -3 .9 -4 .6 - 1 . 8 
1995 17.3 -8 .5 -7 .0 - 1 . 2 
1996 23.9 -23.0 - 1 . 4 1.1 
1997 ~9.2 -8 .2 23.0 -5 .0 
1998 -8 .3 40.4 -25.9 -6 .2 
1999 12.7 24.5 -33.3 -3 .5 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International  Financial  Statistics,  Washington, 
several issues. 
a. A negative sign indicates an increase. 
The Korean government was unable to control the outflow  of  capital, 
and it called in the IMF in late November 1997. The IMF put together a 
package of  financial  resources consisting of  U.S.$21 billion to be disbursed 
in eleven installments over a three-year period. In addition, it secured 
commitments totaling U.S.$36 billion from  bilateral and multilateral 
sources.7 Disbursements were subject to the usual IMF conditions of  tight 
money and the achievement of  a fiscal  surplus, despite the facts  that the 
fiscal  deficit  was small and the economy had entered a steep recession. Sur-
prisingly, it also required the Korean authorities to introduce the follow-
ing far-reaching  structural reforms: 
—The complete opening of  the capital account of  the balance of  pay-
ments, including the elimination of  any remaining limits on mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A); 
—The transformation  of  labor markets in the direction of  Western in-
stitutional arrangements by abolishing lifetime  employment practices and 
obstacles to firing; 
—The restructuring of  the chaebol  to promote better corporate gov-
ernance, greater transparency, and an end to what was viewed as crony cap-
7. For an analysis of  the IMF program, see Y. C. Park (1998); Feldstein (1998); Radelet and Sachs 
(1998); Wang and Zang (1999); Furman and Stiglitz (1998). 
Table 2-5. Korea  and  Taiwan:  Indicators  of  Financial  Fragility,  1992—98 
Billions of  U.S. dollars, except as indicated 
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
International reserves-1 
Korea 17.2 20.4 25.8 32.8 34.2 20.5 52.1 
Taiwan 82 3 83 6 92 5 90 3 88 0 83 5 on i 
Foreign debt" 
Korea 44.1 47.2 72.4 85.8 155.8 137.0 139.1 
Taiwan 19.9 23.2 26.2 27.1 27.5 38.5 30.0 
Short-term debt" 
Korea 11.9 12.2 31.6 46.6 66.6 53.8 28.1 
Taiwan 17.3 19.4 20.0 19.5 18.8 22.2 19.4 
Ratio of  short-term debt 
to reserves (%) 
Korea 69.2 59.9 122.7 142.1 194.9 268.8 54.0 
Taiwan 21.0 23.3 21.6 21.6 21.3 26.5 21.4 
Source: For Korea, World Bank, Global  Development  Finance,  Washington, 2000; for  Taiwan, Asian Development Bank, Asian  Development  Outlook,  various 
issues. 
a. End of  period. 
italism (basically, opaque relations between different  affiliates  and between 
the conglomerates and the government); and 
—The closure of  troubled banks, the promotion of  bank mergers, the 
opening of  the banking sector to purchases by foreign  entities, and an in-
crease in capital requirements and bank reserves to reflect  Basel Commit-
tee standards. 
The IMF adjustment program was bound to make matters worse in the 
short term. Higher interest rates were not able to contain the run on the 
won, which traded as high as W 1,960 to the dollar in December 1997, up 
from  about W 830 at the end of  1996. If  investors perceive a sharp increase 
in interest rates as reducing the likelihood of  loan repayment, the increase 
will not only fail  to shore up the value of  the currency but could wind up 
fuelling  further  depreciation.8 The combination of  high interest rates and 
sharp depreciation caused widespread bankruptcies, as firms  were both 
highly leveraged and heavily indebted in foreign  currency. Company bank-
ruptcies had extremely adverse effects  on banks, many of  which had already 
been weakened by currency and maturity mismatches between assets 
(which were mostly domestic currency denominated and long term) and li-
abilities (which were mostly foreign  currency denominated and short 
term). Many banks failed  and had to be rescued or restructured by the Bank 
of  Korea. 
As shown in figure  2-1, the sharp rise in both interest rates and the nom-
inal exchange rate eventually subsided as a result of  the evolving recession. 
The Korean adjustment was so severe that the current account swung from 
a deficit  of  U.S.$8.2 billion in 1997 (less than 2 percent of  GDP) to a sur-
plus of  U.S.$40 billion in 1998 (12.7 percent of  GDP). This was achieved 
basically through a fall  in import volumes, since export earnings were almost 
flat.  The IMF itself  recognized that it had erred in imposing sharp fiscal  re-
straints, and it relaxed its fiscal  targets at the beginning of  1998. 
Several authors criticize the conditions related to structural reform 
that the IMF imposed in Korea. Radelet and Sachs rightly point out that 
it is difficult  and counterproductive to initiate reforms  in the midst of  a 
crisis.9 Whether the reforms  are even necessary is debatable. I argue below 
that the liberalization of  the capital account without taking any precau-
tion for  the potential adverse effects  of  capital surges was one of  the causes 
of  the Korean crisis. This implies that further  liberalization is unnecessary 
and probably counterproductive. Other reforms  were ill-timed. Requiring 
8. See Furman and Stiglitz (1998) for  a full  development of  this argument. 
9. Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
Figure 2-1. Republic  of  Korea:  Exchange  Rate  and  Short-Term  Interest 
Rates,  1997-98 
Won per U.S. dollar 
banks to increase their capital-asset and reserve-asset ratios during a bank-
ing crisis increased the intensity of  the credit crunch and led to additional 
bankruptcies. 
Feldstein argues that the IMF program for  Korea constituted an un-
warranted intrusion into issues that are far  removed from  the country's bal-
ance-of-payments  crisis.10 He holds that the changes sought in the IMF 
program, which should be left  to national political processes and not im-
posed from  outside under duress in times of  crisis, were derived from  long-
standing demands on Korea to open its markets to Japanese goods and U.S. 
capital. 
The impact of  the crisis was much milder in Taiwan. There was a sharp 
deceleration in export growth and a modest decline in GDP growth, since 
domestic demand compensated the slack. As the crisis in Southeast Asia 
unfolded,  the New Taiwan (N.T.) dollar came under strong attack. The ini-
tial response of  the Central Bank was to defend  the N.T. dollar and to ac-
cept a reduction in its comfortable  level of  foreign  exchange reserves. When 
foreign  reserves began to decline, however, it switched policies and stopped 
defending  the currency in October 1997. The N.T. dollar quickly lost 
10. Feldstein (1998). 
Figure 2-2. Taiwan:  Exchange  Rate  and  Interest  Rates,  1997-98 
N.T. dollars per U.S. dollar Percent 
Source: Central, Bank of  China, "Domestic Key Economic and Financial Indicators," March 1999; Chung-Hua 
Institution for  Economic Research, "Major Economic Indicators for  Taiwan," February 1999. 
about 20 percent of  its value in relation to the U.S. dollar (from  N.T.$28 to 
N.T.$34 to the U.S. dollar). In late 1998, the N.T. dollar began to appreci-
ate again." At the same time, nominal interest rates began an upward trend 
in mid-1997 but fell  again in the first  quarter of  1998. By December 1998 
they were lower than before  the crisis broke (figure  2-2). 
Thus the growth rate of  the Taiwanese economy dropped temporarily 
by about 2 percentage points between 1997 and 1998, mainly as a result 
of  the deceleration of  export growth. Its unemployment rate remained 
largely unchanged at about 2.7 percent. Consumer price inflation  contin-
ued to fall  toward a zero rate. Taiwan was poised to resume rapid growth 
as demand for  its exports recovered in 1999. In fact,  Taiwanese firms  may 
have strengthened their competitiveness by pursuing a policy of  moving 
the export-oriented assembly of  light manufactures  offshore  to locations 
in Southeast Asia, since the effects  of  the financial  crisis have made those 
countries very attractive sites for  export processing.12 
11. In November 2000, the exchange rate stood at N.T.S31 to the U.S. dollar. 
12. Huang (1998). 
The Role of  Economic Structure 
Why Taiwan was able to stave off  the crisis should be clear from  the 
above analysis. What is much less obvious is why Korea was hit so badly. 
Korea was not a mismanaged economy, and it had high investment rates 
financed  basically by domestic saving. A serious problem became apparent 
when the crisis broke, however. Korean firms  had developed excess capac-
ity, partly as a result of  the depreciation of  the yen beginning in the third 
quarter of  1995.13 Rather than pulling back, Korean manufacturers  re-
sponded with even larger increases in production and exports, which 
caused a sharp worsening of  export prices in 1996.14 This was particularly 
the case in the semiconductor industry, where the Korean response to 
gains in the competitiveness of  Japanese firms  contributed to the develop-
ment of  considerable excess capacity globally. 
Government action to coordinate decisionmaking by individual firms 
had been on the wane for  some time, as the government gradually handed 
over to the market most resource allocation decisions. Excess capacity 
problems had previously been dealt with through rationalization efforts 
led by planning agencies, but by the mid-1990s that restraint on the chae-
bol  dominating Korean industry was simply no longer there.15 These 
moves toward the liberalization of  economic policy and the dismantling of 
planning instruments received impetus from  international agreements on 
subjects such as export subsidies and financial  services, under the aegis of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The chaebol  were basically left  to 
their own devices to pursue whatever course of  action they perceived to be 
in their own interests.16 
In Taiwan, increases in export volume were much more modest prior 
to the crisis, and average export prices continued to rise. Like Korea, Tai-
wan exports semiconductors, but firms  were able to weather the global 
semiconductor slump of  1 996 by reducing costs and switching their prod-
uct mix away from  those in excess supply. Strategic alliances between Tai-
wanese producers and leading firms  in the United States, Japan, and 
Europe contributed to avoiding excess capacity.17 
Another important characteristic of  the chaebol  is that they were 
13. Of  all the East Asian economies, Korea is the most competitive with the Japanese. 
14. Y. C. Park (1998). 
15. Chang (1998). 
16. Y. C. Park (1998). 
17. Yanagihara (1999). 
highly leveraged. In 1996, the thirty largest chaebol  had debt-equity ratios 
of  380 percent, compared to less than 100 percent for  Taiwanese firms.18 
High leverage is good when the economy and profits  are expanding briskly 
and when credits are renewed. In such situations, high leverage actually in-
creases a firm's  profitability,  since interest rates are normally much lower 
than the rates of  return on investment. What is a blessing in an expand-
ing economy, however, becomes a curse in a shrinking one. When credits 
are not renewed or when interest rates rise sharply, companies go bankrupt 
more rapidly if  they are highly leveraged than if  their debt-capital ratios 
are more reasonable. Since Korean companies had never experienced a 
downdraft  like the one that hit them in late 1997, their high debt-equity 
ratios seemed rational to them. 
By contrast, Taiwanese companies are much smaller than their Korean 
counterparts, and they are consequently highly risk averse and extremely 
conservative in taking on debt. Investments are usually financed  with re-
tained profits  and capital drawn from  the extended family  rather than 
from  banks. This explains why the average debt-equity ratio in Taiwan is 
much lower than in Korea. 
The Structure and Regulation of  the Banking Industry 
Many Korean conglomerates encompass a finance  company, and they 
obtain funding  from  financial  markets through these financial  affiliates. 
Others have extensive dealings with a single bank, much in the manner 
of  the relationship between the Japanese keiretsu  and their main bank. In 
the years leading up to the crisis, the finance  companies had been allowed 
to become full-fledged  merchant banks, which improved the Korean con-
glomerates' access to international debt markets. Since merchant banks do 
not accept deposits from  the public, it was generally believed that they 
did not need regulation. Commercial banks were, on paper, more tightly 
regulated. In practice, however, regulators turned a blind eye to many of 
their activities, in the mistaken belief  that regulations were somehow con-
trary to the spirit of  liberalization, particularly in view of  the country's ac-
cession to the Organization for  Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).19 
18. Y. C. Park (1998, p. 32). 
19. J.-J. Park (1998) and personal communication. 
Korean banks were accustomed to strong government guidance. Until 
the late 1980s, a large proportion of  their assets was made up of  so-called 
policy loans, which were loans made at preferential  interest rates to firms  in 
sectors that were favored  by government policies for  selective intervention. 
In the mid-1980s, however, the authorities began implementing a policy of 
broad liberalization of  financial  markets, and policy loans—which had rep-
resented 60 percent of  bank lending in the late-1970s—were gradually 
phased out.20 
Until the mid-1980s, then, commercial banks were either state-owned 
or under strong guidance by the planning authorities. Domestic banks 
were therefore  unaccustomed to operating in a market environment, 
despite the recent liberalization. They had not yet developed expertise in 
credit analysis, risk management, or due diligence. Their ability to deal 
with the risks of  foreign  financial  transactions was particularly inade-
quate.21 Banking authorities performed  poorly in the area of  regulating 
and monitoring foreign  financial  activity. Prior to 1985, the economic au-
thorities practiced extensive control over all items in the capital account, 
such that banking supervision and regulation in this area were redundant. 
This may explain why Korea had not developed a strong regulatory frame-
work for  financial  institutions. 
Taiwanese banks are very prudent in their lending policies, and they 
are also closely regulated by the Central Bank. Taiwanese banks were tra-
ditionally state-owned. The establishment of  private banks was very grad-
ual: even as late as 1990, twelve of  the twenty-four  banks in operation 
were state-owned. These banks accounted for  75 percent of  all bank 
branches, 86 percent of  all deposits, and 87 percent of  all loans.22 In 
1991, rules governing the establishment of  private banks were eased, and 
sixteen new private banks were opened. In addition, the Central Bank al-
lowed the licensing of  new foreign  banks. Both public and private banks 
in Taiwan have long been subject to stringent prudential regulations.23 
In September 1998, for  example, the capital adequacy ratio of  Taiwanese 
banks was 11.4 percent—quite a bit above the Basel Committee norm 
of  8 percent. Taiwanese banks also face  a number of  restrictions on open 
20. The liberalization of  financial  intermediation through formal  banks caused the curb market to 
shrink considerably (Noland, 1996). 
21.Y. C. Park (1998). 
22. APEC (1998, chap. 9). 
23. Yang (1998). 
positions in foreign  exchange, which must be approved by the Central 
Bank.24 
These differences  in banking structure and regulation show up in the 
behavior of  nonperforming  loans. At the outbreak of  the crisis in 1997, 
nonperforming  loans in Taiwan were only 4 percent of  all loans, whereas 
they were 14 percent in Korea. This ratio inevitably increased in both 
countries as a consequence of  the crisis, but in Taiwan they remained at a 
manageable level (5.5 percent in 2000). In Korea, in contrast, they came 
close to crippling the banking sector, peaking in 1998 at 25 percent of  all 
loans (or 34 percent of  GDP) and then gradually falling  back to an esti-
mated 18 percent in 2000.25 This forced  the Bank of  Korea to intervene 
by liquidating banks, merging weak banks with stronger ones, injecting 
more capital into banks deemed to be salvageable, and selling others off  to 
foreign  banks. Nonperforming  loans are still a major stumbling block in 
the ability of  the banking sector to grant fresh  credit to the private sector. 
Policies on Capital Inflows 
In globalized financial  markets, it is difficult  for  a country to run into 
an international financial  crisis without first  having experienced large cap-
ital inflows.  A country can have a balance-of-payments  crisis simply be-
cause of  bad domestic policies, of  course, but the IMF is prepared to deal 
with this type of  crisis by means of  conditional lending. Another possible 
source of  crisis in the absence of  large capital inflows  might be a currency 
crisis produced entirely by contagion. If  a crisis elsewhere induces fears  of 
a possible depreciation of  the currency and if  international financial  trans-
actions are reasonably free,  then national and foreign  financial  investors 
could cause a crisis by selling the domestic currency and buying foreign 
exchange. Such contagion was a factor  explaining why countries that had 
been quite well managed experienced difficult  times during the recent cri-
sis regardless of  past policy. Examples include Chile and Hong Kong.26 
Despite the enormous differences  between these two economies, they both 
were pursuing rather prudent policies before  the financial  crisis. Nonethe-
less, they both suffered  significant  contagion. 
24. Personal communication with Central Bank officials. 
25. Data on nonperforming  loans are taken from  Goldman Sachs, March 1998; J.E Morgan, April 
1998; Asiaweek,  "The Asiaweek Financial 500," September 19, 1997, and September 11, 1998. 
26. On Chile, see Ffrench-Davis  and Tapia (in this volume). 
However, the new breed of  crisis associated with the globalization of 
finance  is generally preceded by a strong upsurge in capital inflow.  This 
was the case in Mexico prior to 1994.27 It was universally the case in the 
countries that were most badly hit by the recent financial  crisis: Brazil, In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, and Thailand. Large capital 
inflows  can occur for  a variety of  reasons, including the perception by for-
eign financial  investors that a country is doing things well or simply that 
its currency will appreciate because they believe others think it will.28 Since 
interest rates are normally higher in emerging markets than in mature 
ones, expectations of  currency appreciation can produce very large inflows. 
Such inflows  are often  not marginal for  an individual recipient. 1 hey 
can therefore  have important negative externalities: they can generate cur-
rent account deficits,  appreciate the exchange rate, and unleash asset price 
bubbles. They also often  increase the level of  short-term debt relative to 
international reserves. At the same time, the short-term nature of  the in-
flows  makes it easy for  investors to flee  and for  creditors to not renew their 
lending when they sense trouble.29 Consequently, any worsening of  fun-
damentals that generates perceptions of  vulnerability will cause capital in-
flows  to slow down, usually quite abruptly, and then to reverse direction. 
When the country has lost sufficient  reserves, foreign  and domestic finan-
cial investors discover exchange rate risk. As the fear  of  depreciation gath-
ers momentum, everybody seeks to liquidate positions in domestic 
currency, accelerating the loss of  reserves and precipitating a full-blown 
balance-of-payments  crisis. 
These stylized facts  fit  the case of  Korea fairly  well. Korean banks in-
termediated huge capital inflows  and financial  resources in the 1990s. Even 
so, the current account was not out of  control despite being in deficit  (it 
had been in surplus in the second half  of  the 1980s) . Although the real ex-
change rate appreciated as a result of  capital inflow,  the degree of  apprecia-
tion was not excessive by recent standards. Financial fragility  rose to very 
dangerous levels, however: the ratio of  short-term debt to international re-
serves exceeded 200 percent in 1997, making the economy very vulnerable 
to capital flight  by scared investors and creditors (see table 2-5). 
27. See Ros (in this volume). 
28. This is a peculiar international version of  Keynes's beauty contests (see F.atwell, 1997, p. 243). 
Some investors are more concerned with what other investors are doing than with the underlying 
worth of  assets. When these participants predominate over the so-called fundamentalists,  financial 
markets can be very volatile indeed. 
29. Ffrench-Davis  and Ocampo (in this volume). 
Korea introduced a broad range of  measures in 1991-93 to liberalize 
the capital account. In 1991, all remaining restrictions on greenfield  for-
eign direct investment (FDI) were scrapped, and resident companies and 
banks were allowed to issue securities abroad. Beginning in January 1992, 
foreigners  were allowed to purchase stocks in individual Korean compa-
nies, with the limitation that a maximum of  10 percent of  a company's eq-
uity could be owned by foreigners  as a group.30 Both the aggregate and 
individual investors' ceilings were gradually enlarged thereafter. 
Short -term flows,  however, were liberalized ahead of  most long-term 
flows.  Ceilings on loans in foreign  exchange to domestic firms  were lifted 
in 1994, but ceilings on banks' long- and medium-term borrowing from 
international financial  markets were not. Only trade credits and other 
short-term borrowing abroad were liberalized. This forced  banks to raise 
short-term credit to finance  long-term loans to the chaebol,.31  Other types 
of  long-term capital movements were also excluded from  the trend toward 
liberalizing the capital account. These included purchases of  domestic 
bonds by foreigners,  as well as a virtual ban on M&A owing to restrictions 
on foreign  ownership of  existing Korean companies. The crisis and the 
conditions attached to the IMF program eliminated most of  the remain-
ing restrictions. By the end of  1997, the aggregate ceiling for  foreign  port-
folio  investment had been raised to 55 percent of  a company's equity. All 
restrictions on M&A were eliminated in May 1998.32 
The short end of  the financial  market was thus opened up ahead of 
bond markets, long-term bank finance,  and the market for  corporate con-
trol. The authorities seemed to hold the erroneous view that short-term 
finance  (most of  which was assumed to be trade related) is self-liquidating 
and, as such, unlikely to generate ovenndebtedness. However, Korean 
banks and firms  were borrowing large sums of  short-term funds  to finance 
long-term investments. Even when the authorities became aware of  the 
deteriorating quality of  bank assets and the increasing mismatches in the 
term structure of  assets and liabilities, they failed  to intervene, perhaps be-
cause they lacked experience and resources, but also, to a significant  degree, 
because they were influenced  by the atmosphere of  euphoria predominat-
ing in international financial  markets.33 
30. Park (1996). Until that date, foreigners  were allowed to invest in Korea's stock market only 
through authorized open-end mutual funds. 
31. Y. C. Park (1998). 
32. Wang and Zang (1999, chap. 9). 
33. Y. C. Park (1998). 
The flows  that followed  liberalization in the early to mid-1990s were 
enormous (see table 2-6). Curiously, the big increases were not in FDI 
(perhaps because of  restrictions on M&A), but in portfolio  transactions 
and bank lending. Purchases of  shares on the Seoul market jumped from 
U.S.$2.5 billion in 1992 to U.S.$6.6 billion in 1993. Since Korean com-
panies are among the world's most competitive, they were undoubtedly 
very attractive to foreign  portfolio  investors. Thus much of  the equity 
portfolio  inflows  that took place after  1992 was a stock adjustment phe-
nomenon that should have been fully  anticipated by the authorities. Un-
fortunately,  it was not. This lack of  foresight  fueled  the capital surge. 
Debt-creating portfolio  inflows  rose spectacularly, from  U.S.$2.5 bil-
lion in 1992 to U.S.$15.2 million in 1996. These were mostly securitized 
forms  of  bank lending. International banks were acting as middlemen in 
the placement of  securities by Korean banks (and also by banks from 
other East Asian countries) in international financial  markets.34 Private 
credit to both banks and nonfinancial  firms  also rose dramatically. At the 
same time, Korea experienced large outflows  in the form  of  debt-creating 
portfolio  flows  and lending by banks and nonbanks. This is an indication 
that Korean banks and firms  were engaging in interest rate arbitrage be-
tween international capital markets, on the one hand, and Korean or 
other markets, on the other. As shown above in table 2-4, net capital in-
flows  consistently exceeded the current account deficit  plus reserve accu-
mulation between 1993 and 1996. Large negative errors and omissions 
demonstrate that Korean banks and chaebol  were engaging in financial  in-
vestments in other countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand. There are 
even some reports that Korean banks were purchasing Russian govern-
ment bonds. 
Financial liberalization, then, led to large capital inflows  and outflows. 
Korean banks borrowed short abroad in order to lend long to the chaebol, 
which borrowed to finance  aggressive investment plans. In some instances, 
the borrowers on international markets were the chaebol  themselves or 
their foreign  subsidiaries. This mismatch between the maturity structure 
of  assets and liabilities was accompanied by an equally dangerous currency 
mismatch: Korean banks took on debt in foreign  exchange and lent in won 
(and also in baht, Indonesian rupiahs, and other currencies). Banks be-
came totally illiquid during the crisis when foreign  creditors refused  to roll 
over short-term loans, l he first  to flee  were the foreign  equity investors, 
34. For a description, see Krcgel (1048a, 1998b); Taylor (1999). 
ON 
Table 2-6. Korea:  Capital  inflows,  1992—99 
Billions of  U.S. dollars 
Item 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Foreign direct investment 
Inflows 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.8 2.3 2.8 5.4 9.3 
Outflows - 1 . 2 - 1 . 3 -2 .5 -3 .5 -4 .7 -4 .4 - 4 . 7 -4 .2 
Portfolio 
Inflows:  equity 2.5 6.6 3.6 4.2 6.0 2.5 3.9 12.1 
Inflows:  debt 2.5 3.9 4.5 9.7 15.2 9.8 -4 . 1 -5 .1 
Outflows:  equity - -0 .2 -0 .4 -0 .2 - 0 . 7 -0 .3 0.0 -0 .3 
Outflows:  debt 0.8 -0 .3 - 1 . 6 -2 .0 -5 .3 2.3 - 1 . 6 2.0 
Private credits to Korea 
Banks 1.8 0.7 7.4 11.4 10.0 -9 .8 -6 .2 1.4 
Other 3.8 -0 .3 6.6 10.7 15.1 -3 .1 - 12 .3 -3 .4 
Private credits from  Korea 
Banks -3 .2 -4 .0 -5 .1 -9 .2 -8 .2 -8 .3 7.0 -0 .2 
Other 0.2 0.1 - 1 . 9 -4 .6 - 4 . 7 -5 .0 -0 .2 -2 .1 
Net public transactions -0 .9 -2 .6 -5 .6 - 1 . 0 - 1 . 0 4.5 4.6 3.1 
Total3 7.0 3.2 10.7 17.3 23.9 -9 .2 -8 .4 12.7 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International  Financial  Statistics,  Washington, November 2000. 
a. Excludes capital transfers. 
b. Provisional figures. 
who dumped Korean stock even when doing so meant taking a big hit. As 
the stock market fell,  so did the international value of  the won. The ex-
change rate depreciation, in turn, caused many banks and firms  to become 
technically bankrupt, since their assets were insufficient  to cover their lia-
bilities. 
The case of  Taiwan is quite different.  Taiwan did not experience large 
capital inflows,  not because foreign  investors and lenders were not inter-
ested in Taiwan, but because the authorities did not allow it to happen. 
Although Taiwan underwent a process of  domestic financial  liberalization 
and limited opening of  the capital account in the 1990s, that process was 
extremely cautious. Capital inflows  are still strictly regulated. Given Tai-
wan's long-standing current account surplus, the authorities gave priority 
to liberalizing capital outflow. 
Taiwan limits the value of  shares that can be held by foreigners:  any 
single foreigner  may hold up to 15 percent of  a listed company's equity, 
and all foreigners  together may hold up to 30 percent. Acquisitions ofTai-
wanese companies by foreigners  are forbidden.3''  On the other hand, there 
are no restrictions on green field  FDI investments, profit  remittances, or 
the repatriation of  capital, foreign  institutional investors have a ceiling of 
U.S.$600 million on the investments they can make in Taiwan. Natural 
foreign  persons can purchase up to U.S.$5 million in Taiwanese assets, and 
firms  that are not listed institutional investors face  a ceiling of  U.S.$50 
million. As already noted, Taiwanese banks are under the strict guidance 
and supervision of  the Central Bank as regards their taking on foreign  li-
abilities for  conversion into N.T. dollar-denominated assets. The use of 
N.T. dollar derivatives is authorized by the Central Bank only for  genuine 
hedging purposes. For example, cross-currency swaps between the N.T. 
dollar and the U.S. dollar may be used to cover bank loan obligations or 
interest payments from  one currency to another in order to hedge currency 
and interest rate risks. 
With regard to capital outflows,  the use of  foreign  exchange for  over-
seas investment is allowed, but such investments must be approved by the 
Ministry of  Economic Affairs  and the Central Bank. Natural persons may 
invest up to U.S.$5 million abroad without permission. The limit for  a 
domestic firm  is U.S.S50 million. 
It might be objected that the current account surplus is evidence that 
greater capital account liberalization would not have led to stronger capi-
35. Judging from  press reports, this norm appea r s to have been liberalized in 1999. 
tal inflows.  Stronger capital inflows  are certainly compatible with a surplus 
on current account. Had they taken place, foreign  investments in the Tai-
wanese economy would have been even greater and the outflows  of  capi-
tal from  Taiwan even larger. Larger capital inflows,  however, would have 
made Taiwan more vulnerable to the type of  events that took place in 
Korea. Had Taiwan been more open to capital inflows,  the effects  of  the 
crisis undoubtedly would have been far  worse. Taiwan is one of  the most 
successful  economies in the world. It has strong companies that might be 
of  interest to many transnational corporations. Its stock market is un-
doubtedly attractive for  institutional investors and individuals looking for 
plays in emerging markets. Many Taiwanese banks might have borrowed 
more had the monetary authorities allowed them to do so.36 They might 
have used the good credit rating of  Taiwan to borrow and lend in other 
countries, much as the Korean banks did. 
The fact  is that none of  the damaging sequence of  events that took 
place in Korea happened in Taiwan. The main cause for  Taiwan's relative 
success is clearly its much more cautious policy on the kinds of  capital in-
flow  that are likely to lead to those situations. At the time of  the crisis, Tai-
wan's external debt was notably low at about U.S.$25 billion, a figure  that 
is insignificant  in comparison to its international reserves (see table 2-5). 
Most of  its debt was in the form  of  trade credit. In other words, Taiwan 
had low levels of  external indebtedness because it was cautious about bor-
rowing excessively. Equity markets had little foreign  investment, so port-
folio  outflows  were commensurately moderate after  the crisis struck. 
Korea, on the other hand, found  itself  in a situation of  extreme fi-
nancial fragility  shortly after  liberalizing short-term capital inflows.  By 
1996, just three years after  the implementation of  the most ambitious 
measures, the ratio of  short-term debt to reserves had reached a level that 
was not macroeconomically sustainable, which should have alerted the au-
thorities. The increase in the ratio was not the result of  a fall  in reserves, 
which had in fact  risen; it was due entirely to a very rapid accumulation 
of  short-term debt. Large inflows  of  portfolio  capital also meant that the 
country had made itself  very vulnerable to a change in sentiment. And that 
is what happened: before  the crisis became full-blown,  most of  the foreign 
investors in Korean stock had already exited. 
36. Taiwanese interest rates are lower than those in Korea, however, so the possibilities for  arbitrage 
are more limited. 
The Role of  Contagion 
Contagion clearly had a leading role in the Korean debacle. Would the 
crisis have occurred in the absence of  contagion? Probably not. If  measured 
on the basis of  pre-crisis levels for  the exchange rate and interest rates, 
major Korean firms  and banks were not insolvent. Banks were certainly 
vulnerable to a liquidity squeeze, and the chaebol  were vulnerable to a 
slowdown in world demand for  their products, but both banks and firms 
would have been able to resolve their problems if  foreign  investors had 
been willing to keep their money in Korea and creditors had rolled over 
expiring loans, even at higher interest rates. The proper role of  the IMF 
should have been to coordinate expectations around the fact  that Korean 
institutions were solvent. By insisting that major structural changes were 
required, it reinforced  the view of  market participants that something was 
fundamentally  wrong with the economy, its firms,  and its banks. 
Korea clearly had better fundamentals  than, say, Thailand or Malaysia. 
As noted, Korea's current account deficit  was significant  only in 1996 (4.4 
percent of  GDP). For the period 1992-96, the average Korean deficit  was 
a mere 1.6 percent. And even in 1996, Korea's deficit  was well below Thai-
land's (7.9 percent of  GDP). Thailand ran an average current account 
deficit  of  6.5 percent of  GDP for  the period 1992-96. The average deficit 
for  Malaysia in the same period was 5.8 percent of  GDP, with a peak of 
9.7 percent in 1995.3 
International financial  markets worried about Korea only after  the 
onset of  the financial  crisis elsewhere. Before  the crisis struck other East 
Asian countries, international portfolio  investors and international banks 
were pouring finance  into the Korean economy. After  the Thai, Malaysian, 
and Indonesian crises, they reassessed their commitments to Korea and 
pulled out en masse, with all the adverse consequences described above. 
The almost unrestricted opening of  the capital account (following  over 
three decades of  universally acclaimed economic success) made the coun-
try highly vulnerable to just such a sequence of  events. 
Korea experienced several forms  of  contagion, starting with the effect 
on trade. Generally speaking, when a crisis affects  real economies, other 
countries experience a drop in export volumes or export prices or both. In 
the Korean case, export prices had worsened before  the onset of  the crisis 
37. Data drawn from  International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  various issues. 
as a consequence of  the insufficient  demand vis-à-vis a huge increase in 
supply, partly because the chaebols  insisted on going ahead with their in-
vestment plans regardless of  world market conditions. 
The second important form  of  contagion was financial  contagion. A 
financial  crisis in one country can spread to other economies if  the ensu-
ing panic causes investors to flee  and creditors to refuse  to roll over credit. 
This was the major form  of  contagion in the Korean case, and the one that 
produced the most damage to the domestic economy. 
The third common manifestation  of  contagion is in the exchange rate, 
which occurs when foreign  and domestic agents dump the domestic cur-
rency and purchase foreign  exchange in response to a financial  crisis else-
where. Korea experienced this type of  contagion, but it was relatively 
short-lived. The foreign  exchange market witnessed enormous overshoot-
ing. The permanent effect  was a depreciation of  the won from  about W 
888 to the U.S. dollar before  the crisis (at the end of  the second quarter 
of  1997) to about W 1,100 in October 2000. This represents a permanent 
nominal depreciation of  about 25 percent. In real terms, the depreciation 
was less than 20 percent. This, of  course, reflects  the inefficiency  of  fi-
nancial markets. The Korean won was overvalued in mid-1997, but it did 
not need to go through the wild gyrations that it experienced between the 
fourth  quarter of  1997 and the end of  1998. 
Taiwan similarly experienced strong trade contagion, which was ex-
pressed in a sharp fall  in the growth rate of  export volumes. Some degree 
of  exchange rate contagion was also felt,  but it was much milder than in 
Korea. As already noted, most of  the nominal exchange rate depreciation 
that occurred in Taiwan in late 199 7 was quickly corrected. Where Taiwan 
really differs  from  Korea is in the area of  financial  contagion: Taiwan ex-
perienced no such phenomenon. The country had little volatile foreign 
capital within its borders, so little fled.  If  Taiwanese individuals and com-
panies wished to leave, their ability to do so was limited by financial  reg-
ulations. 
Concluding Remarks 
The main lesson to be drawn from  the differing  experiences of  Korea 
and Taiwan is that liberalization of  the capital account of  the balance of 
payments needs to be very cautious, particularly when it comes to short-
term flows  and portfolio  capital. Countries that choose to liberalize must, 
at the very least, ensure that banking supervision and regulation are ade-
quate. Since domestic interest rates in emerging economies are bound to 
be higher than international rates, domestic banks operating in economies 
with a high degree of  integration into international financial  markets are 
under constant temptation to borrow abroad. Preventing major mis-
matches requires strong, well-trained supervisory authorities. This is eas-
ier said than done. Good banking regulation and supervision develop 
gradually and are highly correlated with the level of  development. Their 
evolution is often  speeded, however, as a consequence of  a financial  crisis. 
Korea is likely to come out of  the crisis with a much improved domestic 
financial  system, much as Chile did after  its 1982 banking crisis. 
But better banking supervision is not a panacea. In financially  open 
economies where banks are not allowed to borrow freely,  domestic firms 
that can borrow directly from  international markets may take on exces-
sive international debt.38 When times are good and the real exchange rate 
is appreciating, even rational firms  may simply ignore the possibility of  a 
damaging exchange rate depreciation. Unhedged borrowing by firms  was 
a component in the Korean and other financial  crises of  the late 1990s. 
Since the borrowing by each firm  inflicts  an adverse externality on the 
economy as a whole (by exposing it to the risk that changes in creditor 
and investor sentiment will force  many firms  into bankruptcy), there is 
a good argument for  monitoring such borrowings and limiting it when 
necessary.39 
Large capital inflows  may have other adverse effects  on the economy, as 
well. Large inflows  unleash asset price bubbles that could attract even more 
foreign  capital, which is extremely volatile and can thus cause excessive 
fluctuations  in the real exchange rate. Such fluctuations  are highly damag-
ing in countries that are attempting to integrate into international markets 
through trade. A good part of  these flows  is temporary, but they can have 
permanent effects  on recipient economies. It may therefore  be advisable for 
the authorities to limit them. This is precisely what Taiwan has done—and 
what Korea used to do before  1992. Korea has now dismantled most of  its 
controls on capital inflows,  however. Much of  this process was carried out 
38. This point is made forcefully  by Furman and Stiglitz (1998). 
39. Fischer (1998), a fervent  advocate of  capital account liberalization, suggests that prudential con-
trols ought to include matching requirements on nonbank firms'  assets and liabilities in foreign  ex-
change. 
before  the crisis struck, and the authorities have essentially completed that 
task as a result of  the crisis, partly under pressure from  the IMF. The policy 
apparatus that allowed the country to change its economic structure dra-
matically and to build strong, internationally competitive firms  is now 
gone. 
The firms  are still there, however, and the Korean economy is recov-
ering from  the crisis much faster  than anyone expected. The growth of  the 
Korean economy was very strong in 1999 (almost 11 percent), and despite 
a slowdown in the fourth  quarter, it appears to have exceeded 8 percent in 
2000. Much of  the growth in 1999 and 2000 represents a recovery of  con-
sumption and equipment investment. The Central Bank was able to re-
duce interest rates as international reserves recovered and capital began to 
flow  back in, which was very beneficial  to the highly-leveraged Korean cor-
porate sector. Strong export growth has also assisted the recovery. 
Nonetheless, the crisis is forcing  major changes on the Korean econ-
omy. The banking sector is undergoing a profound  transformation,  and it 
is to be hoped that banking regulation and supervision will advance sig-
nificantly.  On the other hand, the Korean authorities have been forced  to 
open the economy to the purchase of  domestic firms  by foreign  interests. 
There are reports of  large inflows  of  FDI, mainly in the form  of  M&A. 
Many financial  and nonfinancial  firms  are being bought up at bargain-
basement prices by investment funds—and  often  not by transnational cor-
porations in the same field  as the acquired companies, which could be 
expected to contribute new management or technology. The purchasers 
are portfolio  investors rather than long-term direct investors, and they are 
likely to hold on to their Korean assets only until their prices rise with the 
consolidation of  economic recovery. 
Recovery has thus stimulated renewed capital inflows.  Korean firms 
are already regaining their access to international financial  markets. For-
eign funds  are returning to the stock market. Korean banks will take longer 
to regain international creditworthiness, since the bank restructuring 
process is far  from  complete.40 It is to be hoped that the Korean authori-
ties will soon have in place the banking regulation and supervision that 
can control unnecessary and potentially damaging capital inflow.  It is also 
to be hoped that they will find  substitutes for  the now discarded capital 
account controls of  the past. 
40. Park (1999). 
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Three  Varieties  of  Capital 
Surge  Management 
in  Chile 
Chile's recent history includes three interesting epi-sodes that shed light on the policies designed to 
confront  surges of  capital inflows  and their effect  on the national econ-
omy. The first  episode began in the mid-1970s and ended with the 1982 
debt crisis; the second began in the early 1990s and continued through the 
so-called Mexican tequila crisis; and the third consisted of  the two years 
preceding the Asian crisis. The three have features  in common: they all 
originated in an overabundance of  foreign  funds;  the capital flew  into the 
private sector; in all cases Chile exhibited some strong fundamentals,  such 
as a fiscal  surplus, and held an outstanding image as a successful  country; 
and each financial  boom was followed  by an international financial  crisis. 
Notable differences,  however, are found  in both the policy approach used 
to face  the capital flood  in the three cases and the results obtained. The 
three cases thus offer  a valuable opportunity to study the relation between 
the economic policies in question and their consequences.1 
This paper focuses  011 the characteristics of  the three booms and their 
impact on the sustainabilicy of  macroeconomic balances. It is during this 
*We are grateful  to Guillermo Le I:ort, Manuel Marfan,  Carlos Massad, Jaime Ros, Gonzalo San-
hueza, John Williamson, Felipe Jiménez, Daniel Titelman, María Ángela Parra, and Andras Uthoff  for 
substantive comments and criticisms. 
1. See Ffrench-Davis  (2001. chaps. 5, 6, and 10). 
stage of  the cycle that future  crises are seeded or avoided. We only margi-
nally consider the post-boom period, when additional shocks (such as on 
the terms of  trade) may affect  the adjustment path of  the economy. 
The impact of  capital flows  on emerging economies can be analyzed in 
two dimensions. The first  refers  to the capacity for  domestic absorption, 
which largely determines how flows  affect  fundamentals  in the host coun-
try. If  absorption is efficient,  capital inflows  will contribute to a sustainable 
growth process. If,  on the contrary, the new funds  distort key macroeco-
nomic prices, then wrong resource allocation results, and external sav-
ing will crowd out national saving. The central issue here is how to extract 
the benefits  from  a higher availability of  capital. The second dimension 
has to do with external vulnerability. It involves examining the economy's 
exposure as it encounters volatile financial  markets in order to determine 
the cost of  instability. Both dimensions are crucial for  assessing the manage-
ment of  capital flows.  Dealing with the first  is a necessary—but not suffi-
cient—condition for  sound financial  integration, while neglecting 
the second may generate considerable short-term benefits  at the cost of 
medium-term risks stemming from  higher foreign  debt and exchange rate 
and current account imbalances. These factors  send the wrong signals to 
the productive sector and ultimately make the economy the victim of  its 
own success. 
Chile was the recipient of  huge capital flows  in each of  the three peri-
ods under consideration. Private sector capital predominated in all three 
cases, and it was directed to Chile's private sector. However, indicators of 
vulnerability, such as the current account deficit  and an appreciated ex-
change rate, and indicators of  sound domestic absorption, such as national 
saving and investment rates and the growth rate of  potential gross domes-
tic product (GDP), behaved differently  in each case. The first  case in the 
1970s coincided with low domestic investment and saving. Foreign saving 
sharply crowded out national saving, and the macroeconomic environment 
—with an appreciated exchange rate and extremely high interest rates— 
discouraged the channeling of  resources to productive investment. GDP 
growth was high for  several years, however, because the large underutilized 
capacity resulting from  the heavy 1975 recession (when GDP fell  13 per-
cent) left  an important margin for  easy economic recovery. In other words, 
GDP was able to grow without requiring new capital formation.  Rapid ex-
pansion of  aggregate demand, stimulated by financial  capital inflows,  thus 
moved the economy toward its productive frontier,  closing the gap by 
1980-81.2 The large indeb cedness made the economy highly vulnerable to 
external shifts,  but it was also in itself  unsustainable, given a current ac-
count deficit  of  14.5 percent of  GDP in 1981 (at current prices; the figure 
is 21 percent with a norma' i zed dollar) and growing amounts coming due. 
Pronounced inefficiencies  thus characterized both the absorption of  flows 
(which was mainly limited to contributing to the recovery of  economic ac-
tivity) and management of  the external vulnerability. The result was that in 
1982 Chile suffered  the deepest debt crisis of  all Latin American countries. 
The situation was entirely different  in the first  half  of  the 1990s, re-
flecting  the lessons learned. GDP grew strongly and was accompanied by 
high investment and saving. The pre-tequila phase in Chile, unlike the pe-
riod preceding the debt cris is, began with high utilization of  productive ca-
pacity. Policy designed to maintain the stability of  macroeconomic prices 
allowed aggregate demand to increase along with saving and investment. 
The high growth rates were therefore  sustainable over time. In other words, 
capital inflows  were absorbed efficiently.  In the external sector, the current 
account deficit  was careful!v  controlled, and the Central Bank pursued an 
active policy of  preventing excessive exchange rate appreciation. With the 
Mexican crisis of  1994-95, the Chilean economy showed that its domestic 
achievements were accompanied by great strengths on the external front.  A 
positive trade shock reinforced  this solid position. 
Chile was highly regarded in the international community at the start 
of  the third episode. The economy had been almost immune to contagion 
from  the tequila effect,  and it enjoyed full  utilization of  capacity and solid 
domestic fundamentals.  In 1996-97 Chile recorded vigorous growth that 
could be judged sustainable thanks to high domestic investment rates, but 
the economy was becoming vulnerable to changes in the international en-
vironment. When such changes occurred in 1998, driven by the large trade 
and financial  shocks brought on by the Asian crisis, Chile had a high exter-
nal deficit  and an appreciated exchange rate. The country was forced  to un-
dergo an intense process of  macroeconomic adjustment, which led to a 
recession (though with a moderate drop in GDP of  1 percent in 1999). 
The specific  policies and approaches used in each of  the three episodes 
varied, evolving from  the extreme naiveté of  the 1970s into the more prag-
matic approach of  the early 1990s. The end of  the century saw a turning 
away from  macroeconomic sustainability as authorities gave in to the temp-
2. Ffrench-Davis  (2001, chap. 1). 
tation to move toward financial  globalization without properly respecting 
underlying risks. 
Liberalization of  the Capital Account: 1975-82 
Shortly after  the military coup of  1973, Chile began its transition to 
a free-market  economy with a series of  institutional reforms  of  great depth 
and breadth. The implementation of  the neoliberal model meant substan-
tial changes in the public sector's role in the national economy. An intense 
program of  import liberalization was initiated in 1973, and the financial 
system was radically reformed  in 1975. Almost all the banks that had been 
nationalized by the previous government were privatized. Interest rates 
were abruptly deregulated in April 1975, and the rules governing lending 
(which encouraged its channeling to production rather than consump-
tion) were eliminated. Authorities underrated prudential supervision, be-
lieving that the market would do the job.3 
Volume,  Source,  and  Use  of  Flows 
Capital flows  into Chile rose fast  starting in 1977 as a result of  the 
boom in lending to developing countries by international banks, which was 
triggered by the capital surplus of  oil-producing countries and was further 
stimulated by domestic financial  reforms.  Chile exhibited a significant  ac-
cumulation of  international reserves up to 1981, although shortly thereaf-
ter the external sector showed a high and rising current account deficit.  The 
capital flow  was overwhelmingly concentrated in the private sector without 
guarantees by the State, with less than one-fifth  of  inflows  taking the form 
of  foreign  direct investment (FDI) and loans to the public sector. 
Flows were sizeable in the second half  of  the 1970s, as shown in table 
3-1. Foreign saving (the current account deficit)  and debt service also grew 
as a share of  exports, despite very strong export activity in the initial years 
of  the neoliberal experiment. Foreign debt service in 1982 equaled 88 per-
cent of  goods and services exports, that is, three times the debt-service co-
efficient  for  1970-74. The magnitude of  capital movements is reflected  in 
the fact  that for  1980-81, gross loans received climbed to 24 percent of 
3. See Ffrcnch-Davis  and Arellano (1981); Diaz-Alejandro (1985); Edwards and Cox Edwards 
(1987); Ffrench-Davis  (2001, chap. 5); Harberger (1985); Morando and Schmidt-Hebbel (1988); 
Reinstein and Rosende (2000); Tapia (1979); Valdés-Prieto (1992). 
Table 3-1. Chile,  Net  Capital  Inflows,  and  GDP Growth,  1977-2000 
Percent of  GDP 
Sai'ln&  Fixed  Actual  GDP 
I'eriod 
Net  capital  inflows (current  prices) 
(1986prices) (1986  prices) 
A ) / 7 , / / 
Current  prices 1986prices' National External GDP growth1. 
1977-81 10.8 17.2 11.6 7.2 18.7 7.5 3.0 
1982-89 5.5 6.4 11.5 6.2 18.2 2.6 3.0 
1990-95 6.9 6.9 22.1 2.5 26.1 7.8 7.0 
1996-97 8.0 9.2 21.2 5.7 31.6 7.4 7.1 
1998-2000 1.2 1.3 21.6 2.7 28.6 2.7 4.8 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile. Potential GDP based on R. Ffrench-Davis,  Economic  Reforms  in  Chile:  From  Dictatorship  to  Democracy,  chap. 1, University of 
Michigan Press, 2001. 
a. 1 he constant price series was derived by deflating  the dollar series using an index of  foreign  prices faced  by the Chilean economy. For the denominator, 
GDP at constant prices was converted into 1986 dollars using the 1986 peso-dollar exchange rate. 
b. Productive capacity created in every period. 
ON 
GDP. All of  these indicators were substantially greater than the Latin 
American averages for  the 1970s.4 
The composition of  agents participating in capital flows  changed sig-
nificantly  in this period. On the lending side, 84 percent of  the foreign 
debt in 1981 was to banks, compared to only 19 percent at the end of 
1974. Chile's bank debt grew 57 percent a year between 1977 and 1981, 
while the average for  developing countries was 28 percent. On the borrow-
ing side, the growing net inflows  were directed primarily at the private sec-
tor from  1975 on, while the State moved toward a budget surplus. A 
deliberate policy of  reducing the role of  the State was facilitated  by changes 
in international markets, where official  institutions lending to govern-
ments lost relevance while private capital markets emerged strongly as a 
source of  access for  both public and private borrowers. 
The great majority of  private debt was contracted with no explicit 
guarantee by the State. Fully two-thirds of  Chile's total debt lacked such 
guarantee in 1981. Through 1977, the private sector obtained a signifi-
cant part of  its loans directly, as a result of  quantitative restrictions then 
applying to local banks with respect to foreign  financial  credits.5 From 
1978 on, domestic banks were allowed gradually greater importance in the 
direct intermediation of  foreign  financing.  It was only in April 1980, how-
ever, that domestic banks were allowed access to foreign  credit on the same 
conditions as the nonbanking sector. Lending through the banking sector 
grew dramatically from  then on, yet flows  to the nonfinancial  sector con-
tinued to grow at a significant  rate as well. The private sector received 94 
percent of  the gross flow  in 1976-81/' 
Debt  and  Macroeconomic  Adjustment 
Chile took on massive quantities of  debt between 1977 and 1981, 
which had significant  effects  on aggregate demand and its composition. It 
also contributed to both economic recovery and the concentration of 
wealth, crowded out domestic savings, and had a decisive effect  on mon-
etary and exchange rate policies. Generally speaking, the initial impact of 
foreign  borrowing is an increase in the supply of  foreign  currency, which 
can lead to two outlets: an increase in reserves or exchange rate apprecia-
tion and a growing current account deficit.  Chile experienced both effects 
4. Ffrench-Davis  (1984). 
5. A large share of  these loans was backed by bank guarantees at the beginning of  the borrowing 
boom. See Ffrench-Davis  (2001, table 5.4). 
6. See Ffrench-Davis  (2001, chap. 5). 
up to 1981. Net capital inflows  were greater than the capacity of  the do-
mestic economy to absorb foreign  funding,  despite the growing expansion 
of  that capacity as a result of  economic recovery, import liberalization, and 
exchange rate revaluations driven by inflows. 
The rapid accumulation of  reserves, in turn, had substantial effects  on 
the money supply. The large capital flows—both  those used to finance  in-
creased imports and those that went to expanding international reserves— 
led to a high proportion of  the economy's domestic credit being based on 
foreign  funding.  Despite this volume, substantial differences  between do-
mestic and external interest rates persisted. 
m o n e t a r y p o l i c y a n d c a p i t a l c o n t r o l s Starting in 1975, net pur-
chases of  foreign  currency by the Central Bank were the main source of 
money supply expansion.' They represented over 100 percent of  money 
supply changes in the three-year period 1978-80. As already mentioned, 
the overwhelming share corresponded to private borrowing; operations 
with the public sector actually had a contractive effect  in some years. The 
severe macroeconomic discquilibria that had been accumulating finally 
emerged in 1981, when international reserves began to fall.  The monetary 
effect  of  foreign  exchange operations correspondingly became strongly 
contractive. 
Some direct restrictions were applied to capital inflows  as a part of  the 
monetary program. One such restriction was designed specifically  to mod-
erate the monetary effects  of  flows  by limiting the amount that banks 
could exchange each month at the Central Bank. This measure was in ef-
fect  from  1977 to 1979, with a series of  modifications  in the maximum 
amount allowed.8 The restrictions were not sufficient,  however, to hold 
foreign  loans to the private sector at a volume consistent with the rate of 
monetary expansion considered desirable by economic authorities. Do-
mestic credit by the Central Bank (rediscounts or loans to the banking sec-
tor) was therefore  tightened in the face  of  increased money supply 
stemming from  foreign  exchange dealings. Nevertheless, the increase in ag-
gregate demand was much more rapid than GDP growth. A strong real ex-
change rate revaluation took place despite the accumulation of  reserves, 
which had the effect  of  crowding out domestic producers of  tradables. 
Targets for  expanding liquidity were in effect  while a closed-economy 
approach predominated in policymaking. In 1979, authorities adopted an 
7. Ffrench-Davis  and Arellano (1981, table 13). 
8. Ffrench-Davis  and Arellano (1981). 
open-economy monetary approach to the balance of  payments. The nomi-
nal exchange rate was frozen  in June, and a supposedly neutral monetary 
policy was established. Variations in the level of  international reserves were 
to automatically determine the economy's level of  liquidity, within the con-
text of  a fiscal  budget in surplus and low reserve ratios in the banking sector. 
In April 1979, an unremunerated reserve requirement was established 
for  foreign  loans (under Article 14), with percentages varying according to 
the term of  the loan. The prohibition on loans with an average maturity 
of  less than twenty-four  months was maintained (with a 100 percent re-
serve requirement), and reserve requirements were based on a structure of 
decreasing rates according to the loan term. Loans over sixty-six months 
were exempt. In August 1979 and July 1980, rates were lowered for  loans 
with a maturity of  over twenty-four  months. The modifications  were not 
significant  for  two reasons, however. First, no loan of  less than two years 
could be contracted throughout this period, except for  trade credits gov-
erned by limits that had survived the deregulation of  April 1980. Second, 
the strong segment of  the international market at the time was syndicated 
loans, whose average term varied from  six to ten years in 1976-80.9 
The monetary approach to the balance of  payments prevailed from 
mid-1979 to mid-1982, with a neutral monetary policy based on the dollar 
standard. At the end of  these three years, a contractionary automatic adjust-
ment was in effect,  with disastrous results on employment and output.10 
e x c h a n g e r a t e p o l i c y Exchange rate policy evolved significantly  in the 
1974-82 period.11 Up to June 1976, there was a crawling-peg regime, with 
adjustments made one to four  times a month. The subsequent regime 
combined daily devaluations determined each month in advance with four 
abrupt chang es in the value of  foreign  currency (two devaluations and two 
revaluations). In early 1978 and 1979, a table of  daily adjustments was es-
tablished for  the remainder of  each year. In June 1979, this system was 
interrupted with a devaluation that brought the price of  the dollar to the 
level scheduled for  the end of  the year (39 pesos). This rate was maintained 
until June 1982, when there was an 18 percent devaluation and an an-
nouncement of  a table of  smaller devaluations. This was soon replaced, 
however, by a short-lived freely  floating  exchange rate, which was followed 
by a return to a crawling-peg regime. The evolution of  the real exchange 
rate is shown in figure  3-1. 
9. Ffrcnch-Davis  (1984, tabic 11). 
10. See Arellano and Cortázar (1982); Ffrcnch-Davis  (2001, chaps. 1 and 4). 
1 1. See Ffrench-Davis  (2001, chap. 4). 
Figure 3-1. Real  Exchange  Rate,  1974-2000" 
Index, 1974 = 100 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); Central Bank of 
Chile; Ffrench-Davis  (2001). 
Net inflows  were a crucial factor  in making it possible for  the author-
ities to manage the exchange rate with goals other than efficient  resource 
allocation until 1981. The use of  the exchange rate to shape expectations 
(in 1976-79) or to anchor domestic prices to external prices (1979-82) 
resulted in lower inflation,  but it also produced significant  real exchange 
rate appreciation (45 percent between 1975 and 1981). When combined 
with import liberalization (the average tariff  was reduced from  94 percent 
to 10 percent) and the economic recovery of  1977-81, this caused the not-
able current account deficit  mentioned above.12 Furthermore, the gradual 
appreciation brought the observed real cost of  foreign  borrowing down to 
negative levels in 1979 and 1980, which encouraged inflows. 
i n t e r e s t r a t e d i f f e r e n t i a l s  The government expected liberalization 
to cause a strong trend toward the reduction of  spreads, with an equalizing 
of  domestic and foreign  interest rates. Large differentials  between lending 
12. The increase in the deficit  was also associated with high interest payments and falling  copper 
prices. The loss in government revenue in 1981—compared to the 1965-70 average—represented 1.6 
percent of  GDP. The sharp fall  in copper prices was partially offset  by the government's capturing the 
economic rent following  the nationalization of  copper mining in successive stages in 1966, 1969, and 
1971. 
Table 3-2. Chile:  Domestic  and  External  Real  Interest  Rates,  1975-82-1 
Annual percent in pesos 
Year Domestic External Differential 
1975b 121.0 
1976 51.2 -21.1 72.3 
1977 39.4 0.2 39.2 
1978 35.1 3.8 31.3 
1979 16.9 -0.9 17.8 
1980 12.2 -8.0 20.2 
1981 38.8 12.4 26.4 
1982 35.2 45.0 -9.8 
Sources: Author's calculations, based on data from  the Central Bank of  Chile; Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas (INE); R. Cortázar and J. Marshall, "Indice de precios al consumidor en Chile: 
1970-78," Colección  Estudios  CIEPLAN4  (November), 1980; R. Ffrench-Davis  and], P. Arellano, 
"Apertura Financiera externa: la experiencia chilena en 1973-80," Colección  Estudios  CIEPLAN  5 
(July), 1981. 
a. The domestic rate refers  to the predominant segment of  the market, covering transactions for 
terms of  thirty to ninety-one days. The external interest rate is that paid for  bank credits obtained 
under Article 14, plus the cost in respect of  compulsory deposits and the Financial spread, all 
converted into their peso equivalents. In 1982 the preferential  exchange rate was used to calculate 
the external interest rate. 
b. Second semester, after  interest rate liberalization. 
and borrowing rates in the domestic financial  market persisted throughout 
the period, however, and both rates were quite high. In addition, domestic 
rates continued to exceed international rates by a wide margin despite the 
large capital inflows,  especially from  1979 on (see table 3-2).13 
The distributive impact of  interest rate differentials  is illustrated by 
the fact  that between 1976 and 1982 the average domestic borrower paid 
interest exceeding a "normal" annual real rate of  8 percent, equivalent to 
300 percent of  the principal borrowed. In other words, a borrower who 
paid the lender 8 percent, renewed principal, and capitalized interest over 
8 percent would, by the end of  1982, have had a debt four  times the in-
itial one, in currency of  constant purchasing power. By contrast, the debtor 
borrowing abroad on the same terms would have owed 44 percent less be-
13. One recurring explanation is that the rate differentials  derived from  expectations of  devaluation. 
In 1981, however, many local borrowers still moved from  peso-denominated to foreign-denominated 
debt. Ffrench-Davis  (2001, chap. 5), and Harberger (1985) examine the causes ofthe  real interest rate 
differentials  in pesos. These causes were reinforced  by the rediscount constraints imposed by the Cen-
tral Bank. 
fore  the 1982 devaluation than the original debt contracted in 1976. The 
massive real devaluation of  80 percent then raised this borrower's debt to 
its original level (equivalent to only one-fourth  of  the first  borrower's peso-
denominated debt). The figures  vary, obviously, according to the date of 
borrowing. For example, late borrowers who took loans denominated in 
foreign  currency in 1981 lost dramatically, given the real devaluations that 
took place in 1982. 
These differentials  had significant  effects,  from  both the allocative and 
distributive points of  view.'4 Small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) 
were largely relegated to the high-interest segment of  the market. Firms as-
sociated with the management of  financial  institutions, as well as the larger 
economic groups, enjoyed expeditious access to foreign  credit, whether 
directly or through the intermediation of  Chilean banks. The low rates of 
saving and investment during this period show that the environment pro-
vided more incentives for  financial  activity and speculation than for 
productive activities.15 
d e t e r i o r a t e d p o r t f o l i o  q u a l i t y a n d p r u d e n t i a l s u p e r v i s i o n For -
eign borrowing gave rise to a domestic lending boom. The increase in 
credit took several forms:  direct foreign  loans not backed by guarantees, 
direct foreign  loans with guarantees, foreign  loans intermediated by local 
banks, and loans made by these banks in domestic currency on the basis 
of  the liquidity generated by foreign  exchange operations. The lend-
ing boom took place in an atmosphere of  very lax prudential supervision. 
Related-party lending rose rapidly, often  without guarantees or with ficti-
tious guarantees. Regulations were circumvented via cross-lending and 
loans to paper firms,  as well as loans through off-shore  institutions. Faced 
with high interest rates, the banks renewed loans (often  on a thirty-day 
basis) and financed  interest payments with new loans. Meanwhile, the 
stock of  loans grew 38 percent a year in real terms between 1976 and 
1981. Nonperforming  loans appeared low and the banks' profits  high. 
Many loans were backed by stock and real estate, but the prices of  such 
collateral were inflated  as a result of  the financial  boom and the mistaken 
belief  that the Chilean economy would continue to grow at around 8 per-
cent a year. 
Required provisions were low. In 1979, general requirements were re-
14. Zahler (1980). 
15. See Mizala (1992). 
duced from  2 percent of  loans to 0.75 percent. Priority was to be given to 
individual provisions, although this was not implemented. After  the ex-
plosion of  the banking crisis in January 1983, observers realized that 19 
percent of  loans in late 1982 were with related parties and represented 249 
percent of  the capital and reserves of  private banks. The severe weakness 
of  the financial  system, which resulted from  typical neoliberal reforms,  had 
enormous fiscal  costs in the following  years.16 
It should be emphasized that around 40 percent of  external lending to 
private firms  in the domestic market (Article 14) was handled directly, 
with no intermediary between borrowers and foreign  lenders. Conse-
quently, not even the strictest and most effective  prudential supervision of 
the local financial  system could have fully  prevented the development of 
macroeconomic imbalances as a result of  the boom in foreign  funding.17 
Inefficient  Domestic  Absorption  and  External  Vulnerability 
The world economy and the domestic market underwent a process of 
increasing indebtedness, which led to a gradual exchange rate appreciation 
and great vulnerability for  Chile's external sector. The belief  that the appre-
ciation would prove sustainable made foreign  loans more attractive. Stock 
and real estate prices were rising at a dizzying rate.18 Such feedback  rein-
forced  the cycle, increasing the inflow  of  capital. This, in turn, increased ag-
gregate demand and supported the persistent exchange rate appreciation 
and a notable rise in asset prices. The economy became increasingly accom-
modated to a massive financial  inflow,  and aggregate demand became 
highly intensive in importables.19 
The form  that foreign  funding  took and the incentives provided by 
the economic model led to a decrease in investment, and, more so, in na-
tional savings (see table 3-1 above).20 Gross fixed  capital formation  aver-
ió. Held and Jimenez (2001); Sanhueza (1999). 
17. See Valdés-Prieto (1992) on the weaknesses of  prudential supervision on the supply side and 
the importance of  nonbank flows. 
18. The General Stock Price Index grew by 1,000 percent between 1976 and 1980. Real estate 
prices peaked in 1981 at more than 100 percent above their 1976 prices (Morandé, 1992). 
19. Ffrench-Davis  and De Gregorio (1987). 
20. One theoretical interpretation of  the crowding out of  national savings is that a sharp rise in pro-
ductivity generated the expectation that GDP capacity would continue to grow by 8 percent a year 
even given a low investment ratio. Anticipating the consumption of  future  increased income was there-
fore  seen as an equilibrating intertemporal adjustment. Since the expectation was wrong—capacity 
was growing very slowly—the adjustment was actually destabilizing (Ffrench-Davis  and Reisen, 1998, 
chap. 1). 
aged only 18.7 percent of  GDP in 1977-81, significantly  under the 21.2 
percent average of  the 1960s.21 A growing share of  funds  was channeled 
to the consumption of  imported goods, crowding out spending on do-
mestic tradables and national savings. This phenomenon intensified  in 
1981, as the process of  recovery came up against the economy's produc-
tive capacity. National savings fell  to 8 percent of  GDP in 1981 and to 2 
percent in 1982. Excessively high domestic interest rates, the disman-
tling of  public mechanisms to support productive activities, the drop in 
public investment, and an abrupt import liberalization with an appre-
ciated and unstable exchange rate all combined to discourage productive 
investment. 
It was obvious that the external deficit  could not be sustained for  long, 
even if  the international environment were to remain unchanged. Never-
theless, the government argued that the process was in balance because 
private lenders were financing  it and that it would be self-regulating. 
Demand for  imports would soon reach the saturation point, spontaneously 
checking the rise. A currency crisis could not occur against a background of 
budget surpluses, international reserves larger than high-powered money, 
and a supposedly neutral monetary policy. When international financial 
problems began to emerge in 1981, however, the current account deficit 
was 14.5 percent.22 There was a clear and compelling need to reduce the ex-
ternal imbalance and correct the appreciated exchange rate. 
Chile's difficulty  in obtaining foreign  loans in 1982 coincided, then, 
with a great domestic need for  fresh  funds  to pay growing interest and 
amortization costs, as well as to cover the trade deficit.  The composition 
of  the foreign  debt had some strongly negative dynamics. First, given the 
prevalence of  variable international interest rates, net interest payments 
quadrupled between 1978 and 1982 (reaching 7 percent of  GDP), afterthe 
contraction of  international financial  markets. Second, short-term debt 
grew from  what was considered a normal level, associated with a sustainable 
volume of  trade, to double its share, reaching 20 percent of  all debt by 1982 
21. Figures in 1986 currency. The authorities reiterated that increased productivity made higher in-
vestment unnecessary. Our calculations show, however, that of  the actual GDI' increase of  6.5 percent 
in the 1976-80 period, only 2 percent a year was due to increased capacity, while the rest reflected  ex-
ploitation of  existing capacity that had been underused since the deep recession of  1975 (Ffrench-
Davis, 2001, chap. 1). 
22. This figure,  in current prices, underestimates the importance of  the deficit  as a result of  the ex-
cessive exchange rate appreciation in 1981. The deficit  climbs to 21 percent of  GDP if  measured using 
the exchange rate of  1976-78. For a discussion of  alternative measures of  this coefficient,  see Ffrcnch-
Davis (2001, chap. 5). 
Table 3-3. Debt  Crisis  in  Chile,  1977-83 
Indicator 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
GDP" 8.3 7.8 7.1 7.7 6.7 - 1 3 . 4 - 3 . 5 
Aggregate expenditure" 12.9 9.7 10.4 10.5 12.4 - 2 3 . 8 - 8 . 6 
Fiscal expenditure" 8.8 - 1 8 . 8 - 7 . 4 - 3 . 2 7.6 16.7 - 4 . 0 
Exports" 12.0 11.8 14.2 14.5 - 9 . 0 4.5 0.1 
Imports" 32.4 18.1 23.9 20.7 13.3 - 3 4 . 0 - 1 7 . 7 
Current account deficit1' 3.7 5.2 5.4 7.1 14.5 9.2 5.4 
Real exchage ratec 62.8 69.7 69.7 60.9 51.8 60.1 72.1 
Terms-of-trade  effect1' - 0 . 2 - 0 . 9 1.8 - 0 . 6 - 2 . 2 - 0 . 8 1.6 
Source: Based on data from  the Central Bank of  Chile; F. Larrain, "Public Sector Behavior in a 
Highly Indebted Country: The Contrasting Chilean Experience, 1970-85," in The  Public  Sector  and 
the  Latin  American  Crisis,  edited by F. Larrain and M. Selowsky, San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991 ; 
Ffrench-Davis  (2001). 
a. Official  figures  at 1986 constant prices, annual growth (percent). 
b. Current prices, percent of  GDP. 
c. Index, 1986 = 100. 
d. Current prices, percent of  GDP. 
(13 percent of  GDP). Third, amortization of  private medium-term debt 
grew rapidly. 
In brief,  the Government was relying on the automatic functioning  of 
the dollar standard, and the productive apparatus was weak and suffering 
from  overindebtedness. The external shocks of  the early 1980s thus found 
the Chilean economy in a very vulnerable position. The effects  of  the fi-
nancial and terms-of-trade  shocks were multiplied in the domestic market, 
with a reduction in aggregate spending of  30 percent and a GDP drop of 
17 percent in 1982-83 (see table 3-3). In the midst of  this general crisis, 
many observers failed  to analyze the specific  policies for  capital flow  man-
agement used in this period. The tools were clearly inadequate for  coun-
teracting the crisis. This was not so much the fault  of  the instruments 
themselves, however, as of  the fact  that a small economy was confronting 
an enormous supply of  funds  and that very high differentials  between do-
mestic and foreign  interest rates (about 20 to 30 percentage points) made 
any sort of  inflow  profitable. 
Active Regulation of  Capital Inflows:  1990-95 
Latin America began to see renewed inflows  of  private capital in the 
late 1980s. Chile was one of  the first  to attract new funds  and was among 
the countries facing  the greatest quantity of  inflows  in relation to the size 
of  its economy. Recipient countries generally experienced macroeconomic 
problems stemming from  the magnitude of  the inflows  and their compo-
sition, which was prone to volatility.23 
Chilean policy in the first  half  of  the 1990s represented a significant 
step toward a more pragmatic approach to macroeconomic management. 
In brief,  policymakers responded to the massive availability of  foreign  cap-
ital by attempting to moderate short-term inflows  while keeping the door 
open to long-term flows.  Specifically,  an unremunerated reserve require-
ment was established to raise the cost of  bringing in short-term capital; 
this is a market-based instrument that affects  relative costs. Authorities also 
used exchange rate intervention and monetary sterilization to hold down 
the appreciation of  the real exchange rate in the face  of  those flows  that 
surpassed the reserve barrier and gave way to the monetary effects  of  for-
eign operations. These tools were used in support of  a development strat-
egy that encouraged export growth and diversification. 
The policy was highly successful,  in the sense that in 1991-94 the cur-
rent account deficit  was moderate, the currency appreciated less than in 
most of  the region's countries, and the total short-term external debt was 
held to a fairly  low magnitude. When the Mexican exchange rate crisis ex-
ploded in late 1994, the Chilean economy proved immune to contagion 
(see table 3-4). The country had significantly  reduced its vulnerability. 
Capital  Infloivs  from  1990 to  1995 
The return to democracy in 1990 coincided approximately with the 
beginning of  an episode of  abundant foreign  capital flowing  to emerging 
economies. Effective  private inflows  to Chile achieved some importance in 
1989; after  that date, FDI increased steadily and represented a solid ma-
jority of  capital inflows  in the 1990s (see figure  3-2).24 A set of  active mac-
roeconomic policies was adopted to regulate the capital surge. During this 
period, productive capacity expanded vigorously, and the economy was 
running close to full  capacity. This was a determining factor  in creating a 
virtuous circle of  rapid capital formation.25 
23. See, for  instance, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993); Ffrench-Davis  and Griffith-Jones 
(1995). 
24. Significant  movements began in 1986 in relation to a debt conversion program, but this activ-
ity involved debt paper instead of  cash flows.  See Ffrench-Davis  (2001, chap. 7). 
25. See Agosin (1998); Ffrench-Davis  and Reisen (1998). 
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Table 3-4. Tequila  Crisis  in Chile,  1991-95 
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
GDP'' 8.0 12.3 7.0 5.7 10.6 
Aggregate expenditure'1 6.2 15.0 10.8 5.5 16.2 
Fiscal expenditure-1 10.4 12.3 7.4 5.6 6.2 
Exports-1 12.4 13.9 3.5 11.6 11.0 
Imports-1 7.0 21.8 14.2 10.1 25.0 
Current account deficitb 0.3 2.3 5.6 3.0 2.0 
Real exchage rate1- 106.4 97.6 96.9 94.3 88.9 
Terms-of-trade  effectd 0.1 -0.3 -1.9 2.8 2.5 
Source: Based on data from  the Central Bank of  Chile; Dirección de Presupuestos del Ministerio 
de Hacienda (DIPRES), Estadísticas  de  las  finanzas  públicas:  1990-1999,  Santiago, March 2000; 
Ffrench-Davis  (2001). 
a. Official  figures  at 1986 constant prices, annual growth (percent). 
b. Current prices, percent of  GDI'. 
c. Index, 1986 = 100. 
d. Current prices, percent of  GDP. 
Private short-term lending also figured  prominently in the capital 
surge into Latin America in the 1990s. For a country to be the target of 
interest rate arbitrage, domestic interest rates must exceed international 
rates by a margin that more than offsets  the currency's expected deprecia-
tion and the country risk. Such conditions obtained in Chile starting in 
the early 1990s. On the one hand, in 1992 and 1993, international rates 
on dollar loans were at their lowest level in thirty years, and though they 
later rose, they continued to be moderate and remained far  below their lev-
els in the 1980s. On the other hand, Chile is a capital-scarce country, with 
a stock consistent with a GDP of  only U.S.$5,000 per capita. Because the 
scarcity entails a higher price, the interest rate in emerging economies 
tends to be higher than in developed countries.26 Monetary policy must 
keep average real interest rates above international rates to ensure sustain-
able macroeconomic balances.27 
Other conditions for  interest rate arbitrage also proved favorable  to in-
flows.  After  a cumulative real depreciation of  130 percent in the 1980s, 
26. Our policy implications are consistent with the idea that the fastest  growing economies have 
higher interest rates associated with their GDP growth rates. 
27. Chilean authorities increased the structural interest rate differential  through a macroeconomic 
adjustment in 1990, based unilaterally on a substantial rise in the interest rate by the Central Bank 
(see Ffrench-Davis,  2000, chap. 7). 
Figure 3-2. Composition  of  Capital  Flows,  1980-2000 










Source: Central Bank of  Chile. 
the exchange rate began to appreciate gradually in the 1990s. As in the case 
of  other countries in the region, Chile's country risk premium fell.  An at-
mosphere of  emerging markets mania (à la Kindleberger) on the part of 
international investors generated a spectacular drop in perceived country 
risk.28 Private short-term capital inflows  were heavy well into 1992, after 
which they began to fall  as a result of  policy measures taken to check them. 
Portfolio  inflows  took two forms:  investment through large interna-
tional mutual funds  and the issuing of  American depositary receipts 
(ADRs) by large Chilean firms.  Primary issues of  ADRs represent an op-
portunity for  a firm  to expand its capital at a relatively low cost, since costs 
in international markets naturally tend to be lower than in the Chilean fi-
nancial market. Secondary issues of  ADRs occur when foreigners  purchase 
securities available on the Chilean stock market and subsequently convert 
them into ADRs.29 This operation constitutes a change of  ownership from 
nationals to foreigners,  without a direct financial  effect  on the firm.  Chile's 
relatively developed domestic securities market, together with the growing 
use of  ADRs to reach the U.S. securities market, made Chilean securities 
28. For instance, the Eurornoney  index shows an improving country risk from  47.7 in 1990 to 72.9 
in 1995. 
29. See Ffrench-Davis,  Agosin, and Uthoff  (1995). 
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attractive for  investors seeking new financial  vehicles. These changes of 
ownership exposed the economy to an additional degree of  uncertainty and 
volatility, since foreign  investors can easily withdraw their investments.30 
Such flows  clearly played a destabilizing role in the economy. They contrib-
uted to the inflationary  behavior of  the securities market in 1994 and 1997 
and depressed the market in 1995 and 1998, operating procyclically. 
While private sector flows  increased, public debt fell.  The Chilean 
government reduced new credits from  international financial  institutions 
and made sizable prepayments, particularly in 1995-96. 
The  Response  of  Macroeconomic  Policy  and  Its  Effects 
Monetary authorities in Chile deployed a wide range of  measures to 
regulate the surge in financial  capital in 1990-95. The Central Bank took 
steps to discourage inflows  of  short-term, liquid capital by means of  the 
unremunerated reserve requirement. At the same time, it kept the doors 
open for  FDI risk capital. It moderated the impact of  those waves of  cap-
ital by intervening in the foreign  exchange market to prevent an overabun-
dance of  foreign  currency from  appreciating the real exchange rate too 
much and by sterilizing the monetary effects  of  the rapid accumulation of 
international reserves.31 
Three other policies contributed to the success in managing capital in-
flows.  First, fiscal  policy was very cautious. Increases in social spending were 
financed  with new taxes. Consequently, Chile had a significant  nonfinan-
cial public sector surplus of  1 or 2 percent of  GDP. This prudential ap-
proach, which included observing the regulations of  a stabilization fund  for 
public copper revenues, facilitated  the monetary authorities' task of  regulat-
ing capital inflows,  and it contributed to preventing excessive exchange rate 
appreciation in the first  half  of  the decade. Of  course, running a fiscal  sur-
plus does not guarantee financial  stability. The great 1982 crisis occurred 
despite Chile's having had several years of  budget surpluses. The same thing 
happened in Mexico with tequila crisis and in Korea with the Asian crisis. In 
all three cases, the external deficit  was led by the private sector. 
30. Some analysts maintain that foreigners  who become pessimistic about a country generally sell 
their ADRs on the U.S. stock market, and the sale therefore  has no impact on domestic stock and for-
eign exchange markets. This argument disregards the fact  that when firms  issue ADRs, the prices of 
securities on the domestic and U.S. markets tend toward equality through arbitrage. In fact,  equity 
price movements of  Chilean firms  that have issued ADRs on U.S. markets are closely linked with 
movements on the Santiago exchange. 
31. See Ffrench-Davis,  Agosin, and Uthoff  (1995). 
Second, prudential banking regulations had been introduced in re-
sponse to the banking crisis of  1982-83, and the regulatory system had 
then been improved over the years. Authorities effectively  resisted pres-
sures to weaken supervision when lobbying sectors argued that the system 
was mature enough to self-regulate;  in fact,  prudential supervision was 
strongly intensified.  This made it difficult  for  capital inflows  to trigger an-
other credit boom in the commercial banks, which in turn helped keep the 
current account deficit  and exchange rate within sustainable limits until 
1995. It is important to note that a significant  share of  financial  flows  is 
not channeled through local banks. This phenomenon became decidedly 
more pronounced in the 1990s, with the development of  portfolio  invest-
ment funds  and derivatives markets. Nevertheless, fiscal  responsibility and 
effective  prudential supervision of  the financial  system are two very impor-
tant complements in regulating capital flows. 
Third, authorities continually monitored aggregate demand and its 
consistency with productive capacity. Consequently, macroeconomic dis-
equilibria were not allowed to accumulate. Some overheating occurred in 
1993, but the authorities conducted a downward adjustment. When the 
tequila crisis exploded, Chile had a moderate external deficit,  large re-
serves, and space for  increasing economic activity. Those conditions would 
not have been feasible  without regulating capital inflows,  managing the ex-
change rate flexibly,  and pursuing an active monetary policy.32 
p o l i c y f o r  m a n a g i n g c a p i t a l i n f l o w s  Strategic features  of  the policies 
used went against the fashion  of  capital account liberalization. The two 
main targets of  exchange rate and inflows  management policies were, first, 
achieving sustained macroeconomic stability in an economy prone to huge 
cycles (Chile experienced the sharpest recessions in all Latin America in 
1975 and 1982) and, second, supporting the growth model adopted by 
the authorities, which gave the expansion and diversification  of  exports a 
crucial role. 
In the face  of  a plentiful  supply of  foreign  funds,  Chilean authorities 
opted to regulate the foreign  currency market in order to prevent large 
misalignments in the real exchange rate relative to its medium-term trend. 
The natural short-term horizon of  financial  markets can lead to exchange 
rate values that are inconsistent with medium- and long-run trends, which 
32. Good luck also played a role, with a sharp improvement in the terms of  trade in 1995. Even so, 
the other factors  provided strong macroeconomic insurance. 
negatively affects  decisions in the productive sector.33 The authorities 
sought to preserve the predominance of  medium-term fundamentals  over 
short-term factors  influencing  the exchange rate. 
In June 1991, the financial  environment featured  accelerating growth 
in available external funds  and a high copper price—factors  considered to 
have a significant  transitory component. The authorities reacted by estab-
lishing an unremunerated reserve requirement of  20 percent on foreign 
credit (covering the entire spectrum of  foreign  credit, from  that associated 
with FDI to trade credit). The reserve was to be on deposit at the Central 
Bank for  a minimum of  90 days and a maximum of  one year, according 
to the time frame  of  the operation. At the same time, a tax on domestic 
loans of  1.2 percent for  operations of  up to one year was extended to for-
eign loans. The reserve requirement, an option of  paying its financial  cost, 
and the tax on foreign  credits all involved zero marginal cost for  the loans 
outstanding after  a one-year term. The first  two, however, were heavily on-
erous for  very short-term inflows. 
Since capital inflows  persisted, the reserve requirement was tightened 
and extended to almost all international financial  transactions. In May 1992 
the requirement was raised to 30 percent and was extended to cover time de-
posits in foreign  currency, and in July 1995 it was extended to the purchase 
of  Chilean stocks (secondary ADRs) by foreigners.34  The term of  the deposit 
was raised to one year, independent of  the maturity of  the loan. With some 
lag, authorities took measures to eliminate a loophole that made it possible 
to circumvent the reserve requirement by means of  FDI (since risk capital 
was exempt). This was accomplished by scrutinizing FDI applications. Per-
mission for  FDI exemptions from  reserve requirements was denied when it 
was determined that the inflow  was disguised financial  capital. In these 
cases, foreign  investors had to register their funds  at the Central Bank as fi-
nancial investments subject to the reserve requirement. 
Beginning in 1991, measures were put in place to facilitate  capital out-
flows  as a way of  lightening pressure on the exchange rate.35 Specifically,  a 
series of  incremental changes allowed Chilean pension funds  to invest up 
33. F French-Davis (2000, chap. 6); Ffrench-Davis  and Ocampo (in this volume); Zahler (1998). 
34. It is not difficult  to impose reserve requirements on foreign  portfolio  investments. If  funds  to 
be invested are deposited in a Chilean bank, they remain subject to the reserve requirement there. For 
funds  not using a Chilean bank as an intermediary, the reserve requirement can be enforced  at the 
time the asset is registered to a party with a foreign  address. Registration with the Central Bank is also 
necessary when converting securities into ADRs. 
35. See Ffrench-Davis,  Agosin, and Uthoff  (1995). 
to 6 percent of  their total assets abroad as of  1995.36 Expeditious access to 
the formal  foreign  currency market was provided for  residents wanting to 
invest abroad (chapter XII of  the exchange regulations), which had the ad-
ditional benefit  of  encouraging the development of  Chilean firms.  This 
was effective  in stimulating considerable flows  of  FDI, as well as acquisi-
tions by Chilean firms  in neighboring countries.37 Still, the greater profit-
ability of  financial  assets in Chile compared to financial  investments 
abroad, along with expectations of  an appreciating exchange rate, discou-
raged foreign  investments by pension funds  and by the mutual funds  cre-
ated at that time. 
The immediate effect  of  deregulating outflows  was probably to en-
courage new inflows  thanks to the greater certainty that it gave potential 
investors coming into Chile. This scenario may actually produce the op-
posite of  the desired effect,  because the market takes advantage of  the 
opportunity to move foreign  currency abroad when expectations of  appre-
ciation are replaced by expectations of  depreciation, which is precisely 
when the economy is most vulnerable and likely to suffer  from  speculative 
attack.38 The progressive deregulation of  outflows  can thus imply a risk of 
capital flight  not only from  the sudden exit of  capital that previously came 
in, but also from  domestic funds  seeking to speculate against the peso. 
This procyclical feature  makes it particularly dangerous to facilitate  out-
flows  by domestic investors, since it weakens the effect  of  measures such 
as the reserve requirement on inflows,  as was proved in 1998-99. 
e x c h a n g e r a t e p o l i c y Exchange rate policy also underwent a substan-
tial shift  after  the 1982-83 crisis. From 1984 on, authorities used a crawl-
ing band, which was widened to ±5 percent in 1989. The official  rate was 
devalued daily, according to an estimate of  net inflation.  Discrete nominal 
devaluations were added at various junctures, serving to achieve the not-
able real depreciation of  130 percent between 1982 and 1988. 
Chile was thus coming out of  the depths of  a debt crisis faced  with de-
preciation. The real exchange rate had reached historic highs, such that 
there was room for  some appreciation. However, the economy was mov-
ing from  a shortage to a very abundant supply of  foreign  savings, and au-
thorities wanted to avoid an excessive and overly rapid adjustment in the 
36. It was argued that this would contribute to diversifying  risk and increasing the profitability  of 
the private pension system. 
37. Calderón and Griffith-Jones  (1995). 
38. Williamson (1992); Labán and Larrain (1997). 
exchange rate.39 One particularly problematic aspect of  the situation in-
volved foreign  expectations: as pessimism turns to optimism, foreign  in-
vestors tend to rapidly define  a new stock of  desired investments in the 
emerging market; this generates excessive inflows  of  capital, whose high 
levels are naturally transitory, not permanent. 
The crawling band was broadened to ±10 percent in January 1992. 
This produced a wave of  revaluatory expectations fed  by capital inflows. 
The flows  were stimulated by the knowledge that the Central Bank would 
not intervene within the set band. For many months, a proposal had cir-
culated at the Central Bank to initiate a dirty or regulated float  within the 
band. Proponents of  such intramarginal intervention argued that given an 
increasingly active informal  foreign  exchange market and a more porous 
formal  market, the current pure band led to an observed exchange rate 
with a tendency toward the extremes of  the band (the ceiling in 1989-90, 
the floor  shortly thereafter).  The sudden revaluation of  almost 10 percent 
in the observed rate between January and February 1992 contributed to 
the Bank's initiating the dirty float  in March. The observed rate then fluc-
tuated within a range of  1 to 8 points above the floor  of  the band—in 
other words, generally off  the bottom of  the band and always with active 
purchases by the Bank, though also with sales from  time to time. 
The initial broadening of  the band had created expectations that the 
Bank had renounced the attempt to avoid revaluatory pressures and sus-
tain the export strategy, instead giving the market—which was dominated 
by short-term participants—the job of  determining the observed rate 
within a very wide range. By establishing the regulated float,  the Central 
Bank regained a greater role, which allowed it to strengthen the long-term 
variables that determine the exchange rate facing  producers of  exportables 
and importables. 
In subsequent months, U.S. interest rates continued to fall,  putting 
pressure on the Central Bank. Nevertheless, the Chilean economy had a 
notable boom, with a GDP increase firmly  in the double digits. The Bank 
therefore  wanted to raise rather than lower domestic interest rates to pro-
mote macroeconomic balance. To deter arbitrage, it decided to increase the 
reserve requirement on capital inflows.  The effectiveness  of  the reserve re-
quirement and its flexible  application at that juncture facilitated  monetary 
policy and avoided accumulation of  macroeconomic imbalances. 
Finally, in July 1992, the dollar was replaced by a basket of  currencies 
39. Sec Zahler (1998). 
as the currency standard for  the exchange rate. This measure was intended 
to introduce greater exchange rate uncertainty in short-term dollar-based 
operations, thereby reducing incentives for  interest rate arbitrage, given 
the daily instability governing the international values of  the currencies in-
cluded (namely, the dollar, the deutsche mark, and the yen). At the same 
time, replacing the dollar with the basket meant greater stability for  aver-
age peso values of  returns on exports. Unlike financial  operations, which 
are denominated largely in dollars, trade is geographically diversified  and 
thus operates with a more diverse mix of  currencies. 
The actual market performance  strongly indicates that the exchange 
rate appreciation during this period represented equilibrating movements. 
This is consistent both with the disappearance of  the effects  of  the 1980s 
crisis, allowing the elimination of  the overdevaluation then required, and 
with net improvements of  productivity for  Chilean tradables. A revealed 
proof  is the fact  that the current account deficit  was very moderate: 2.5 
percent GDP in 1990-95. 
s t r o n g e r b a n k i n g s u p e r v i s i o n The Chilean banking crisis of  ^ S I -
SÓ, which followed  on the heels of  a massive capital surge in the late 1970s, 
carried a number of  valuable lessons that were reflected  in Chilean legisla-
tion.40 Some of  the elements of  prudential supervision adopted include the 
continuous monitoring of  the quality of  bank assets; strict limits on banks' 
lending to related agents; automatic mechanisms to adjust banks' capital 
when its market value falls  beneath thresholds set by regulators; and the 
authority to freeze  bank operations, prevent troubled banks from  transfer-
ring funds  to third parties, and restrict dividend payments by institutions 
not complying with capital requirements. Chile's financial  markets had 
also become deeper; this allowed the orderly infusion  of  new funds,  as well 
as their withdrawal, without significantly  affecting  the quality of  bank 
portfolio.41 
Despite the quality of  prudential supervision, however, macroeco-
nomic imbalances that suddenly lead to massive devaluations and very 
high interest rates can unexpectedly affect  the quality of  banks portfolios, 
as can exploding bubbles in asset markets. Sustainable macroeconomic 
balances are an essential part ner of  sustainable prudential supervision. 
40. See Diaz-Alejandro (1985); Held and Jiménez (2001); Reinstein and Rosende (2000); Valdés-
Prieto (1992). 
41. C. Larrain (1995); Aninal and I.arrain (1996). 
Effectiveness  of  Policies  for  Stabilizing  Macroeconomic  Variables 
The Chilean mechanism for  prudential macroeconomic regulation at-
tracted considerable international attention, and many studies attempt to 
measure its effectiveness.42  Various tests seek to determine how the reserve 
requirement affects  the composition and volume of  flows,  as well as their 
impact on the exchange rate, the authorities' ability to make monetary pol-
icy, and the aggregate demand. There is ample evidence that Chile's regu-
lations on foreign  capital changed the maturity structure of  inflows, 
reducing the short-term component.43 This evidence points to a very pos-
itive feature  of  the instrument, since the liquidity of  foreign  liabilities is a 
major factor  in the probability and severity of  crises.44 
Disagreement arises, however, on the effect  of  the overall volume of 
flows,  since some econometric studies fail  to find  that these instruments 
affected  the total volume or exchange rates, though they do find  an effect 
on the composition of  flows.4>  The implication here is a high substitution 
between short- and long-term flows.  Part of  this compensatory phenome-
non between flows  of  different  maturities is to be expected, in the sense 
that long-term investors prefer  a more stable country (as results from  the 
reserve requirement). In fact,  FDI was predominant in Chile, whereas in 
Latin America as a whole it accounted for  only one-fourth  of  total flows 
in the first  half  of  the 1990s.46 The flows,  however, do not encompass the 
same money or the same investor; it is a different  investor with a different 
behavior, closely connected to productive investment. On the one hand, 
FDI creates new capacity, which contributes to capital formation  and also 
increases importation, in particular of  capital goods. Given the size of  the 
inflows,  therefore,  the foreign  currency market experiences a smaller excess 
supply than in the case of  financial  inflows.  On the other hand, FDI in 
Chile has behaved as a permanent variable, while other flows  have acted 
42. References  to Chilean-style policy for  dealing with capital flow  instability are frequent  in the 
main circles where these issues are discussed, for  example, by people such as Andrew Crockett, Paul 
Krugnian, Dani Rodrik, and Lawrence Summers. See, for  example, Stiglitz (1998), then vice presi-
dent of  the World Bank; see also lit  Diario,  Santiago, March 30, 2000, which quotes Horst Koehler, 
the recently appointed managing director of  the IMF. 
43. De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000); Edwards (1999b); Le Fort and Lehman (2000); 
Schmidt-Hebbel, Hernández, and Gallego (1999). 
44. See, for  instance, Rodrik and Velasco (1999); Tapia (2000). 
45. De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000); Edwards, (1999b); Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998). 
46. It should be pointed out that loans associated with FDI remained subject to the reserve re-
quirement. Since the average maturity of  these loans was around seven years, the cost incidence was 
small, while it did minimize the risk that short-term loans would be disguised as long-term flows. 
as transitory disturbances.' Because FDI is much less volatile than other 
types of  incoming capital, macroeconomic regulatory policies such as re-
serve requirements that are based on short-term or volatile inflows  will en-
courage long-term stability over continued volatility. 
Some observers have stated that the effectiveness  of  measures to dis-
courage capital inflows  is only temporary, since private sector agents gen-
erally find  ways around such measures.48 In principle, a number of 
loopholes facilitate  such evasion. One is to underbill imports or overbill 
exports. Another is to delay payment for  imports or accelerate export re-
ceipts. A third possibility is to bring in funds  through the informal  cur-
rency market. Fourth, short-term funds  can be registered as FDI, although 
this was a costly option since Chilean law required FDI to remain in the 
country for  at least a year. Nonetheless, this method was becoming an im-
portant loophole, so the authorities agreed to eliminate it. Fifth,  business 
partners may arrange back-to-back operations in which, for  instance, one 
party pays for  imports with a local bank deposit in Chilean pesos rather 
than foreign  currency, while the exporter is then paid in foreign  currency 
through a bank in his or her country. All of  these tactics (and others) are 
possible, but they all imply costs, and some may have undesirable reper-
cussions on the tax liabilities of  those employing them to circumvent re-
serve requirements. Though a certain level of  evasion is inevitable, there is 
no evidence suggesting large-scale evasion of  measures to discourage short-
term capital, as shown by the reserve deposits actually made and the col-
lection of  the equivalent fee  by the Central Bank. 
The most recent studies tend to confirm  that the reserve requirement 
also reduced total inflows  and moderated exchange rate appreciation.49 
Qualitative analysis reinforces  the conclusion: Chile confronted  a supply 
of  foreign  funds  that was greater (in relation to its GDP) than other Latin 
American countries, owing to its more attractive economic performance 
and its greater political stability in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, exchange 
rate appreciation and the current account deficit  (as a fraction  of  GDP or 
exports) were smaller, on average, than in the other countries in the region 
that received large amounts of  foreign  capital.30 
All of  these studies coincide in their assessment that the reserve re-
quirements maintained an adequate spread between domestic and inter-
47. Agosin and Ffrench-Davis  (2001); Ee Fort and Lehmann (2000). 
48. See, for  example, Valdés-Prieio and Soto (1998). 
49. Le Fort and Lehmann (2000); Nchmidt-Hebbel, Hernandez, and Gallego (1999). 
50. See Ffrench-Davis  (2000. chap. 10). 
national interest rates and thus provided room for  monetary policy. This 
factor  was important in the process of  sustained growth seen throughout 
the decade, since frequent  mini-adjustments by the Central Bank pre-
vented the need for  maxi-adjustments and allowed the economy to remain 
persistently at or near its productive capacity or production frontier.  Ac-
tual output thus coincided with potential output. The resulting perception 
of  real sustainable stability stimulated capital formation  and the growth of 
productive capacity and employment. 
The combination of  policies used involved financial  costs for  the 
monetary authority, since accumulation of  large volumes of  foreign  cur-
rency implies a significant  cost. This also generates a social cost for  the 
economy, since the profitability  of  these assets abroad is naturally less than 
interest payments on the Central Bank liabilities issued to sterilize the 
monetary effects  of  accumulating reserves. The losses for  the Central Bank 
are estimated at 0.5 percent of  GDP annually. Evidence shows that disin-
centives to short-term, liquid capital inflows  tended to reduce the magni-
tude of  the financial  costs of  sterilization and generated substantial 
macroeconomic benefits.  Even more flexible  and timely management of 
the intensity and coverage of  the reserve requirement and additional mech-
anisms by the monetary authority would undoubtedly have kept the fi-
nancial costs lower.52 Furthermore, the existence of  high levels of  reserves 
has frequently  been a very important stabilizing factor  in emerging econ-
omies facing  crisis situations, as was proved in Chile in the next episode. 
Domestic Strengths and External Vulnerability: 1996-97 
The previous section examined how prudential policy in the first  half  of 
the 1990s was effective  in achieving objectives of  macroeconomic sustain-
ability during a capital surge. In 1995, the year in which the tequila crisis 
erupted, GDP dropped in Mexico and Argentina by 6.1 percent and 3 per-
cent, respectively, whereas output rose 10 percent in Chile in a great show of 
external strength (helped by a positive terms-of-trade  shock).53 Paradoxi-
cally, satisfactory  performance  was one of  the causes of  the disequilibria 
51. Agosin (1998); Ffrench-Davis  and Reisen (1998). 
52. Another potential source of  real compensation for  the Central Bank losses is the exchange rate 
hand, which allows the exchange rate board to buy cheap (near the floor)  and to sell expensive (near 
the top). This would generate profits  only if  there is not an excessively strong revaluation of  the band. 
53. A negative impact was fell  only on the stock market. See Ffrench-Davis  (2000, chap. 10). 
built in 1996-97. In the first  place, foreign  investors' confidence  in the 
strength of  the Chilean economy encouraged them to invest massively, 
which created additional pressure on the exchange rate and tested the econ-
omy's capacity for  efficient  absorption. Second, a generalized optimism 
characterized the world financial  environment, based on the notion that the 
international community had been learning how to handle international 
crises and that virulent crises were gone forever.  One reflection  of  this 
was the attempt by the IMF, at its annual meeting in Hong Kong in Octo-
ber 1997, to achieve a mandate to promote capital account liberalization 
among member countries. Lobbying pressure and a strong fashion  toward 
financial  liberalization were enormous factors  that were well received in 
Chile, where many actors felt  themselves immune from  the effects  of  finan-
cial crises. Third, some officials  understandably let themselves be swayed by 
this euphoric atmosphere, accepting as sustainable a rising external deficit 
and the sharp appreciation of  the real exchange rate. 
Chile thus gave in to the pressures of  the dominant international and 
domestic environment at the time. It indeed managed to reduce inflation 
quickly, but it paid a price in the form  of  the imbalances this generated.,4 
The general policy was kept in place, against the fashion,  but the author-
ities failed  to strengthen measures in the face  of  the very abundant supply 
of  capital during 1996—97. The combination of  policies and the intensity 
with which they were applied remained constant. The surge clearly weak-
ened the fundamentals  of  the Chilean economy: the current account def-
icit rose, the exchange rate appreciated, and the stock of  liquid foreign 
liabilities grew somewhat. The deterioration certainly could have been 
checked during the boom by means of  higher reserve requirements and 
other measures. Nevertheless, a notorious complacency reigned while the 
new boom made the country increasingly vulnerable to external shocks. 
The effects  of  contagion from  the Asian crisis began in late 1997 and 
were felt  strongly in 1998-99. This time, Chile experienced a sharp drop 
in the terms of  trade, equivalent to 3 percent of  GDP per year. At the same 
time, the large 1996-97 capital inflows  gave way to outflows  of  domestic 
and foreign  funds,  and the nominal exchange rate began to depreciate. 
This correction process interrupted the most successful  period of  eco-
nomic growth recorded in Chile's history, which lasted from  1991 to 1998. 
54. An overwhelming proportion of  operators pushed for  greater deregulation and maintained that 
larger external deficits  were sustainable. Following the crisis, most of  them blamed what they called 
excessive fiscal  spending as the source of  the subsequent recessive adjustment. This hypothesis has no 
empirical support, however, as shown below. 
The  New  Wave  of  Capital 
As shown in figure  3-2 above, the tequila crisis led to a considerable re-
duction in net capital inflows  to Chile. This is mostly explained by the be-
havior of  portfolio  flows,  which entirely disappeared in Chile, as in the rest 
of  Latin America. Despite the reduction in the most volatile flows,  the con-
fidence  of  long-term investors was striking, as reflected  in increased FDI. 
Capital flows  returned to the region shortly after  the tequila crisis. Net 
inflows  to Latin America grew from  U.S.$30 billion in 1995 to U.S.$80 
billion in 1997. Of  this, a larger share than in the preceding years went to 
Chile. The image of  a successful  country on solid footing  attracted foreign 
investors in massive quantities. In 1997, net inflows  climbed to more than 
10 percent of  GDP. 
The foreign  capital boom of  1996-97 involved some changes in com-
position. FDI remained high. Portfolio  flows  increased sharply, however, 
despite the fact  that these were subject to the reserve requirement. The 
progressive increase of  investment abroad, which started at the beginning 
of  the decade, reached considerable levels. Some of  this investment was in-
creasingly funded  by borrowing abroad. At the same time, the main insti-
tutional investors—the private pension funds—had  placed only slightly 
over 0.5 percent of  their assets abroad by mid-1997. 
In 1998, for  the third time in sixteen years, financial  flows  to Latin 
America underwent a drastic reversal and actually became negative. The 
crisis was ameliorated by the presence of  FDI, however. In 1982, most of 
the loans were bank loans with variable interest rates. This time, the bulk 
of  flows  were from  FDI, which tends to be a more friendly  component in 
periods of  crisis, and these remained high in Chile. The behavior of  FDI 
also tends to be anticyclical, reducing the amount of  profit  that can be sent 
abroad. In fact,  FDI remittances fell  from  U.S.$1.9 billion in 1997 to 
U.S.$1.1 billion in 1999. 
Investment abroad intensified  even more. Devaluatory expectations 
(starting in late 1997) triggered a massive exit of  funds  through those open 
channels. Pension fund  outflows,  for  example, increased notably starting 
in late 1997, when expectations shifted  from  appreciation to depreciation. 
Outflows  from  January 1998 to June 1999 peaked at the equivalent of  4.8 
percent of  1998 GDP, or 12 percent of  the funds.55  The 10 percent drop 
55. A hurried financial  deregulation runs the risk of  leaving too many exit doors open, which can 
he a massive oversight when the market is nervous and expectations are shifting  to the devaluatory side 
(as was duly advised in Ffrench-Davis,  Agosin, and Uthoff,  1995). this tends to make it more diffi-
in aggregate demand, and the recession it generated, were partly associated 
with the monetary contraction resulting from  additional devaluating pres-
sures caused by these outflows. 
Policy  after  the  Success  of  1995 
The set of  policies available to authorities in the second half  of  the 
1990s was relatively unchanged, including responsible surplus-based bud-
get management. However, the use of  such tools had strongly different  fea-
tures compared with the previous episode, and the economic approach 
thus constituted a different  variety of  policy. In particular, authorities 
demonstrated a marked passivity at the time that the imbalances were gen-
erated, and their highly risky nature was underestimated. A proof  is that 
the target for  a sustainable current account deficit  was raised from  3.5 per-
cent to 5 percent of  GDP. This contrasts with the active management of 
the previous capital boom of  1991-94, and it highlights the fact  that the 
survival of  macroeconomic balances requires a highly pragmatic and pru-
dent approach to episodes of  financial  euphoria. 
As in the previous episodes, the cycle closed with negative external 
shocks. This time, the shock came from  Asia and was very intense, but the 
breadth of  its repercussions was closely linked to the Chilean economy's 
degree of  exposure. 
p o l i c i e s f o r  r e g u l a t i n g c a p i t a l i n f l o w s  An examination of  capital 
inflow  regulation does not reveal significant  changes, despite strong pres-
sures by lobbyists pushing for  full  liberalization of  the capital account. Not 
bending to those pressures deserves clear recognition, given the world en-
vironment of  financial  euphoria. The reserve requirement stayed at 30 per-
cent with a one-year term for  much of  the period, with only minor 
adjustments.56 Still, there was a radical shift  in how the problem was ap-
proached. As analyzed above, the authorities made explicit efforts  in the 
cult to sustain exchange rate and macroeconomic stability, and it makes international financial  crises 
more painful.  Such was the case in Chile in 1998-99, when the pension funds  and chapter XII in-
vestors were responsible for  the capital flight  that worsened the external imbalance. Curiously, analysts 
have practically ignored this highly significant  fact. 
56. In June 1996, the possibility of  renewing a trade credit more than once a year was eliminated 
to close a loophole. A threshold (U.S.8200,000) under which small transactions were not subject to 
reserve requirements was set in December 1996 to help reduce the operating costs of  the instrument. 
This exemption became a source of  evasion, however, and then the threshold was lowered to 
U.S.S 100,000 in March 1997. 
first  half  of  the 1990s to address the stability of  key macroeconomic prices 
and not to create vulnerability to eventual external shocks; these efforts  in-
cluded limiting the growth of  the current account deficit  and restraining 
currency revaluation.57 The external accounts and the exchange rate were 
monitored continuously, and there was ample willingness to refine  the 
tools by increasing their coverage and evaluating their effects.  The various 
instruments used were not ends in themselves, but only means to achiev-
ing the objectives mentioned. 
The approach was rather different  after  the tequila crisis. Chile's 
strength in the tequila crisis sent a signal of  invulnerability to many. The 
perception of  Chile as solid and different  from  the rest of  Latin America 
provoked doubt about the need to use the prudential macroeconomic in-
struments, which many analysts considered inefficient  or unnecessary for 
a modern country. The result was a complacent attitude on the part of  the 
authorities, who failed  to prevent the development of  evident imbalances 
in 1996-97, on account of  the abundant inflows,  and then took no meas-
ures to solve them when it was possible to do so, namely, during the boom. 
On the contrary, the prevailing trend was to "modernize" the management 
of  the capital account and to take advantage of  currency appreciation in 
the fight  against inflation,  as had been done two decades earlier. 
As a part of  the move toward financial  integration, measures were taken 
to facilitate  the investment of  Chilean capital abroad. The percentage of  for-
eign investment authorized to pension funds  was raised from  6 percent in 
1995 to 12 percent in April 1997, and new alternatives for  such investment 
were opened up.58 Rather than discouraging entry, the changes encouraged 
exit. This was supposed to diversify  risk. Given the extremely optimistic ex-
pectations about the national economy and the opportunities for  profit  that 
the domestic markets offered  in 1996-97, the outflows  of  funds  were mod-
est until expectations shifted  to devaluation (see figure  3-3). While the 
changes did allow the funds  to diversify  risk as intended, they clearly in-
creased risk for  the economy as a whole, as demonstrated in 1998-99. 
Throughout this period, the Central Bank did not dismantle policies. 
The government, for  its part, forcefully  defended  the reserve requirement 
in negotiations of  a free  trade agreement with Canada. When the Asian 
crisis began to be strongly felt,  portfolio  and other short-term inflows 
plummeted. The Central Bank confronted  this phase of  the cycle, com-
57. See Ffrench-Davis,  Agosin, and Uthoff  ( 1995) for  more detail. 
58. The limit was raised to 16 percent in January 1999. 
Figure 3-3. Chilean  Pension  Fund  Outflows  and  Real  Exchange  Rate 
Pension funds'  external portfolio  Real exchange rate 
Source: Ceiura! Bank of  Chile; Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones de Chile (SAFP). 
bined with a depressed external capital supply, by lowering the reserve re-
quirement to 10 percent in [une 1998 and then to 0 percent in Septem-
ber. Authorities stated, however, that this was only a resetting of  the 
parameters and that its use would continue to be relevant for  confronting 
renewed capital surges.V) 
e x c h a n g e r a t e p o l i c y The plentiful  supply of  capital flows  after  1995 
kept the exchange rate close to the floor  of  the band until the end of 
1997. Given the overwhelming expectations of  appreciation following  the 
tequila shock, the large spread between the expected profitability  of  peso-
denominated and dollar-denominated funds  (along with a good outlook 
for  large Chilean firms)  offered  foreign  portfolio  and short-term investors 
a potentially very lucrative opportunity despite the reserve requirement 
they paid to enter the domestic financial  market. 
Although the Central Bank formally  adhered to a crawling band in 
1996-97, the flexibility  of  the exchange rate was, in fact,  increasing. Thus 
the Bank, as well as most observers, gradually moved toward one of  the 
59. Massad (2000). 
two corner solutions that was increasingly in fashion:  full  foreign  exchange 
flexibility.  For instance, to lower the floor  of  the band (beyond a formal 
broadening of  the band to ±12.5 percent in early 1997), authorities made 
contradictory adjustments in the weights assigned to the currency basket, 
causing a loss of  credibility for  the basket.60 The external inflation  used to 
calculate the referential  exchange rate was overestimated, which generated 
considerable additional revaluation of  10 percentage points between 1995 
and 1997. Furthermore, an annual 2 percent appreciation of  the reference 
rate had been set in November 1995, based on the assumption that Chi-
lean productivity would grow more rapidly than that of  its main trading 
partners. At the same time, however, the Bank accumulated significant 
amounts of  international reserves. 
When exchange rate expectations shifted  in Chile in late 1997, the 
Central Bank operated asymmetrically. It now strongly held back depre-
ciating pressures by selling abundant reserves, thus preventing a correction 
of  the exchange rate value. The authorities argued that accepting a sharp 
devaluation would be significantly  inflationary  in an economy operating 
on the productive frontier  and with a high external deficit.  In our view, an 
ambitious anti-inflationary  objective was again predominant. In mid-
1998, the band was drastically shortened right at the moment of  greatest 
uncertainty, and the macroeconomic adjustment process was led by inter-
est rate hikes; this intensified  the monetary effects  of  outflows.  The Central 
Bank was sending a signal that it would not give in to devaluatory pressures 
in the market. The band was widened again at the end of  1998 and then 
suspended in September 1999 to allow the exchange rate to adjust, now in 
the context of  strongly depressed domestic absorption (see table 3-5). 
The  Consequences  of  a Prone-to-Risk  Policy 
Macroeconomic policy in 1996—97 proved unable to prevent the crea-
tion of  imbalances in the external sector. As discussed above, the financial 
environment was characterized by an overoptimistic mood of  success and 
invulnerability. Most participants seemingly ignored the danger of  a finan-
cial crisis, which is always present in today's volatile world. 
The economy took in large inflows  in the form  of  FDI, which sur-
60. In November 1994, the weight of  the dollar was reduced from  50 percent to 45 percent, re-
flecting  the declining influence  of  that currency in Chile trade. It was arbitrarily raised to 80 percent 
in January 1997. For a comparative analysis of  bands in Chile, Israel, and Mexico, see Helpman, Lei-
dcrman, and Bufman  (1994). On Chile, Colombia, and Israel, see Williamson (1996). 
Table 3-5. Asian  crisis  in Chile,  1996-99 
Indicator 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDPa 7.4 7.4 3.9 -1.1 
Aggregate expenditure3 7.9 9.1 3.9 -10.0 
Fiscal expenditure1 9.6 6.1 6.3 5.7 
Exports'1 11.8 9.4 5.9 6.9 
Imports1 11.8 12.9 5.4 -14.3 
Current account deficit11 5.8 5.7 6.2 0.2 
Real exchage ratec 84.7 78.2 78.0 82.4 
Terms-of-trade  effect*1 -3.4 0.6 -3.0 0.2 
Source: Based on data from  the Central Bank of  Chile; DIPRES (2000); Ffrench-Davis  (2001). 
a. Official  figures  at 1986 constant prices, annual growth (percent). 
b. Current prices, percent ol (¡DP 
c. Index, 1986 = 100. 
d. Current prices, percent ol CiDP. 
passed all previous records when they reached 6.8 percent of  GDP in 
1996-97. The signs of  solvency and stability that Chile exhibited in the 
tequila crisis no doubt contributed to attracting these funds.  The supply 
to emerging economies also underwent a significant  positive shift  that 
heightened the country-specific  trend. At the same time, portfolio  flows 
experienced unusual growth despite the cost of  the reserve requirement. 
The evidence thus indicates that entry to the market was considered cheap 
in comparison with the verv positive economic parameters and a strong 
likelihood that the real exchange rate would appreciate as a result of  the 
large supply of  foreign  capital.61 This is a classical case of  an imbalance 
creating bubbles in the exchange rate market and in aggregate demand. 
The Central Bank made heavy purchases of  foreign  currency, but it 
was unable to avoid a very significant  real exchange rate appreciation (16 
percent between the 1995 average and October 1997). The appreciation 
and the creation of  liquidity by the inflows,  in turn, sharply stimulated ag-
gregate demand and biased it towards tradables. The current account def-
icit thus rose to 5.7 percent of  GDP. Key macroeconomic prices had 
clearly become outliers, and instruments for  dealing with excessive finan-
cial flows  needed to be strengthened. The Central Bank, however, declared 
itself  unable to fulfil  its commitment to defending  a more stable and com-
61. See Herrera and Valdés (1997). Country risk was again reduced; the Euromoney  index, for  in-
stance, improved from  72.9 in 1995 to 79.0 in 1997. 
petitive long-term exchange rate.62 Instead, it gave priority to the inflation-
ary goal, which was facilitated  by the appreciating trend. 
The situation called for  a demand-reducing adjustment focused  on 
the control of  the external imbalance. Given that the large supply of  cap-
ital inflows  was the source of  the disequilibrium, measures were needed to 
increase the cost of  inflows,  to devalue the real exchange rate, and not only 
to raise the cost of  domestic credit (that is, the interest rate). The mainte-
nance of  a constant rate and coverage of  the reserve requirement, without 
the implementation of  additional measures, became insufficient  for  deal-
ing with the massive capital inflow  in 1996-97.63 If  the prudential regu-
lation of  inflows  had been strengthened in 1996-97, it would have 
accomplished the triple goal of  regulating the growth of  the stock of  liq-
uid external liabilities, softening  appreciation, and moderating the increase 
in aggregate expenditure. 
A controversial issue involves the level of  fiscal  responsibility for  the 
excess aggregate demand of  1996—97. An expansionary fiscal  policy was 
recorded in the period, with government expenditure rising somewhat 
faster  than GDP (7.9 versus 7.4 percent a year). However, several points 
have to be taken into account to fairly  assess this fact.  First, the fiscal  ex-
penditure with macroeconomic effects  represents only one-fifth  of  the 
economy. The large majority of  the pulls behind the 8.5 percent growth 
in domestic aggregate demand in the period were in the private sector, 
which accounted for  90 percent of  the expenditure increase. A fiscal  con-
tribution to moderating total expenditure would thus have been insuffi-
cient. Second, the main components in the increased fiscal  expenditure 
were education, justice, and infrastructure.  All three areas underwent 
major and widely demanded transformations,  with a political consensus 
around increasing expenditure on them. Third, the fiscal  budget showed 
a surplus over 2 percent GDP and, consequently, overfinanced  its expen-
diture. Moreover, the government stopped borrowing from  the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and prepaid debt. 
Fourth, the measured fiscal  surplus does not include resources accumu-
lated in the Copper Buffer  Fund. 
Here again, imbalances were externally generated and overwhelmingly 
private. The government's responsibility in this case lay in its failure  to 
62. See, for  example, the president of  the Central Bank's statements in the Chilean business news-
paper Estrategia,  October 16, 1997. 
63. Lc Fort and l.ehmann (2000, p. 33) offer  a similar assessment. Le Fort was at that time the di-
rector of  the Central Bank's International Division. 
enforce  coordination between the Central Bank and the Ministry of 
Finance.64 This shortcoming was related to the Central Bank's autonomy. 
Authorities need to recognized that there is not a single form  of  autonomy 
in the world, but rather several alternative ones. 
As a result of  the lack of  timely and sufficiently  strong measures, the 
Asian crisis found  Chile with a significantly  appreciated exchange rate, an 
overstimulated aggregate demand, and a high current account deficit  that 
was double the 1990-95 average. This all added up to a level of  vulner-
ability that was unprecedented in the decade, and Chile received a strong 
trade shock. Nevertheless, if  the reserve requirement had not been main-
tained, portfolio  inflows  would have been much greater, the overall flow 
more significant,  and the exchange rate appreciation more marked.6"' 
Financial capital began to flow  out in late 1997 and accelerated in 
1998-99. The nominal exchange rate depreciated to correct for  misalign-
ment.66 This time, the impact of  the exit of  foreign  capital was aggravated 
by the outflows  associated with pension funds,  which intensified  the de-
valuating pressures on the exchange rate. The channels that had been pro-
gressively opened up over the course of  the decade, under the argument 
they would moderate the abundance of  foreign  currency in boom periods 
and diversify  risk, were effectively  used only during the bust. Thus the ob-
jective was not achieved during the boom. Rather, the mechanism caused 
a significant  loss of  international reserves during the crisis, a monetary 
contraction, and a sharpening of  the recessionary adjustment in 1998-99. 
The cumulative current account deficit  was moderate during the 
decade thanks to the active management of  inflows  in the first  half  of  the 
1990s and the persistence of  regulations in the following  years with only 
gradual liberalization. The stock of  foreign  liabilities was relatively low, 
and volatile funds  played only a minor role, creating external imbalances 
only in 1996 and 1997. These conditions, together with the country's con-
siderable international reserves, put Chile on a better footing  than in the 
64. The lack of  coordination between the ("entrai Bank and the government was evident. As men-
tioned, the Central Bank authorities expressed no concern about imbalances in the external sector, 
while the Minister of  Economics, for  instance, held that "it is necessary to intensify  and strengthen 
policies such as the reserve requirement to reduce exchange rate appreciation." Estrategia,  September 
26, 1997. 
65. Schmidt-Hebbel, Hernández., and Gallego (1999); Le Fort and Lehmann (2000). 
66. The real exchange rate reached its peak for  1999 in November. This depreciation represented a 
movement toward equilibrium, in correction of  the disequilibrium of  1 996-97. The real exchange rate 
actually recovered its 1 995 average level; this real rare tended to prevail in the second semester of  2000, 
after  strong swings during the first  semester. 
previous crises for  confronting  the hardships of  trade and financial  shock 
caused by the Asian recession. The domestic financial  system did not suf-
fer  radically, as a result of  the strictness of  the Chilean banking commis-
sion. Nonperforming  loans as a percentage of  total loans rose from  0.97 
percent in December 1997 to 1.8 percent at its worst moment in April 
1999—a level comparable to 1992, a crisis-free  year.67 This is remarkable 
given that aggregate demand fell  by 10 percent. 
Still, the social and economic costs were significant.  Production under-
utilization in 1999 fell  by about U.S.$7 billion, opening a gap of  approxi-
mately 10 percent between actual GDP and productive capacity that year. 
Together with the increase in interest rates, this gap caused gross fixed  in-
vestment to fall  17 percent, jeopardizing the potential GDP growth of  7 
percent on average. Unemployment exceeded 10 percent of  the labor force 
in 1999-2000, which reversed some of  the progress that had been made in 
reducing poverty and inequality since 1990.68 
Concluding Remarks 
The rich experience of  Chilean policy in managing foreign  capital 
surges throws light on key principles and specific  instruments for  exploit-
ing the benefits  and minimizing the costs of  financial  globalization. De-
spite the extent to which globalization reduces the space for  action, there 
is still room for  each country to foster  its objectives. In this sense, a coun-
try that falls  victim to a financial  crisis of  external origin is never blame-
less. We have solid evidence that market imbalances in the exchange rate, 
high current account deficits,  and excessive shares of  short-term or liquid 
funds  make a small, open economy vulnerable in a crisis. The challenge, 
then, is to fight  worsening in these parameters. 
Exchange rate policy has proved to be one of  the key elements in the 
development of  recent crises in Chile. Freezing the exchange rate as part of 
a price stabilization policy in the late 1970s and keeping it frozen  for  three 
years entailed a very significant  outlier real price of  the dollar, based on an 
unsustainable level of  capital inflows.  The discrepancy stimulated and fi-
nanced a high current account deficit  up to 1981, and a correction was to 
be expected. When it occurred in 1982, the economic and social results 
67. SBIF (2000). 
68. Sec Ffrcnch-Davis  (2001, chap. 9). 
were very negative: GDP fell  17 percent, and the unemployment rate 
jumped to over 30 percent. In the 1990s, policy aimed at preventing a re-
peat performance.  The use of  a managed crawling band reduced exchange 
rate volatility while moderating its appreciation up to the mid-1990s. This 
supported the target of  maintaining an exchange rate that was consistent 
with the export model, at the expense of  the objective of  reducing inflation 
more quickly. The approach was successful  in the first-half  of  the 1990s.69 
After  the tequila crisis, however, the Central Bank did not check the large 
appreciation. Monetary authorities gave precedence to achieving more am-
bitious inflation  goals despite an increased current account deficit  and an 
excessive aggregate demand, thus repeating risky behavior of  the past. 
A curious fact  of  the Chilean case is that the three financial  boom epi-
sodes generated different  outcomes with the consistent use of  certain tools 
to regulate capital inflows,  in particular, an unremunerated reserve require-
ment on short-term capital. The main lesson is that an instrument that al-
ters relative prices in the market, as does the reserve requirement, cannot 
remain unchanged in the face  of  a changing supply of  foreign  funds.  Fur-
thermore, a policy of  sustainable macroeconomic balances must not rest 
solely on one inflexible  instrument, excellent though the instrument may 
be. A reserve requirement was clearly ineffective  in saving the economy 
from  the debt crisis in 1982, while in 1996-97 its impact was insufficient 
for  staving off  contagion from  the Asian crisis. However, one might ask 
what would have happened if  it had not been applied in those cases. Em-
pirical evidence indicates that the imbalances would have been worse, es-
pecially with regard to the Asian crisis. The effectiveness  of  this sort of 
instrument depends, first,  on the values set for  its parameters and the de-
gree of  coverage, and, second, on complementary policies that support the 
strategy, as in the first  half  of  the 1990s. These policies include fiscal  re-
sponsibility and effective  prudential supervision of  the financial  system. 
Regulatory instruments such as a reserve requirement have costs.70 
Quasi-fiscal  losses stemming from  excessive accumulation of  reserves and a 
lower GDP growth rate owing to higher interest rates are those most often 
mentioned. A serious assessment requires weighing these effects  against 
their macroeconomic benefits.  The benefits  are extensive, deriving from 
69. The economy's performance  in that period was quite satisfactory,  with dynamic exports and a 
gradual but large reduction of  inflation.  Sebastián Edwards summarizes this point well: "Given the rel-
ative success of  the Chilean band system, it is surprising that more countries have not adopted this 
type of  regime" (1999b, p. 37). 
70. Schmidt-Hehbcl, Hernández, and Gallego (1999) summarize and measure these costs. 
the notable imperfections  of  international financial  markets (including 
high volatility and information  asymmetry). By helping to counterbalance 
these market imperfections,  measures to drive capital flows  at a sustainable 
level and moderate exchange rate instability reduce both the likelihood of  a 
crisis and its potential costs. They are also associated with gains in growth 
because of  their positive impact on resource allocation and export develop-
ment. Finally, economic growth benefits  enormously when monetary au-
thorities are given room to regulate spending and smooth the cyclical 
behavior of  the economy. These benefits  are difficult  to quantify,  since the 
moderation of  cyclical behavior not only creates a better environment for 
productive investment and growth, but also favors  social development by 
improving conditions of  poverty, income distribution, and welfare  pro-
grams, a dimension which is highly sensitive to economic fluctuations.71 
In liberalizing the capital account, a dose of  prudence is also in order 
with regard to outflows.  Observers and lobbyists argue that the funds  are 
too big for  Chile and that profitability  is increased by investing abroad. 
Chile is a capital-scarce country, however, and the return of  capital tends to 
be higher in Chile than in developed countries. Hence, it is questionable 
whether funds  saved by Chileans and held by pension funds  should be en-
couraged to move abroad rather than preferentially  invested domestically. 
The issue is particularly controversial when macroeconomic risk diversifi-
cation is achieved at the expense of  macroeconomic sustainability because 
of  its procyclical nature. This issue requires further  discussion and analysis. 
Another of  the dimensions that make Chile an interesting case study 
is the development of  its domestic financial  institutional structures. The 
deregulation of  banking activity in the absence of  a proper framework  of 
prudential regulation in the 1970s was, without a doubt, a destabilizing 
element that contributed to an overborrowing syndrome.72 Moreover, 
progress made to address the weakness contributed to the development of 
one of  the healthiest financial  markets among emerging countries and fos-
tered macroeconomic stability throughout the 1990s. It would be a mis-
take, however, to emphasize this dimension as the sole explanation of 
financial  crisis in Chile. In the three episodes examined here, the domes-
tic financial  market operated as the channel for  only a portion of  the funds 
coming into the country. This was particularly relevant in the 1990s, when 
bank loans constituted a minority of  inflows.  As the events of  1998-99 
71. See Rodrik (2001). 
72. McKinnon and Pill (1997). 
showed, the high quality of  Chile's domestic financial  market did not pre-
vent the country from  becoming quite vulnerable to external financial 
shocks. This point must be stressed, given the persistence of  the danger-
ous hypothesis that efficient  banking supervision is enough to impede the 
absorption of  excessive inflows. 
The fact  that fiscal  policy did not play a leading role in managing the 
Chilean crises may seem unusual, especially considering the broad litera-
ture that explains external sector crises as a result of  unsustainable budget 
deficits.  In the three Chilean episodes discussed here, however, the fiscal 
situation was solid, with surpluses each year.73 Deficits  were registered only 
in 1982 and 1999, and these were the result of  the crisis conditions, not 
the cause. They were thus associated with external disequilibria during the 
previous booms. Once more, the lesson is not to trust in a single funda-
mental of  the economy as adequate protection. 
The challenge of  making good use of  foreign  capital in emerging econ-
omies, ensuring the healthy domestic absorption of  funds,  and keeping 
vulnerability to external factors  low requires a comprehensive set of  meas-
ures. It is indispensable to take an active, pragmatic approach to checking 
the development of  imbalances, to respond to shifts  in domestic and ex-
ternal variables, to work in close coordination with a solidly structured 
financial  sector, to implement a foreign  exchange policy that prevents ex-
cessive misalignment of  the real rate, to design fiscal  and monetary poli-
cies that keep a handle on spending, and to take a flexible  approach to 
managing the capital account so that measures taken are consistent with 
the realities of  a developing country where capital is not only scarce in ab-
solute terms but minuscule in comparison with the volume of  capital that 
can flood  a country through an imperfect  and volatile international finan-
cial market. Chile's experience shows that all of  this is possible and that the 
challenge is ongoing. New problems will always arise, and dangerous 
temptations can exact a heavy price tomorrow for  today's success. 
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JAIME ROS* 
From  the  Capital  Surge  to 
the  Financial  Crisis  and 
Beyond:  The  Mexican 
Economy  in  the  1990s 
In the early 1990s, after  almost a decade of  economic decline and high inflation,  the Mexican economy 
appeared to be on its way to recovering economic growth and price stabil-
ity. Privatization revenues and a Brady agreement had facilitated  a large re-
duction in domestic and external public debt, and a successful  stabilization 
program was expected to finally  allow the economy to take advantage of 
the structural reforms  undertaken since the mid-1980s. Or so it appeared 
to the many observers who believed that Mexico, a model reformer  and 
successful  emerging market, was to become a Latin American economic 
miracle. Optimistic expectations became even more widespread when the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was approved in 1993. 
The optimistic view was further  reinforced  by the fact  that the Mexican 
government had complemented wide-ranging economic reforms  with an 
anti-poverty program aimed at meeting the country's pressing needs in 
health and education infrastructure.  To many, then, Mexico appeared to 
be on a firm  path toward economic and social modernization. 
By the end of  1994, however, the Mexican economy was in a finan-
cial crisis and entering its worst recession since the Great Depression of  the 
*I am grateful  to Maiju Perala for  research assistance and to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis  and participants 
at seminars held at the United Nations Economic Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) in Santiago, Chile, for  helpful  comments. 
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1930s. The Mexican government was unable to roll over its debt follow-
ing the December devaluation of  the peso. Amid surging fears  of  default, 
an unprecedented international rescue package was implemented in early 
1995 to stop panic selling of  Mexican debt. The country also experienced 
political turmoil and violence throughout 1994: an armed uprising by the 
Zapatistas in January (on the day NAFTA came into effect),  the assassina-
tion of  the presidential candidate in March and of  the Secretary General 
of  the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) in September, and the 
resignation in November of  the Assistant Attorney General who had been 
in charge of  investigating the latter assassination. 
The country was considered one of  the most successful  emerging mar-
kets, and it was supposed to be entering a period of  sustained prosperity, 
yet in the mid-1990s it became immersed in the worst economic crisis of 
the last seventy years. How could the Mexican government find  itself  on 
the brink of  default  just four  years after  the first  Brady agreement, despite 
having significantly  reduced its external and domestic debt? These are the 
issues addressed in this paper. The following  section reviews the episode of 
massive capital inflows  of  the early 1990s and discusses the financial  re-
forms  that preceded it. The paper then examines how the success of  the 
Mexican economy in attracting foreign  capital itself  undermined the fun-
damentals of  the economy by causing a large appreciation of  the peso, a 
misallocation of  resources, and increasing financial  fragility.  The next sec-
tion analyzes how these three consequences of  the capital surge combined 
and interacted to produce the crash landing that was to follow,  and com-
pares our interpretation to other explanations of  the crisis. The final  sec-
tion looks at the performance  of  the economy after  the crisis and discusses 
its medium-term prospects. 
Financial Liberalization, Debt Reduction, and 
the Capital Surge 
While the capital surge of  the early 1990s extended to most countries 
in Latin America and other developing regions, Mexico had a prominent 
place in this episode: nearly half  of  the capital inflows  to Latin America in 
the period 1990—93 went to Mexico (see table 4-1). These massive inflows 
had their origin in a diversity of  circumstances: almost all of  the various 
internal and external determinants of  capital movements had a positive ef-
fect  on inflows.  The external environment was characterized by the con-
Table 4-1. Capital  Inflows  in  Mexico  and  latin  America,  1977-95 
Billions of  dollars, except as indicated 
Capital  inflows 1977-81 1983-89 1990-93 1994-95 
Total  annual  capital  inflows  (net) 
Latin America 28.86 8.15 45.89 38.55 
Mexico 8.15 -0.66 22.50 3.60 
Mexico as percent of  total 28.3 -8.1 49.0 9.3 
Foreign  direct  investment 
Latin America n.a. n.a. 11.43 17.28 
Mexico n.a. n.a. 4.05 6.99 
Mexico as percent of  total n.a. n.a. 35.4 40.4 
Other  capital  inflows  (net) 
Latin America n.a. n.a. 34.46 21.27 
Mexico n.a. n.a. 18.45 -3.39 
Mexico as percent of  total n.a. n.a. 53.5 -15.9 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
América  Latina  y el  Caribe:  políticas  para  mejorar  la  inserción  en la  economía  mundial,  2d ed., 
Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica and ECLAC, 1998, tables 9.1 and 9.4. 
tinuous reduction of  foreign  interest rates through early 1994, a U.S. re-
cession in the early 1990s, and regulatory changes introduced by the U.S. 
Securities Exchange Commission, all of  which were favorable  to an in-
crease in U.S. investment abroad.1 In addition, improved terms of  trade in 
the late 1980s and the debt relief  agreement with creditor banks led to a 
reduction in Mexico's risk premium.2 
The favorable  domestic factors  arose out of  the new institutional en-
vironment that characterized the Mexican economy as a result of  the struc-
tural reforms  initiated in the mid-1980s. The reforms  that were most 
directly relevant to the capital surge include the liberalization of  domestic 
financial  markets and their opening to foreign  investors, as well as the der-
egulation of  foreign  direct investments (FDI). Starting in 1988, a succes-
1. The regulatory changes—regulation S and rule 144A—stimulated portfolio  investment in de-
veloping countries through the issue of  American depository receipts (ADRs) on the New York stock 
market and the development of  country funds  in U.S. financial  markets. See ECLAC (1995, 1998); 
Ffrench-Davis  (2000, chap. 5). See also Banco de Mexico, Informe  Anual,  1993, available at www. 
banixco.org.mx. 
2. The Brady Plan was announced in March 1989 and an agreement in principle was signed in July 
1989. Mexico became the first  country to sign a debt agreement with commercial banks under the 
United States-sponsored plan in February 1990. 
sion of  measures relaxed reserve requirements, credit quotas to high prior-
ity sectors, and controls on interest rates; unified  the controlled and free 
exchange rates; and abolished the exchange controls that were adopted 
during the 1982 crisis. Restrictions on foreign  investments in the domes-
tic bond and stock markets were eliminated in 1989 and 1990.3 Through-
out the 1980s, the De La Madrid and Salinas de Gortari administrations 
liberally interpreted the Foreign Investment Law of  1973 and adopted a 
series of  regulatory changes to facilitate  the inflow  of  FDI. These changes 
culminated with a new Foreign Investment Law in 1993. The new Law 
opened areas that had previously been closed to foreign  companies and 
eliminated the clause that restricted foreign  participation in local firms  to 
49 percent. Other relevant policy changes include the privatization of  the 
banking system and telecommunications in 1991—92. In addition to dem-
onstrating the government's commitment to market-oriented reforms,  pri-
vatization provided the government with large revenues that were used to 
sharply reduce the burden of  domestic and external debt in the fiscal  ac-
counts (see table 4-2). 
These domestic reforms  and positive external shocks, together with the 
initiation of  NAFTA negotiations in 1990, contributed to the surge of  cap-
ital inflows  through three channels. The first  was a sharp reduction in the 
country's risk premium—the improved image of  Mexico as a good place to 
invest. The debt relief  agreement, the fall  in foreign  interest rates, and the 
use of  large privatization revenues to repay external debt in 1991-92 pro-
duced a substantial reduction of  interest payments both as a percent of  ex-
ports and as a percent of  gross domestic product (GDP) (see table 4-3). 
These indicators, which are conventionally used by national and foreign  in-
vestors to evaluate country risk, fell  in the 1990s to levels below those 
achieved in the mid-1970s before  the onset of  the balance-of-payments  cri-
sis that was under gestation in the period 1974-76.4 Moreover, privatiza-
tion revenues also financed  a sharp reduction of  domestic, as well as 
external, government debt. By the first  quarter of  1993, domestic debt was 
down to half  its real value in mid-1990. Total government debt had there-
fore  fallen  from  55 percent of  GDP in 1990 to 35 percent in 1993, which 
3. A decree in May 1989 liberalized the neutral-investment regime to promote the entry of  foreign 
investors into the local stock market. By late 1990, restrictions on the foreign  purchase of  domestic 
bonds (largely government bonds) had been eliminated. 
4. From 1990 to 1993, Mexico's foreign  debt was upgraded by foreign  risk evaluators, and in the 
case of  two Mexican development banks, it was given an investment grade rating (see Gurria, 1995). 
This occurred despite the emergence of  the first  symptoms of  serious financial  vulnerability, as dis-
cussed below. 
Table 4-2. Mexico:  Use  of  Privatization  Revenues,  1991-92 
Percent  of  Percent 
GDP Billions  of  dollars  of  total 
Destination  of  revenues 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991-92 1991-92 
Total revenues from 
privatization-' 3.3 3.3 9.42 10.74 20.16 100 
Financial deficit1' 1.4 0.1 4.02 0.28 4.30 21.3 
Net reduction of  debt 1.9 3.2 5.39 10.46 15.85 78.6 
External 1.5 0.8 4.39 2.55 6.94 34.4 
Central Bank 1.9 0.2 5.49 0.70 6.19 30.7 
Private sector total' - 1 . 6 2.2 - 4 . 4 8 7.21 2.73 13.5 
Residents'1 1.8 1.5 5.03 4.94 9.97 49.5 
Nonresidents' - 1 . 2 - 2 . 7 - 3 . 5 4 - 8 . 7 7 - 1 2 . 3 1 - 6 1 . 1 
Commercial banks - 2 . 1 3.4 - 5 . 9 7 11.04 5.07 25.1 
Source: J. Ros, "Mercados financieros y flujos  de capital en México," in Los  capitales  externos  en 
las  economías  latinoamericanas,  edited by J. A. Ocaropo, Bogotá: Fedesarrollo and Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), 1994. Calculations based on data from  Banco de México, Informe 
Anual,  1991 and 1992, available at www.banixco.org.mx. 
a. Includes cash revenues (or amortization of  the banking privatization bonds) and reduction of 
the domestic or external public sector debt as a result of  the reclassification  of  Mexican 
telecommunications as a private enterprise. 
b. Accrued public financial  deficit.  Includes the accrued nonpaid interests that are only 
incorporated to the financial  deficit  at the time of  liquidation. 
c. Banking and nonbanking (includes nonresidents). 
d. Nonbanking. Obtained as a residual of  private sector debt reduction. 
e. Foreign portfolio  inflows  to the money market (displayed with a negative sign). 
is about half  the average for  the member countries of  the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and less than a third of 
that for  Italy or Belgium. 
A second channel was the opening of  domestic financial  markets, which 
had the same effect  as a shift  in the portfolio  preferences  of  foreign  investors 
between domestic and foreign  assets. In an earlier study of  the determinants 
of  capital inflows,  I find  that the opening of  the bond market accounts for 
most of  the shift  in asset preferences  during the period.5 Only after  1994— 
the year NAFTA went into effect  and a year after  Congress approved the 
new Foreign Investment Law—did FDI become significantly  more impor-
tant than in the 1960s and 1970s. This partly accounts for  the heavy con-
centration of  capital inflows  in portfolio  investments through late 1993. 
The third channel, which interacted with the reduction in the risk pre-
mium, was the real appreciation of  the peso and the very high interest rates 
5. Ros (1994b). 
Table 4-3. Mexico:  Macroeconomic  Performance  Indicators,  1988—98 
Percent 
Indicator 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GDP growth 1.2 4.2 5.1 4.2 3.6 
Inflation 51.7 19.7 29.9 18.8 11.9 
Real exchange rate (index) 100.0 94.6 89.9 82.0 75.0 
Real interest rate" 7.3 13.8 1.0 - 1 . 3 3.4 
Private savings rateb 17.5 14.8 13.2 10.6 10.5 
Domestic savings rateb 21.4 19.5 20.3 19.0 18.1 
Fixed private investment11 11.7 11.8 12.8 14.1 15.6 
Fixed public investment15 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.1 3.8 
Urban unemployment 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.8 
Average real wage (index) 100.0 105.9 107.4 114.2 122.8 
Traded 
Exports 13.9 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.4 
Imports 11.7 13.2 15.0 16.6 19.2 
Capital  account!' 
Direct investment 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.8 1.6 
Portfolio  inflows 0.5 0.2 1.4 4.9 6.6 
Loans - 1 . 8 0.4 4.7 3.1 - 0 . 6 
Debt 
Gross external debt 43.7 36.6 32.1 30.1 28.4 
Gross domestic debt 22.4 23.4 20.9 16.8 11.8 
1993 1994 1995 1996  1997  1998 
2.0 4.4 - 6 . 2 
8.0 7.1 52.0 
70.8 73.6 106.6 
14.0 13.3 6.6 
11.6 11.4 15.8 
18.2 18.0 18.5 
14.8 14.3 11.0 
3.8 4.9 3.6 
3.4 3.7 6.2 
130.6 136.9 118.8 
15.2 17.2 23.9 
19.2 22.3 20.2 
1.5 3.5 3.1 
10.1 2.6 - 3 . 2 
1.0 0.4 7.5 
27.5 27.1 31.0 
10.2 10.8 9.5 
5.2 6.7 4.8 
27.7 15.7 18.6 
96.7 85.5 86.4 
9.2 8.8 10.1 
16.7 
22.5 c 24.11 20.5 
13.2 15.3 16.8 
2.9 3.0 2.5 
5.5 3.8 3.2 
109.1 112.5 115.5 
26.8 27.9 29.2 
23.6 27.1 29.5 
2.9 3.7 2.9 
4.2 1.5 0.4 
- 3 . 8 —2.6 1.1 
30.8 26.9 24.9 
6.8 7.4 8.9 
Public  financeb 
Total expenditure 36.4 30.6 27.5 23.9 22.2 22.5 23.1 23.0 23.3 23.7 21.5 
Operating expenditure 12.5 11.2 10.5 9.9 8.8 9.1 8.9 8.2 8.1 8.3 7.2 
Investment 2.9 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.9 2.5 1.8 
Domestic interest payments 12.5 9.0 6.8 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.1 2.6 2.3 2.5 1.5 
External interest payments 3.6 3.3 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.2 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.4 
Other 4.9 4.7 5.2 6.1 7.0 8.2 8.9 7.7 7.9 8.8 9.6 
Total revenue 27.7 25.8 25.3 23.5 23.7 23.1 22.8 22.8 23.2 23.0 20.3 
Federal government (total) 16.3 16.4 15.9 15.5 16.0 15.5 15.2 15.3 15.7 15.8 14.1 
Taxes 11.4 11.1 10.7 10.7 1 1.3 11.4 1 1.3 9.3 9.0 9.8 10.4 
Nontax federal  revenue 5.0 5.3 5.2 4.8 4.8 4.1 3.9 6.0 6.7 6.0 3.7 
Income  shares 
Profits  and interest11 56.5 56.0 54.5 52.9 51.8 50.4 49.8 54.6 55.9 n.a. n.a. 
Tradable goods sectors 25.1 21.3 19.1 17.5 16.0 14.2 13.8 17.0 19.2 n.a. n.a. 
Nontradable goods sectors 31.4 34.7 35.4 35.4 35.8 36.2 36.0 37.6 36.7 n.a. n.a. 
Skilled labor1 9.8 11.7 12.3 14.0 15.6 17.2 18.2 16.6 15.5 n.a. n.a. 
Otherf 33.8 32.3 33.2 33.0 32.6 32.4 31.9 28.7 28.6 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía  e Informática  (INEGI), National  Accounts,  Indicators of  Competitivity, various years; Banco de Mexico, 
Economic  Information;  Organization for  Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD  Economic  Surveys,  various years; Secretaría de Hacienda v 
Crédito Público de México, historical data; International Monetary Fund (IMF), International  Financial  Statistics,  various years; United Nations Economic 
Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic  Survey  of  latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  1998-99. 
a. Discontinuous series: 1988-92 calculations based on ECLAC data; 1993-98 calculations based on IMF statistics. 
b. Percent of  GDP. 
c. Value not comparable with earlier series. 
d. Operating surplus (excluding oil, agriculture, commerce, and other services) minus property income paid abroad plus government interest payments to the 
private sector. 
e. Estimated using the average wage in construction as an upper limit to the wage of  unskilled labor. 
f.  Unskilled labor and self-employed  earnings. Estimated as a residual. 
that prevailed during the initial stages of  the disinflation  program of  late 
1987. The annual real interest rate on three-month Treasury bills (CETES) 
in mid-1989 was still on the order of  19 percent to compensate for  the in-
flation  uncertainty that accompanied the disinflation  process. The rapid 
success of  the counterinflation  program, which required a significant  ap-
preciation of  the peso in real terms, implied extremely high ex post dollar 
interest rates on short-term domestic securities. 
The magnitude and composition of  the inflows  were key elements for 
the macroeconomic consequences of  the capital surge. Gross inflows  in-
creased tenfold  from  U.S.$3.5 billion in 1989 to U.S.$33.3 billion in 
1993, before  falling  sharply in 1994.6 Net inflows  rose from  negligible 
numbers to 12.6 percent of  GDP at their peak in 1993. During the capital 
surge, the inflows  were strongly biased toward highly liquid assets. The 
composition of  these short-term investments changed over time. In the in-
itial stages of  the surge (1989 and 1990), inflows  involved foreign  loans to 
the private sector and the acquisition of  bank deposits, but the liberaliza-
tion of  the domestic money and stock markets redirected inflows  toward 
government bonds and stocks. Throughout the period, portfolio  invest-
ments in the stock market increased rapidly and represented the largest 
component at the peak of  the surge in 1993. From the end of  1990 to the 
end of  1993, the market value of  the accumulated portfolio  investments 
in the stock market jumped from  U.S.$4.5 billion to U.S.$54.6 billion. 
In 1993 alone, the flow  of  portfolio  investments in the stock market 
amounted to U.S.$28.4 billion.7 Short-term outflows  were dominant dur-
ing the contraction after  1994: average portfolio  investments fell  to around 
1.7 percent of  GDP from  1994 to 1998, well below FDI (3.3 percent of 
GDP on average and about 20 percent of  private domestic investment). 
The cycle of  capital movements appears to be especially marked in the 
case of  Mexico, which has a history of  being the main beneficiary  of  inflows 
during booms and the most vulnerable country during contractions. Dur-
ing periods of  expanding capital inflows,  the Mexican economy has tended 
to absorb a large share of  the portfolio  inflows  into Latin America, much 
larger than its fraction  of  the less volatile FDI flows.  This concentration of 
inflows  in liquid assets increases Mexico's financial  fragility  relative to other 
countries, such that the downturn catches Mexico in a very vulnerable po-
sition. The result is that the country is generally one of  the most severely hit 
by the reversal of  the portfolio  inflows  and receives a very small share dur-
6. Banco de Mexico, Informe  Anual,  1994, available at www.banixco.org.mx. 
7. See Gurda (1995). 
ing the period of  contraction. The recent past has been an exception to this 
pattern. Financial turbulence started in East Asia and later in Russia and 
Brazil, while Mexico maintained a relatively solid position. 
How Success Undermined the Fundamentals 
The magnitude and composition of  capital inflows  should have raised 
three legitimate sources of  concern for  economic policy: the continuous 
appreciation of  the peso in the midst of  a rather radical trade liberalization 
process; an allocation of  resources biased toward consumption rather than 
investment and toward the production of  nontradables, which originated 
in the difficulties  of  adequately intermediating such massive inflows  and 
resulted in slow economic expansion; and the increasing financial  fragility 
that resulted from  the concentration of  inflows  in highly liquid assets and 
the progressive deterioration of  the banks balance sheets. This section dis-
cusses these three consequences of  the capital surge. 
Capital  Inflows,  Financial  Markets,  and  the  Real  Appreciation 
of  the  Peso 
The capital surge episode featured  a large real appreciation of  the peso: 
from  1988 to 1993, the real value of  the peso increased by more than 40 
percent (the real exchange rate fell  by 30 percent; see table 4-3). The pro-
cess of  appreciation appears to have been even more dramatic if  measured 
by the ratio of  tradable to nontradable goods prices: the ratio fell  from 
140.9 in 1988 to 74.3 in 1993 (Gurría, 1995).8 This section presents a 
formal  analysis of  the mechanisms at work behind the real appreciation 
and of  the macroeconomic adjustment problem it generated. The analyt-
ical framework  is based on a model of  the goods and financial  markets in 
which the exchange rate and the interest rate have a dual role, as key prices 
in the allocation of  resources and as prices of  financial  assets.9 First, they 
8. In 1981, in the eve of  the 1982 currency devaluations, the ratio was 98.1. 
9. The model draws on Branson (1985), with elements borrowed from  Ros (1994b, 1995a) and 
Ros and Skott (1998). It differs  from  Branson in two major areas. First, relative prices respond asym-
metrically to excess demand and supply. While an increase in the demand for  nontraded goods leads 
to a real appreciation of  the currency (an increase in the relative price of  nontraded goods), an excess 
supply leads to a downward output adjustment (leaving the real exchange rate, at least temporarily, at 
its initial level). Second, the model attributes an important role to changes in the position of  the mar-
ginal investor in explaining the behavior of  asset prices. 
Figure 4-1. Financial  and  Goods  Markets 
e 
clear the goods market, that is, they guarantee the flow  equilibrium of  the 
economy, through their effects  on desired investment, savings, and net ex-
ports. Second, they ensure financial  equilibrium—the stock equilibrium 
of  the economy—through their role as prices of  financial  assets. 
Figure 4-1 shows the flow  and stock equilibria of  the economy at the 
intersection of  two curves (the IX and FM curves in Branson's terminol-
ogy).10 The first  curve (IX) is a locus of  real exchange rate and real inter-
est rate combinations along which desired investment is equal to savings 
(national plus foreign).  Investment depends positively on the real ex-
change rate (on account of  its positive effects  on profitability)  and in-
versely on the real interest rate. Given total employment, this locus is one 
along which the nontraded goods market clears through changes in the 
real exchange rate. It therefore  has a positive slope in figure  4-1: a fall  in 
the interest rate raises investment and creates excess demand for  goods; the 
relative price of  nontraded goods increases to clear the market for  non-
traded goods. Moving along the curve, lower values of  the real exchange 
rate cause the current account deficit  to increase, as the fall  in the real ex-
change rate (appreciation of  the domestic currency) leads to a larger gap 
between the demand for  and domestic supply of  traded goods. 
10. See the appendix for  a full  exposition of  the model. 
The second curve (FM) is a locus of  financial  market equilibrium. In 
portfolio  balance, the interest rate differential  between domestic and for-
eign short-term securities, adjusted for  exchange rate expectations, is equal 
to the risk premium on domestic securities. This premium is assumed to 
be a function  of  an exogenous component reflecting  investors' subjective 
perceptions of  country risk and the stock of  external liabilities. With re-
gressive expectations about the real exchange rate (see appendix), the locus 
slopes downward. An appreciation of  the domestic currency tends to gen-
erate expectations of  depreciation, which requires an increase in the do-
mestic interest rate to maintain financial  market equilibrium. 
Consider now the situation in mid-1989. The current account deficit 
was on the order of  2.6 percent of  GDP (roughly the average of  the past 
three decades), and the real exchange rate was at its 1978 value (the aver-
age of  the 1970-94 period). There were no significant  expectations of  real 
depreciation, and a high risk premium accounted for  the large real inter-
est rate differential  between domestic and foreign  securities.11 Let these 
conditions be described by point 1 in figure  4-1. Starting with the debt re-
lief  agreement and the beginning of  NAFTA negotiations in mid-1990, a 
series of  positive shocks disturbed the initial stock equilibrium. These 
shocks reduced both the real interest rate and the real exchange rate; they 
also reduced the risk premium and shifted  the FM curve down and to the 
left.  As the FM curve shifts  downward, the short-term equilibrium value 
of  the domestic currency appreciates along the IX curve. The anticipation 
by financial  markets of  a fall  in interest rates (and thus in the real exchange 
rate), as a result of  the downward shifts  in the FM curve, generates short-
term expectations of  real appreciation. Falling interest rates, real apprecia-
tion of  the peso, and continuous expectations of  real appreciation were 
indeed key features  of  Mexico's financial  markets from  mid-1990 to mid-
1992.12 
By mid-1992 the process of  reducing domestic and external govern-
ment liabilities ended, and the FM curve stopped shifting  down. Exchange 
rate expectations then came to be dominated by the increased gap between 
11. See Ros (1994b). The expected rate of  real depreciation is obtained from  the interest rate dif-
ferential  between CETES and the dollar-indexed Tesobonos and from  the inflation  expectations im-
plicit in the differential  between CETES and indexed Ajustabonos. Because the differential  between 
Ajustabonos and CETES includes an inflation-uncertainty  premium, the risk premium also reflects 
an inflation-uncertainty  premium. Uncertainty about inflation  was large in 1989, since the heterodox 
stabilization program launched in December 1987 had yet to prove its success. This contributed to 
the high measured risk premium between domestic and foreign  securities. 
12. Ros (1994b). 
the exchange rate and its expected long term value.13 At this point, the real 
interest rate would have to increase again to compensate for  expectations 
of  depreciation, which is what happened between the second and third 
quarters of  1992 when the expected rate of  depreciation turned from  neg-
ative to positive. 
Subsequently, however, real interest rates remained surprisingly stable 
and low (until the political shocks of  1994), and the persistent gap be-
tween the current and long term real exchange rates failed  to be reflected 
in higher interest rates. This appears to have been the consequence of  a 
change in the position of  the marginal investor (at the margin between do-
mestic and foreign  short term securities), as the stock of  domestic govern-
ment bonds changed hands between the bearish domestic wealth holders 
and the bullish foreign  investors.14 
Adjustments  in  the  Goods  and  Labor  Markets 
Consider now the evolution of  the goods and labor markets. The styl-
ized facts  here are, first,  the rapid and unprecedented contraction of 
manufacturing  employment and the expansion of  underemployment in 
commerce and agriculture. These trends are shown in table 4-4, together 
with output and productivity performance  during the crisis and post-crisis 
periods (1993-97). As shown in the table, the reduction in manufactur-
ing employment is the result of  a very high growth rate of  labor produc-
tivity (6.0 percent per year) in the face  of  a rather slow rate of  output 
growth (4.2 percent per year). 
Second, wage inequality in the labor market increased in the early 
1990s. Figure 4-2 shows the decline since 1988 in the relative labor earn-
ings of  the low wage sectors (namely, agriculture, construction, commerce, 
and services). Wage inequality also increased within sectors as the wage pre-
mium for  skilled labor rose. Figure 4-3 illustrates the rising trend of  white-
collar wages relative to blue-collar wages in all manufacturing  industries, 
while table 4-3 (above) tracks the redistribution between skilled and un-
skilled labor earnings that took place from  1988 to 1994. Other evidence 
reported in a number of  studies similarly documents the increase in wage 
dispersion and shows that it largely revolved around the increase in skilled 
13. Formally, this is equivalent to an upward shift  in the FM curve. 
14. Bulls and bears are defined  here according to their perceptions about the future  of  the exchange-
rate. See Ros (1994b); Ibarra (1997). 
Table 4-4. Mexico:  Output,  Employment,  and  Productivity  Growth, 
1988-97 
Average annual growth rates 
Sector 
Employmc 'tit  growth Output  growth Productivity  growth 
1988-93 1994-97 1988-93 1994-97 1988-93 1994-97 
Total 3.1 3.2 3.7 2.4 0.6 - 0 . 8 
Mining" - 7 . 4 8.8 2.0 4.1 9.4 4.7 
Manufacturing - 1 . 8 4.9 4.2 4.7 6.0 - 0 . 2 
Agriculture 5.8 0.5 1.9 1.7 - 3 . 9 1.2 
Nontradable goods 3.6* 3.9' 3.1 1.8 - 0 . 5 - 2 . 1 
Construction 4.1 - 1 . 7 4.9 0.1 0.8 1.8 
Transport and 
communication 5.0 2.7 4.1 5.0 - 0 . 9 2.3 
Commerceb 5.1 3.4 4.3 1.0 - 0 . 8 - 2 . 4 
Services 3.0 5.5J 3.9 1.6d 0.9 - 3 . 9 
Government 0.8 n.a. 0.9 n.a. 0.1 n.a. 
Source: 1NF.GI, National  Accounts,  various years; INEGI, National  Survey  of  Employment,  1997. 
a. Includes electricity. 
b. Includes restaurants and hotels. 
c. Includes unspecified  activities. 
d. Includes government. 
relative to unskilled labor incomes.15 As a result of  these trends, the Gini co-
efficient  of  wage inequality increased from  0.46 in 1989 to 0.49 in 1992, 
and then to 0.53 in 1994.16 The increase in wage inequality is, in turn, the 
single major factor  behind the worsening of  income distribution during the 
period.17 
These stylized facts  can be explained as consequences of  trade liberal-
ization and the real overvaluation of  the peso, which caused intensified 
competition from  imports and thus accelerated the rate of  technology 
adoption and reduced the demand for  low skilled workers in manufactur-
ing. This hypothesis can be elaborated in the framework  of  a two-sector 
model (tradables and nontradables) in which tradable goods are produced 
under imperfect  competition with unskilled labor as the variable factor, 
while skilled labor is largely fixed  in the short run, since it is complemen-
tary to physical capital. Trade liberalization implied greater competition in 
1 5. See Hanson and Harrison (1995); Cragg and Epelbaum (1996); Alarcón and McKinley (1997). 
16. Lustig and Székely (1998), based on income and expenditure household surveys. 
17. Ros and Lustig (1999). 
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Source: INEGI, Cuentas  Nacionales. 
a. Average labor earnings in the sector relative to the ecomomy's average. 
Figure 4-3. Mexico:  Ratio  of  White-  to  Blue-Collar  Earnings  in 
Manufacturing,  1988-97 
Wage ratio 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Paper and paper products, printing, and 
publishing 
Nonmetallic mineral products, except from 
petroleum and coal 
Fabricated metal products, machinery, and 
equipment 
•—• Total 
— Wood and wood products, including 
furniture 
— Chemicals and chemical, petroleum, coal, 
rubber, and plastic products 
— Basic metal industries 
— Other manufacturing 
Source: INEGI, Cuentas  Nacionales. 
the domestic market and increased the share of  imports in domestic de-
mand. At the same time, the real value of  the peso rose as a result of  the 
capital inflows,  the increased demand for  nontradables, and the chosen ex-
change rate policy. Increased competition and the appreciation of  the real 
currency, in turn, caused the profit  markup over marginal costs in the 
import-competing goods sectors to fall.  The profit  squeeze is shown in 
table 4-3: the property income share fell  continuously from  1988 to 1994, 
with a cumulative decline of  7 percentage points. The impact of  the profit 
squeeze was very different  among sectors, with a large redistribution tak-
ing place from  the tradables toward the nontradables sectors. The lower 
profit  markup had a negative effect  on unskilled employment, since this is 
the variable factor  that firms  can adjust in the short run. This resulted in 
the tendency to substitute skilled for  unskilled labor, which is observable 
in the industrial employment data. 
Figure 4-4 shows the determination of  the real wage (W/P) and the 
level of  employment in the import-competing goods sector at the intersec-
tion of  two schedules. The NN locus is the equilibrium schedule in the 
markets for  unskilled labor and nontradables (which are intensive in un-
skilled labor). The schedule slopes upward: an increase in employment in 
the import-competing goods sector (LT) reduces the labor supply to the 
nontradable goods sector and increases the real wage. The TT locus is the 
equilibrium schedule in the market for  import-competing goods. It is 
downward sloping, since an increase in wages increases costs and prices in 
this sector, which reduces the demand for  import-competing goods (to the 
benefit  of  imported and nontradable goods). 
The increase in capital inflows  generated an expansion in the demand 
for  nontradable goods, which shifted  the NN curve up and to the left.  This 
increased the real wage and crowded out employment in the tradables sec-
tor. At the same time, the effects  of  trade liberalization and currency over-
valuation on the goods and labor markets operated through three channels. 
First, the relative price of  imported goods fell,  shifting  the TT locus down 
and to the left.  Output demand and employment in the import-competing 
goods sector fell  in the short run. Given nominal wages in the import-com-
peting goods sector, the adjustment involved an expansion of  employment 
in the nontradables sector, which reduced productivity and wages in that 
sector. This opened a gap between the wages of  unskilled labor employed in 
the two sectors, observable in the increasing wage inequality between low-
and high-wage sectors (see figure  4-2). The downward pressure on real 
wages in the import-competing goods sector eventually reduced the prod-
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uct wage of  unskilled labor there and generated an intrasectoral increase in 
the wage premium of  skilled labor. The cost and relative price reductions in 
the import-competing goods sector tended to reestablish the initial relative 
prices, shifting  the TT schedule upward. Even if  the initial relative prices 
are reestablished in the long run, however, the displacement of  local pro-
duction by imports may have hysteresis effects  which lead to a permanent 
increase of  the ratio of  imports to domestically produced import-compet-
ing goods. Through this second channel, the downward shift  of  the TT 
schedule may be permanent and has long-lasting effects  on employment 
and real wages in the import-competing and nontradable goods sectors. 
These hysteresis effects  are the consequence of  the real currency apprecia-
tion associated with trade liberalization. 
Finally, the intensified  competition in the local market led to an in-
crease in the price elasticity of  demand facing  producers of  import-com-
peting goods. The higher price elasticity reduced the firms'  profit  margins, 
which had two consequences. First, it implied a fall  in the price of  import-
competing goods relative to nontradables and imported goods. This in-
creased the demand for  import-competing goods and shifted  the TT 
schedule upward. Second, the fall  in profitability  tended to reduce invest-
ments in the import-competing goods sector and had negative longer-run 
effects  on employment. This second effect—together  with the short-run 
and long-run effects  of  import penetration discussed above—clearly dom-
inated in the Mexican experience. 
Currency overvaluation also had adverse effects  on aggregate invest-
ment, to the extent that the increased profitability  of  nontradables was less 
than the reduced profitability  of  tradables. (As shown in table 4-3, the 
overall share of  profits  in total income fell.)  Together with the distributive 
effect  of  the profit  squeeze against incomes with relatively high savings 
rates, these adverse effects  on investment explain why the rapid expansion 
of  bank credit that accompanied the capital surge fuelled  a consumption 
boom. From 1988 to 1994, the gap between private investment and sav-
ings increased by 6.2 percentage points of  GDP. The increase was fully  ex-
plained by a collapse of  private savings (6.1 percentage points of  GDP) 
rather than by any significant  change in the investment rate. 
The positive shock that hit the Mexican economy in the early 1990s 
reduced the real interest rate and appreciated the real value of  the domes-
tic currency. In figure  4-1 (above), as the real value of  the peso appreciates 
along the IX curve, the current account deficit  increases. Thus a large cur-
rent account deficit  emerges at point 2 in the figure,  exacerbated by the 
effects  of  the capital surge on domestic private savings. From then on, the 
resulting accumulation of  foreign  liabilities should produce an upward 
pressure on the domestic savings rate (or a reduction in the domestic in-
vestment rate or both), while the expectations of  depreciation should gen-
erate an increase in the real interest rate. The resulting excess supply of 
nontradable goods would, in a flex  price economy, tend to increase the 
price ratio of  tradable to nontradable goods and to gradually correct the 
current account deficit.  The IX line shifts  up in this process, bringing 
about a real depreciation. Because expectations of  depreciation fall  as the 
gap between the current and the long-term exchange rate closes, the path 
also features  a reduction of  domestic interest rates. 
This mechanism of  current account correction and resource realloca-
tion will fail  to operate if  the excess supply of  goods does not lead to a 
lower relative price of  nontradables. In that case, the ex ante excess of  sav-
ings over investment will turn into a downward output adjustment. This 
output adjustment can be seen as a downward shift  of  the IX curve that 
prevents the correction of  the real exchange rate, the fall  of  depreciation 
expectations, and the reduction of  the interest rate. Currency overvalua-
tion persists, and large current account deficits  remain in the face  of  a de-
celeration of  growth. 
Such was the actual path followed  by the Mexican economy: growth 
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slowed in 1992 and substantially decelerated in 1993. As shown in figure  4-
5, the decline in the trade balance occurred in the midst of  sluggish growth 
and then persisted with excess capacity. While earlier current account defi-
cits on the order of  7-8 percent were an exceptional feature  occurring only 
in periods of  very fast  economic expansion (with GDP growth rates above 
7 percent), in the early 1990s these large deficits  appeared in a semi-
stagnant economy and showed no signs of  reversal as growth decelerated in 
1992 and 1993.18 
Financial  Fragility  and  the  Deterioration  of  the  Banks'  Balance  Sheets 
In the financial  markets, the continuous accumulation of  external 
liabilities eventually caused the FM curve to shift  up, putting further  up-
ward pressure on the interest rate (at a given value of  the real exchange rate, 
as the IX curve endogenously shifted  down with the level of  output). As 
already discussed, this increase in interest rates was initially prevented by 
the foreign  purchase of  the stock of  government bonds held by local 
investors. In 1994, three additional processes came into play to hold down 
18. For a full  d i scuss ion , see Ros ( 1 9 9 4 b ) a n d Lus t ig a n d Ros ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
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the government debt service. All three were the consequence of  the slow-
down of  capital inflows  that occurred as foreign  investors, who had be-
come the major holders of  short-term government securities by late 1993, 
became increasingly fearful  about the government's ability to hold to its 
exchange rate policy. 
The first  process, which began in full  in early 1994 and accelerated 
with the assassination of  the PRI's presidential candidate in March of  that 
year, was the dollarization of  the stock of  domestic government debt. As 
peso-denominated Treasury bills (CETES) fell  due, they were converted 
into dollar-indexed short-term bonds (Tesobonos) (see figure  4-6). This 
process represented a change in the position of  the investor at the margin 
between CETES and Tesobonos, and it prevented even larger increases in 
the CETES rate. 
The second process was the shortening of  the average maturity of  gov-
ernment bonds. The dollarization of  debt involved not only peso-denom-
inated short-term Treasury bills, but also peso-denominated securities with 
longer maturities. These long-term bonds (Bondes and inflation-adjusted 
Ajustabonos) were similarly converted into Tesobonos (which is why in 
figure  4-6 the stock of  Tesobonos in December is larger than the stock 
of  CETES a year earlier). The result was a steady decline in the average 
maturity of  the debt from  a peak of  306 days in April 1994 to 206 days 
in December 1994. A consequence of  this process was the large amount 
of  debt coming due in 1995 in the form  of  both CETES and Tesobonos. 
In the case of  Tesobonos, U.S.$28.6 billion was due in 1995, of  which 35 
percent (U.S.$9.9 billion) was due in the first  quarter.19 
The third process involved the Central Bank's decision to sterilize the 
effects  of  reserve losses on the money supply. The loss of  international re-
serves stemmed from  massive speculative attacks, especially in March 1994 
at the time of  the Colosio assassination, as well as from  a more gradual 
process that occurred the second half  of  1994 as a result of  the persistently 
large current account deficit  in the face  of  the slowdown of  capital inflows. 
The sterilization of  reserve losses prevented the money supply from  shrink-
ing and contributed to keeping interest rates relatively low. 
Why did the government choose this course of  action, given the high 
risks involved? The next section addresses this question fully,  but part of 
the answer has to do with another set of  problems created by the capital 
surge: the increased vulnerability of  a recently privatized banking system. 
A large fraction  of  capital inflows  was intermediated by commercial banks, 
whether directly through bank deposits acquired by foreigners  or indi-
rectly through the substitution, in the portfolio  of  residents, of  commer-
cial bank liabilities for  financial  assets sold to foreigners.  Trigueros 
estimates that domestic banks decided the final  destination of  close to 60 
percent of  foreign  inflows.20  As a result of  the intermediation of  capital in-
flows,  commercial bank credit to the nonfinancial  private sector multi-
plied by a factor  of  3.5 between the end of  1989 and the end of  1994. 
Credit was misallocated, partly as the unavoidable result of  the mag-
nitude of  its expansion, partly in response to the profit  squeeze on invest-
ment, and partly because the demand for  consumer durables had been 
repressed for  almost a decade. The result was an imbalance between the 
financing  of  consumption and the financing  of  investment, together with 
a deterioration in the banks' balance sheets. The magnitude of  the imbal-
ance in the financing  of  consumption and investment is revealed in the 
fact  that household credit increased from  9.6 percent of  total credit in De-
cember of  1989 to 26.7 percent in November 1994. The deterioration of 
the banks' balance sheets is revealed by the increase in nonperforming 
loans, which rose from  a negligible amount in 1990 to about 9 percent of 
19. See Cole and Kehoe (1996); Ibarra (1997). 
20. Trigueros (1998). 
total bank loans in 1994. At the same time, dollar-denominated bank 
liabilities expanded rapidly: dollar deposits (mostly in commercial banks) 
captured nearly one-fourth  of  total capital inflows  from  the beginning of 
1990 to the third quarter of  1994. This expansion, together with the fact 
that the sources of  foreign  exchange necessary to service the commercial 
bank liabilities in hard currency were not being created, created a vulner-
ability to exchange rate changes that had dramatic consequences after  the 
December 1994 devaluation. 
The Crisis: Currency, Banking or Debt? 
The path that the economy had taken well before  the convulsions of 
1994 was likely to lead, sooner or later, to a slowdown of  capital inflows. 
The slowdown came in 1 994, and it partly took the form  of  a series of  spec-
ulative attacks associated with the political shocks of  that year. The govern-
ment was then faced  essentially with three options: an early (albeit already 
overdue) exchange rate realignment through a shift  to a floating  rate, a step 
devaluation, or a faster  slide of  the band ceiling; a monetary contraction re-
sulting from  unsterilized reserve losses, which would have led to large in-
creases in interest rates; or an expansion of  domestic credit to sterilize the 
effects  of  reserve losses on the monetary base, combined with the dollariza-
tion of  domestic debt to stem capital flight  and prevent further  increases in 
interest rates. 
The first  option was probably judged unnecessary and likely to send 
the wrong signal concerning the Central Bank's commitment to price 
stability (which had recently been elevated to the sole objective of  the Cen-
tral Bank). The second option was discarded, probably out of  the fear  on 
the part of  the Central Bank that such a monetary contraction would trig-
ger a major banking crisis, l he possibility of  a major banking crisis was 
undoubtedly a real reason for  concern: the speculative attack in March had 
caused a loss of  one-third of  international reserves, and the balance sheet 
of  the banking system had deteriorated as a result of  the earlier overexpan-
sion of  bank credit. 
Another major reason why the authorities pursued the third option 
was that they assumed the slowdown in capital inflows  was temporary and 
reversible. The slowdown was not seen as the beginning of  a macroeco-
nomic adjustment process that required a change in exchange rate policy 
in order to proceed more or less smoothly. Policymakers—and for  a while 
many financial  market participants—wrongly  assessed the deterioration of 
the real fundamentals  of  the Mexican economy that began well before  the 
political events and hard policy dilemmas of  1994. They thus perceived 
the reserve losses following  the runs on the peso in January and March as 
unique events that had unfortunately,  but only temporarily, sent a healthy 
situation off  course. Furthermore, the sterilization and debt management 
decisions temporarily accomplished their intended objectives of  stopping 
capital flight  and relieving the pressure on domestic interest rates. Domes-
tic interest rates started to fall  in July, and from  April to mid-November 
there were no new dramatic drops in international reserves. Reserves did 
undergo a gradual and continuous loss, however, as the slowdown in cap-
ital inflows  persisted and the large current account deficit  was financed  by 
running down reserves. 
The  Currency  Crisis 
Interpretations of  the Mexican crisis fall  into several categories. A first 
distinction can be made between a disequilibrium view, which emphasizes 
the economy's real disequilibria (that is, real overvaluation and unsustain-
able current account deficit),  and an equilibrium speculative attack view, 
which gives preeminence to the excessive monetary growth that caused 
reserves to decline until the exchange rate regime collapsed.21 The interpre-
tation presented here clearly falls  into the real disequilibria school. The cur-
rent account deficit  was indeed on an unsustainable path, and its correction 
would eventually require a large real exchange rate realignment. Between 
1989 and 1993, the current account deficit  (excluding interest on the debt) 
averaged 31.7 percent of  exports. Given an export growth rate of  8.7 per-
21. See Sachs, Velasco, and Tornell (1996) for  this distinction. Within the first  view, Dornbusch 
and Werner (1994) explain the real appreciation of  the peso as the result of  the exchange rate-based 
stabilization program in the face  of  sluggish price adjustments; Ros ( 1994b, 1995a) and Lustig and 
Ros (1998) discuss the so-called Mexican disea.se, that is, the unsustainability of  exchange rate and 
trade policies and the misallocation effects  of  the capital surge, which led to the collapse of  private sav-
ings and unsustainable current account deficits;  and Atkeson and Rios-Rull (1996) argue that Mexico 
hit a borrowing constraint in early 1994 following  the collapse of  domestic savings in previous years. 
For examples of  the second view, which emphasizes the inconsistency between exchange rate and mon-
etary policy generated by the Central Bank's attempt to sterilize the reserve losses arising from  the slow-
down of  capital inflows,  see Sachs, Velasco, and Tornell (1995) and Calvo and Mendoza (1996). The 
standard speculative attack model is Krugman (1979); later generations of  speculative attack models 
are discussed below. Many of  these interpretations go beyond the events leading to the devaluation in 
December 1994, encompassing the post-devaluation crisis. Here, the locus is on their interpretations 
of  the economic mechanisms that led to the devaluation. 
cent per year (the average for  1989-93), Dadush, Dhareshwar, and Jo-
hannes estimate a steady-state ratio of  foreign  liabilities to exports of  3.6.22 
I reach similar conclusions in earlier papers.23 The World Bank debt tables 
classify  a country as severely indebted if  its debt is greater than 220 percent 
of  exports, that is, well below the 3.6 steady state ratio in Mexico. It is thus 
unlikely that foreign  investors would have been willing to finance  this high 
debt path. The Mexican economy would therefore  have faced  severe debt 
and balance-of-payments  problems well before  reaching the steady state.24 
The presence of  real disequilibria, however, is not enough to explain 
the currency crisis, let alone its timing. What if,  for  example, the Central 
Bank had chosen not to finance  the current account deficit  by running 
down reserves during most of  1994? Before  looking more closely at this 
question, a further  distinction must be made among three different  types 
of  currency crisis models, this time within the speculative attack hypoth-
esis.25 Fundamentalist or first-generation  models á la Krugman or Flood 
and Garber are based on the inconsistency between an exchange rate peg 
and an expansionary monetary and fiscal  policy.26 When forced  to mone-
tize a fiscal  deficit,  the central bank defends  the peg by gradually losing re-
serves. The inconsistency is perceived by speculators, and it consequently 
leads to a speculative attack and the collapse of  the exchange rate. These 
are fundamentalist  models in the sense that the origin of  the crisis has to 
do with wrong fundamentals,  in this case the inconsistency between the 
rate of  domestic credit expansion and the exchange rate regime. 
Second-generation models endogenize economic policy by introducing 
the costs and benefits  of  devaluation. Speculative attacks can then arise in 
the absence of  any fundamental  problems.27 The reason is that the endogen-
eity of  economic policy introduces an element of  indeterminacy and self-
fulfilling  prophecy: a government may be willing to continue to defend  the 
exchange rate (and follow  a consistent monetary policy) if  no speculative at-
tacks occur, but it would rather shift  to a floating  regime if  a speculative at-
22. Dadush, Dhareshwar, and lohannes (1994). 
23. Ros (1994a, 1994b). 
24. The 3.6 ratio of  foreign  liabilities to exports includes not only debt, but also other forms  of  for-
eign investments, "this qualification  does little, however, to reduce the assessment of  Mexico's vulner-
ability, given that most of  these investments took the form  of  highly liquid and volatile portfolio 
inflows  with a rate of  return that was usually higher than that of  foreign  debt. 
25. See P. Krugman, Balance  Sheets,  the  Transfer  Problem  and  Financial  Crises,  1999, available at 
web.mit.edu/krugman/www/. 
26. Krugman (1979); Flood and Garber (1984). 
27. Obstfeld  (1986). 
tack forces  it to face  the alternative of  monetary contraction. The private 
sector is in equilibrium in both cases, and multiple equilibria exist within a 
range of  costs and benefits  of  defending  the exchange rate. Self-fulfilling 
changes in expectations can then shift  the economy from  one equilibrium to 
the other. The European Monetary System (EMS) currency crises of  1992, 
it has been argued, fit  into this framework.28  Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 
apply a variant of  the argument to the 1994 Mexican devaluation (see 
below).29 
Finally, the Asian crises inspired third-generation models that empha-
size banking problems and the effect  of  moral hazard on lending and in-
vestments.30 Calvo and Mendoza bring elements of  this approach into 
their interpretation of  the Mexican crisis.31 
Although these elements are not entirely absent from  the Mexican cri-
sis, none of  these views fits  the Mexican experience especially well. The 
inconsistency between exchange rate policy and a monetary policy that 
sterilized reserve losses, for  example, was certainly a feature  of  economic 
policy in 1994, but the reserve losses were the result of  the speculative at-
tacks themselves rather than, as in the Krugman model, of  a fiscal  deficit 
financed  by the Central Bank's expansion of  credit which then led to a spec-
ulative attack. Trying to understand the crisis through such a model leaves 
unexplained the very phenomenon that these first-generation  models aim 
to explain (namely, the speculative attack). The more gradual reserve losses 
during the second half  of  the year, which resulted from  the slowdown of 
capital inflows  in the face  of  a huge current account deficit,  were validated 
by the sterilization policies followed  throughout the year. Here again, how-
ever, first-generation  models cannot explain why the Central Bank fol-
lowed this course of  action: there was no fiscal  deficit  to account for  the 
expansion of  domestic credit. 
Why, then, did the Central Bank validate the reserve losses instead of 
adopting a tight monetary policy to reduce the current account deficit  and 
increase the capital account surplus? Such a tight monetary policy prob-
ably would not have prevented new speculative attacks and the eventual 
collapse of  the exchange rate, even over a short horizon. The reasons that 
the Central Bank pursued the policy it did are related to the second- and 
28. Obstfeld  (1994). 
29. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996). 
30. See P. Krugman, Balance  Sheets,  the  Transfer  Problem  and  Financial  Crises,  1999, available at 
web.mit.edu/krugman/www/. 
31. Calvo and Mendoza (1996). 
third-generation models, though in rather subtle ways. First, as argued ear-
lier, the Central Bank had to consider the prospect of  a severe banking cri-
sis. Banking problems thus had an important role in the developments 
leading to the devaluation, as in recent models inspired by the Asian cri-
sis. This factor,  however, did not arise because the currency crisis was a by-
product of  a bank run caused by perceptions of  insolvency or even because 
government guarantees and moral hazard generated bad lending and a hid-
den fiscal  deficit.  Banking problems were important because the fragility 
of  the banking system, which resulted from  the nature of  the capital surge, 
influenced  the authorities' decision to sterilize the reserve losses and dol-
larize the domestic debt. 
Second, a contractionary monetary policy would have generated addi-
tional high costs. The fact  that the exchange rate regime was eventually 
abandoned reveals a growing conflict  between exchange rate stability and 
other objectives of  economic policy, including employment and growth. 
The costs of  not devaluing, as perceived by the government, eventually be-
came too high. Ibarra applies this reasoning to explain why the exchange 
rate policy was abandoned just after  the change in administration in 
December 1994, when the costs of  devaluing (such as the loss of  reputation) 
could be minimized.32 Moreover, the adoption of  a tight monetary policy 
would have lacked credibility in the eyes of  investors, given the high costs in-
volved. High interest rates are often  the prelude to speculative attacks pre-
cisely because they signal to speculators the high costs of  defending  the peg. 
The endogeneity of  economic policy, as emphasized by second-gener-
ation models of  currency crises, was thus clearly relevant to the Mexican 
experience. This does not mean, however, that the endogeneity of  eco-
nomic policy necessarily generated multiple equilibria, as argued by Sachs, 
Tornell, and Velasco.33 They hold that multiple equilibria arise when a suf-
ficiently  high (but not too high) level of  government debt generates par-
tial credibility in the exchange rate peg. The government's incentive to 
devalue then depends on self-fulfilling  expectations of  devaluation: if  these 
are low, interest rates allow debt to continue to be serviced without deval-
uing; if  they are high, they create a strong incentive for  the government to 
reduce the value of  the debt through devaluation. The interdependence 
between exchange rate policy and devaluation expectations opens the door 
to self-fulfilling  outcomes. 
32. Ibarra (1997). 
33. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996). 
This argument has two unsatisfactory  features.  First, devaluation 
could hardly inflate  away the real value of  the debt, which by this time was 
mostly in dollars or dollar-indexed bonds. It is doubtful,  then, that this 
could have acted as an incentive to devalue, so the incentives for  the gov-
ernment action on December 20 have to be found  elsewhere. Second, the 
argument neglects the effects  that the change in government probably had 
on the net costs of  devaluing. As argued by Ibarra, the reduction in these 
costs—as perceived by a new administration that could blame the previ-
ous government for  the necessary policy change—was probably a major 
factor  in the timing of  the devaluation.34 If  this is the case, as I believe it 
is, a model with multiple equilibria is not necessary for  explaining the cur-
rency crisis. The shift  in the perceived costs of  devaluing probably moved 
the economy from  a situation in which the peg had enough credibility that 
a single equilibrium existed (because nobody believed that the old admin-
istration would devalue on the eve of  the change in government) to one in 
which a commitment by the new government to pursue the same exchange 
rate policy had so little credibility, given the costs of  maintaining the pol-
icy, that again a single equilibrium (devaluation) existed. 
All this suggests that a hybrid model—in which worsening policy trade-
offs  and shifting  perceptions of  the costs of  devaluation interact against the 
background of  real disequilibria, a large current account deficit,  and a slow-
down in capital inflows—is  perhaps the most useful  approach for  under-
standing the timing of  the devaluation of  December 1994. In this view, the 
presence of  banking problems, together with policymakers' confidence 
about the future  course of  capital inflows,  decisively influenced  the mone-
tary and debt management decisions of  1994. The strategy of  dollarizing 
debt to avoid tightening monetary policy had run its course, with practically 
the whole stock of  CETES existing in late 1993 converted into Tesobonos 
by December 1994, and capital inflows  had not recovered sufficiently.  In 
this context, the change in administration that took place in December 
abruptly modified  the perceived costs of  devaluing. 
The  Debt  Crisis 
So far  the paper has focused  on the policy actions and events leading 
to the devaluation. Understanding the currency crisis, however, is only half 
of  the story, for  the Mexican crisis involved more than the exchange rate. 
34. Ibarra (1997). 
Multiple equilibria arguments become much more relevant in understand-
ing the second half  of  the story than they were in the first. 
After  November 1991, the peso-dollar parity fluctuated  within a band 
based on a fixed  floor  and a sliding ceiling (with a daily crawling peg of 
0.04 centavos after  October 1992). The peso depreciated within the band 
by around 10 percent in 1994, and the band's ceiling was raised 15 per-
cent on December 20, 1994. The announcement of  the new band ceiling 
immediately sent the value of  the dollar to the new 4 peso ceiling, and it 
is estimated that U.S.$5 billion left  the country in the course of  two days. 
The Central Bank then decided to withdraw from  the foreign  exchange 
market. A rapid and substantial depreciation followed:  the dollar parity 
went from  4 pesos on December 20 to 6.35 on January 30 and 7.55 on 
March 9, when an emergency economic program for  1995 finally  stopped 
the slide. Panic selling of  government debt sent the risk premium on Tes-
obonos (measured as the interest rate differential  between Tesobonos and 
U.S. Treasury bills) from  less than two percentage points before  the deval-
uation to five  percentage points at the end of  December and twenty per-
centage points at the end of  January 19 9 5.35 On December 27, aTesobono 
refinancing  auction was cancelled because investors were no longer willing 
to hold these obligations at interest rates acceptable to the Mexican au-
thorities. In the stock market, it is likely that some of  the investors who 
had their funds  invested in pesos interpreted the devaluation as a breach 
of  contract. Their reaction was to withdraw their capital as soon as pos-
sible. Toward the second week of  January, Mexico was on the verge of 
default,  and the financial  markets of  Latin America and other regions in-
creasingly began to be affected. 
In sum, the collapse of  the peso rapidly degenerated into a debt crisis. 
Why was a government that had substantially reduced its foreign  and do-
mestic liabilities since 1990 unable to roll over its debt in December 1994 
and January 1995? Why was a rescue package of  about U.S.$50 billion 
eventually required to stop the collapse of  the peso? The answer to these 
questions is that fears  of  default  surged in the face  of  the small level of  re-
serves left  at the Central Bank at the time of  floating  and the large amount 
of  short-term debt, particularly dollar-linked Tesobonos, coming due 
throughout 1995. Moreover, the dollarization of  the debt meant that de-
valuation did nothing to reduce the high ratio of  Tesobonos to reserves, 
while it increased the real value of  the dollar debt in pesos. Through sim-
35. Cole and Kehoe (1996); Ibarra (1997). 
pie arithmetic calculations, investors saw that payments coming due in 
1995 (which were estimated at about U.S.$50 billion, assuming that most 
of  the short-term debt would not be rolled over) were far  greater than the 
estimated resources available: international reserves in the Bank of  Mexico 
were about U.S.$6 billion. Individual investors may have been willing to 
roll over their holdings of  Mexican short-term debt if  others did the same, 
but when others panicked, few  remained confident  of  being repaid. This 
probably explains why the first  international rescue package of  U.S.$18 
billion was unsuccessful  in calming the markets. The rescue package plus 
the international reserves would barely have covered half  of  Mexico's finan-
cial obligations for  1995. Stopping the collapse of  the peso required a 
package of  around U.S.$50 billion, equivalent to the total debt payments 
coming due in 1995.36 
Elements of  this story have been formalized  by Ibarra, who highlights 
the role of  the ratio of  Tesobonos to reserves in the post-devaluation spec-
ulation against the peso, while Cole and Kehoe model the government's 
inability to roll over its debt as a self-fulfilling  debt crisis.37 The latter may 
seem paradoxical since Mexico's government debt fell  continuously and 
substantially in the six years preceding the crisis. Cole and Kehoe's argu-
ment rests on the maturity structure of  the debt (and not only on its level). 
Their model identifies  a crucial interval of  debt for  which the government 
will be willing to service the old debt provided that it can roll it over, but 
will default  if  it cannot sell new debt. Outside this interval, debt service is 
presumably either so low that the government will not want to default 
even if  it fails  to sell new debt or so high that it overwhelms the costs of 
default.  When government debt is in the critical interval, which the au-
thors call the crisis zone, multiple equilibria exist, and whether default  oc-
36. The final  package included $20 billion of  loan guarantees from  the U.S. government, $17.8 bil-
lion of  credits from  the IMF, $10 billion in short-term loans from  central banks via the Bank for  In-
ternational Settlements, and several billion dollars of  loans from  other governments in North and 
South America. The IMF loan amounted to over seven times Mexico's IMF quota and was unprece-
dented in the history of  the IMF. The Mexican government declared its intention to reduce govern-
ment spending by 1.3 percent of  GDP and to cut the amount of  credit granted by state development 
banks. A National Accord among workers, business, and government was set up to contain the infla-
tionary pressures arising from  the devaluation. The Mexican government also emphasized its com-
mitment to market-oriented reforms  and pledged to propose constitutional amendments to open 
previously restricted areas of  the economy to private investment and to increase foreign  participation 
in the domestic banking system. As a source of  collateral, the Mexican government agreed to have im-
porters of  Mexican oil make payments through an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of  New York. 
For an analysis of  the package, see Lustig (1997). 
37. Ibarra (1997); Cole and Kehoe (1996). 
curs depends on whether the government can roll over its debt. A key fea-
ture of  the model is that the size of  the crisis zone depends on the average 
length of  maturity of  government debt. With a very short maturity struc-
ture, the interval is large and includes levels of  debt that are not high by 
international standards, as was the case in Mexico before  the crisis.38 
This line of  reasoning has interesting implications. First, it suggests 
that the post-devaluation panic could not have taken place if  the devalua-
tion had occurred in the first  quarter of  1994 (after  the Colosio assassina-
tion), when reserves were still close to U.S.$20 billion, Tesobonos were 
about U.S.$6 billion, and the average maturity of  government bonds was 
306 days (compared to 206 days in December). Given these figures,  the 
economy was probably still outside the crisis zone, and a devaluation at 
that time would have looked more like the EMS crises of  1992 than the 
Mexican debacle of  1994. Second, if  multiple equilibria indeed existed, 
this implies that while the post-devaluation financial  panic in December 
was a possibility, it was not inevitable. A Mexican government default  was 
obviously not in the collective interest of  investors. The financial  panic 
that was forcing  the government to default  was a bad equilibrium that was 
clearly inferior  to what collective rationality dictated. To the extent that 
the self-fulfilling  debt crisis reflected  the lack of  mechanisms for  organiz-
ing investors' collective action, the argument suggests that the rescue pack-
age had a good chance of  succeeding—as it did. 
Economic Performance  after  the Crisis and 
the Medium-Term Prospects 
The argument in this paper can be summarized as follows:  the critical 
problems faced  by the Mexican economy in the mid-1990s resulted from 
the fact  that trade liberalization and the opening of  the domestic bond and 
stock markets took place in the midst of  a persistent real overvaluation of 
the peso and a high volatility of  capital flows.  The combination of  trade 
and exchange rate policies was unsustainable, particularly given the vul-
nerability generated by massive portfolio  capital inflows  from  1990 to 
1993. In this sense, Mexico's success in attracting capital from  abroad con-
tained the seeds of  its subsequent failure. 
38. On the crisis or vulnerability zone, see also Ffrench-Davis  (2000); Ffrench-Davis  and Ocampo 
(in this volume). 
The legacy of  the crisis will be long lasting. The effects  on living stan-
dards and income distribution were dramatic: average real wages fell  by 20 
percent between 1994 and 1996. The devaluation caused a deep crisis in 
the domestic banking sector, which at the time had net foreign  currency 
liabilities and plenty of  bad performing  loans, and its bailout will more or 
less double the domestic public debt. 
Despite these adverse consequences, however, the economy emerged 
from  the crisis stronger than it was before  in several ways. After  the deep re-
cession of  1995—and in contrast to the period following  the 1982 debt cri-
sis—the economy recovered a growth rate of  about 5 percent per year, and 
open unemployment fell  to about 3 percent. Can the country sustain 
growth at rates higher than those observed since the early 1980s? A number 
of  factors  lend some credibility to such a scenario. First, the international 
environment is more favorable  today than in the aftermath  of  the 1982 debt 
crisis, despite increased volatility and contagion effects  such as those experi-
enced in the aftermath  of  the East Asian and Russian financial  crises. The 
United States, Mexico's main trading partner, has experienced the longest 
peace-time economic expansion in history. Mexico's participation in 
NAFTA has therefore  been a bonus, which is reflected  in the fact  that 
among Latin American countries Mexico was one of  the least affected  by the 
Brazilian currency crisis. While other countries in the region experienced a 
recession in 1999, the Mexican economy grew at 3.7 percent, with a contin-
ued deceleration of  inflation  to around 12 percent. Moreover, foreign  inter-
est rates have remained low compared to the early 1980s, and in contrast to 
the earlier crisis, the international rescue package successfully  prevented the 
financial  panic from  degenerating into a decade-long credit run in the inter-
national credit markets. In this context, fiscal  and exchange rate policies that 
ensure the economy is operating at full  capacity and with a high real ex-
change rate have greater chances of  success now than in the 1980s. 
Second, the crisis itself  may have positively altered the long-term mac-
roeconomic outlook. The huge real devaluation of  the peso abruptly elim-
inated the unsustainable combination of  trade and exchange rate policies 
that played a major role in the process that generated the crisis. The mac-
roeconomic impact of  export expansion has been enhanced in the context 
of  a more open economy and greater integration with the U.S. economy 
under NAFTA. A comparison of  the performance  of  Mexico's exports dur-
ing the 1995 crisis with the 1983 recession illustrates the positive legacy 
of  a more open economy. In 1995, the exchange rate increased by 86 per-
cent. In that year, maquiladora  (in-bond assembly) exports increased by 30 
percent, while nonoil and non-maquiladora  exports expanded by 37 per-
cent. In 1983, following  a 466 percent increase in the exchange rate in 
1982, maquiladora  exports increased by 29 percent while non-maquiladora 
and nonoil exports fell  by nearly 6 percent. Contrary to what happened in 
the period 1988-94, net exports expanded after  1995.39 
Given its magnitude, the real devaluation of  the peso also contributed 
to a reversal of  the factors  underlying the profit  squeeze in the tradables 
sector and the fall  of  the private savings rate. The positive effects  on the 
profitability  of  the tradables sector must, in turn, have contributed to the 
observed increase in FDI. These investments now represent nearly 20 per-
cent of  total private investment, and between 1996 and 1998 they ac-
counted for  around 60 percent of  total foreign  investment (including 
portfolio  inflows).  Consequently, a much lower portion of  the current ac-
count deficit  is now being financed  by short-term capital than was the case 
in the first  half  of  the 1990s, thus making the economy less vulnerable to 
new domestic or external shocks. Private savings increased substantially in 
1995 and continued to increase up to 1997. The increase was probably 
due not only to the real devaluation, but also to the domestic banking cri-
sis and the associated credit crunch. 
As credit constraints become less acute, however, the upward trend of 
private savings may be reversed. The domestic savings rate declined signif-
icantly in 1998, which most probably reflects  a fall  in private savings. 
Moreover, the banking crisis is far  from  resolved, and the bailout of  the 
banking system will impose a large burden on the fiscal  accounts in the 
years to come. With the exception of  the banking sector, the economy is 
more robust than in the early 1990s, but it is too early to tell whether pol-
icymakers have learned from  the experience of  1990-94. The sources of 
policy concern associated with capital surges (namely, appreciation, re-
source misallocation, and financial  fragility)  are not nearly as serious today 
as they were in the first  half  of  the 1990s. This is the case, however, sim-
ply because the magnitude of  capital inflows  did not return to their previ-
ous levels after  Mexico regained access to international capital markets. 
Appendix 
The model of  the goods and financial  markets used in the paper has 
two equations, corresponding to the conditions of  goods market (or flow) 
equilibrium and financial  market (or stock) equilibrium. The equation of 
39. See Ros (1999) for  a full  discussion. 
the IX curve is a locus of  real exchange rate (e)  and real interest rate (r) 
combinations along which desired investment (I) is equal to national sav-
ings (SJ  plus foreign  savings (¿y): 
(1)  I  in  e) = Sd  (L,  IT)  + Sf(e,  L, IT), 
where Ir  < 0 , I e >  0, SdL  > 0, SdD*  > 0, Sfe  < 0, SfL  > 0, and SfD* 
> 0, and where L  is total employment, which positively affects  both do-
mestic and foreign  savings (in the last case, through its effects  on the trade 
deficit)  and D*  is the stock of  external liabilities, which positively affects 
domestic savings on account of  wealth effects  and positively affects  the 
current account deficit  (5 )̂ on account of  the higher interest payments 
abroad associated with a higher level of  D*.  Investment depends positively 
on the real exchange rate (on account of  its positive effects  on profitabil-
ity) and inversely on the real interest rate. Given total employment, this 
IX locus is one along which the nontraded goods market clears through 
changes in the real exchange rate. 
The equation of  the financial  market (FM) curve refers  to the equal-
ity between the risk premium («) on domestic securities and the interest 
rate differential  between domestic and foreign  short-term securities, ad-
justed for  exchange rate expectations. The risk premium is assumed to be 
a function  of  an exogenous component ( « J reflecting  investors' subjective 
perceptions on country risk and the stock of  external liabilities (£>*):40 
(2) r  = r*  + ee  + u and u = u {D*,  ug), 
where r*  is the real foreign  interest rate. Expected depreciation (ee)  is as-
sumed to depend on both the future  short-term equilibrium exchange rate 
(e+l),  which for  simplicity is given by the solution of  the model, and the 
long-term equilibrium exchange rate (e*),  which is defined  as the value of 
e consistent with a sustainable current account deficit  and full  employ-
ment: 
e'=  a (e+l  - e) + b (e*  - e), 
where 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < 1. 
Exchange rate expectations are thus subject to two forces  that tend to 
offset  each other whenever the short-term and long-term equilibrium ex-
change rates move in opposite directions. Substituting this mechanism of 
40. In principle, the domestically held stock of  government securities should also be included. The 
specification  in equation 2 is justified  if  the risk of  default  on domestically held securities depends on IT. 
expectations formation  into equation 2 and solving for  e gives the equa-
tion of  the FM locus: 
b a 1 
e*  + _{a + b)_ (a  + b)_ e+\ (a  + b)_ 
where u — u{D*,  uo). 
Equation 3 defines  a downward sloping line in (e,  r)  space: a fall  in 
the exchange rate tends to generate expectations of  depreciation (for  given 
values of  <?*and <?+]), and this requires an increase in the domestic inter-
est rate to maintain financial  market equilibrium. 
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STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES* 
An International 
Financial  Architecture  for 
Crisis  Prevention 
The deep integration of  developing countries into the global economy has many positive effects.  In 
particular, capital flows  to developing countries have important bene-
fits.  These benefits  are especially clear in the case of  foreign  direct invest-
ment (FDI), which not only is fairly  stable but also brings technological 
know-how and access to markets. Other external flows  also have impor-
tant positive microeconomic effects,  such as lowering the cost of  capital 
for  creditworthy firms.  At a macroeconomic level, foreign  capital flows  can 
complement domestic savings, leading to higher investment and growth. 
However, large surges of  short-term and potentially reversible capital 
flows  to developing countries can have very negative effects.  First, these 
surges pose complex policy dilemmas for  macroeconomic management, as 
they can initially push key macroeconomic variables, such as exchange 
rates and prices of  assets like property and shares, away from  what could 
be considered their long-term equilibrium.1 Second, and more important, 
such flows  pose the risk of  sharp reversals, which can result in very serious 
losses of  output, investment, and employment, as well as dramatic in-
creases in poverty, particularly if  they lead to currency and financial  crises. 
This was clearly illustrated by the impact of  the crisis in Asia, which 
I thank Ricardo Ffrench-Davis  and Jose Antonio Ocampo for  insightful  suggestions and Jenny 
Kimmis and Jacques Cailloux for  their valuable inputs. 
1. Ffrench-Davis  and Griffith-Jones  (1995). 
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quickly spread to many other countries, including Brazil. The East Asian 
countries that were hit by the crisis saw their gross domestic product 
(GDP) fall  by 8 percent, on average, in 1998; Mexico saw its GDP fall  by 
almost 7 percent in 1995. Fortunately, output has tended to recover fairly 
quickly in most cases. The negative effects  of  a crisis, however, are not just 
the significant  short-term costs, but also include the long-term negative ef-
fect  on lower productive investment stemming from  increased uncertainty. 
Asian-style currency crises—and their extremely high development 
costs—raise a very serious concern about the net development benefits 
that developing countries receive from  large flows  of  potentially reversible 
short-term international capital. While the high costs of  reversals of  those 
flows  are evident, the benefits  are less clear. This contrasts sharply with 
FDI and trade flows,  in which the large developmental benefits  clearly 
outweigh the costs. As a result, volatile short-term capital flows  emerge as 
a potential Achilles' heel for  the globalized economy and for  the market 
economy in developing countries. If  the international community and na-
tional authorities do not learn to manage these flows  better, such volatile 
flows  could seriously undermine the tremendous benefits  that globaliza-
tion and free  markets can otherwise bring. 
Causes of  Currency Crises 
The causes of  currency crises always include domestic causes, which 
differ  from  case to case. The East Asian countries, for  example, displayed 
serious problems, including important weaknesses in the regulation of 
their domestic financial  systems. In particular, short-term private debt in-
curred by both banks and nonfinancial  firms  had been poorly monitored 
and regulated. Some mistakes also seem to have been made in the liberal-
ization of  the capital accounts, as this was reportedly implemented in ways 
that encouraged short-term flows.  Furthermore, several of  the East Asian 
countries had fixed  exchange rate policies that pegged their currencies to 
the U.S. dollar. 
However, an important cause of  the East Asian crisis was not signifi-
cant changes in several macroeconomic fundamentals,  but rather a sharp 
deterioration in confidence  throughout the region, which spread through 
contagion effects.  Indeed, the most disturbing element in the East Asian 
crisis was that it affected  countries with long track records of  good eco-
nomic management, countries that had been remarkably successful  over 
extended periods in terms of  economic growth, dynamism of  their export 
sectors, low rates of  inflation,  fiscal  surpluses, and high rates of  saving. 
A crucial causal factor  for  explaining crises thus relates to the behav-
ior of  international capital flows.  This aspect is linked to certain imperfec-
tions of  international capital markets. These imperfections  almost always 
featured  in the financial  panics of  earlier times, but their impact has in-
creased significantly  as a result of  the speed with which capital markets can 
react in today's global economy, aided by highly sophisticated information 
technology. Paradoxically, this impact appears to be strongest for  econo-
mies that are highly successful  or that are perceived to be in the process of 
becoming so. Such conditions trigger a perverse interaction between eu-
phoria in international capital markets and complacency by governments 
in recipient countries. 
Successful  economies offer  high returns by way of  yields as well as cap-
ital gains. If  international investors can find  ways to enter these economies, 
or if  their entrance is facilitated  by capital account liberalization, they tend 
to rush in, generating a surge of  capital inflows  that affects  key economic 
variables. Exchange rates become overvalued; the prices of  key assets, such 
as shares or real estate, rise quickly and sharply. Both real income and per-
ceived wealth increase. Banks assume that current trends will continue and 
therefore  tend to relax lending standards, lifting  liquidity constraints on 
firms.  The balance of  payments deteriorates, often  quite rapidly, as both 
consumption and investment rise. Initially, this is not seen as a problem, 
since foreign  lenders and investors are willing to continue lending and in-
vesting. Economic authorities thus delay necessary adjustment, confident 
that their previous success will continue and that crises happen elsewhere. 
Then something changes. The change may be domestic or interna-
tional, economic or political, important or relatively small. Whatever it is, 
it triggers a sharp modification  in perceptions and leads to a large fall  in 
confidence  in the economy among internationally mobile investors, that is, 
both foreign  and national investors who are able to take their liquid assets 
out. The change of  perception tends to be both large and quick. A country 
that was perceived as a successful  economy or a successful  reformer—for 
which no amount of  praise was sufficient—is  suddenly seen as fragile,  risky, 
and crisis prone. The media, and in particular the specialized financial 
press, contribute in an important way to creating—or magnifying—rapid 
changes in perceptions: the media suddenly tend to focus  on bad short-
term news and to underplay more favorable  long-term fundamentals.  The 
rating agencies also tend to play a procyclical role, accentuating changes of 
perceptions. The change of  perception tends to be far  larger than the mag-
nitude of  the underlying change in macroeconomic fundamentals.  Fur-
thermore, any weakness in fundamentals  is then discovered and magnified 
by markets. There can be much overshooting. Exchange rates collapse, and 
stock markets and property prices also fall  sharply. 
This pattern helps explain the currency and banking crises in the 
Southern Cone of  Latin America in the early 1980s, as well as the Mexi-
can peso crisis of  1994. It also provides important elements for  under-
standing the 1997 East Asian crisis and the more recent crisis in Brazil. 
There are significant  differences  among these crises, of  course, and among 
the crises in the East Asian economies, particularly with regard to domes-
tic causes. However, they demonstrate a common denominator in the 
boom-bust behavior of  short-term lenders and investors, driven not just 
by real trends, but by dramatic changes in perceptions. The complacency 
of  the economic authorities in recipient countries during the period of 
boom represents another common feature. 
Capital and financial  markets are special in that although they gener-
ally function  well, they are prone to important imperfections.2  Asymmetric 
information  and adverse selection play an important role in explaining 
these imperfections,  since financial  markets are particularly information  in-
tensive.3 Furthermore, financial  markets offer  strong incentives for  herd-
ing, as individual short-term investors, lenders, or fund  managers try to 
choose the investment or loan that they think is most likely to be chosen by 
other investors or lenders. Structures within private financial  institutions 
also cause distortions by giving insufficient  influence  on decisionmaking to 
research departments concerned with analysis and risk assessment. Further 
investigation is required to explore the microeconomics of  speculation car-
ried out by different  categories of  market actors. This could be helpful  for 
designing measures, for  example, to be taken by the financial  industry it-
self,  aimed at helping to inhibit excessive speculative behavior; this would 
imply designing new systems of  reward and punishment that would help 
prevent crises. 
Another relevant area for  understanding the East Asian crisis is the 
analysis of  self-fulfilling  attacks, that is, crises that arise without obvious 
current policy inconsistencies. In such cases, the attitude of  speculators 
and investors is crucial to whether an attack occurs. The existence of  self-
2. Griffith-Jones  (1998). 
3. Stiglitz (1994). 
fulfilling  attacks and multiple equilibria for  exchange rates and other key 
variables implies that good macroeconomic fundamentals  are an impor-
tant and necessary—but not sufficient—condition  for  avoiding currency 
crises. There is, at present, a limited understanding of  what triggers self-
fulfilling  attacks.4 Market actors tend to give rather different  explanations 
for  the recent crises. Policymakers in developing countries therefore  face 
the daunting task of  plaving to moving goalposts to avoid crises. However, 
certain conditions of  vulnerability can be identified  (such as high current 
account deficits  as a proportion of  GDP or the ratio of  external liabilities 
like net short-term debt, which can easily be reversed). Further investiga-
tion on conditions of  vulnerability and the nature of  triggering events is 
clearly required to facilitate  the prediction of  risk and, above all, to im-
prove the prevention of  currency crises. 
Lessons for  Crisis Prevention 
Given the volatility and reversibility of  some categories of  capital flows, 
the costs of  these flows  to countries' development may be higher than their 
benefits,  at least during certain periods of  time. Consequently, there is 
a growing consensus among leading policymakers—in developed as well 
as developing countries—and market actors that important changes are 
urgently needed both in the international monetary system as a whole and 
in the policies of  recipient countries. By aiming to avoid costly crises and to 
manage them better if  they do occur, these reforms  will help limit the neg-
ative effects  of  volatile capital flows.  Care must be taken, however, that the 
measures adopted contribute to broadening access by all developing coun-
tries to capital flows,  particularly long-term flows. 
Actions that are urgently needed include identifying  the possible 
changes required for  achieving these aims; ensuring that new policies are 
based on an in-depth understanding of  how different  market actors oper-
ate; carefully  evaluating the potential economic effects  of  such changes; 
and adopting the required measures, including possible institutional de-
velopments to facilitate  their implementation. 
The measures discussed below can be divided into three groups. 
—Measures that can he taken within existing institutional arrange-
4. Wyplosz (1998). 
5. See Ffrench-Davis  and Ocampo un this volume). 
ments. Two important examples are, first,  the more expansive monetary 
policy pursued by the U.S. and European central banks in the second half 
of  1998 to deter the worsening of  financial  crises and, second, changes in 
the capital adequacy requirements for  short-term and long-term lending 
that could be initiated in the context of  the expanded Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. 
—Measures that require some development, expansion, and adapta-
tion of  existing institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) or the Regulatory Committees that meet under the aegis of  the 
Bank for  International Settlements (BIS). Examples include creating new 
facilities  within the IMF (or adapting existing ones) to cope with capital 
account—caused currency crises (see below); expanding the Financial 
Stability Forum or establishing a world financial  authority to provide ap-
propriate surveillance and prudential regulation of  financial  intermediar-
ies, not only in developed and developing countries, but also globally; and 
filling  international regulatory gaps to encompass the national regulation 
of  mutual funds  and hedge funds  and their international coordination. 
—Measures that require more institutional radicalism, in the sense of 
creating new institutions or drastically adapting existing ones. While this 
is clearly desirable from  the perspective of  designing institutions and 
mechanisms to meet the new needs of  a globalized private financial  sys-
tem, it is significantly  more difficult  to achieve. The key problem is that 
there is no global government to create the new global institutions that are 
needed to effectively  manage a globalized private financial  system, and the 
political process for  national governments to create global institutions will 
undoubtedly be complex and slow. It seems highly desirable, however, to 
develop a clear vision of  an appropriate new international financial  archi-
tecture that would allow an orderly global financial  market to support the 
development process and that would avoid developmentally and finan-
cially costly crises. Such a vision should inform  current debates on a new 
financial  architecture. 
This paper focuses  on issues of  crisis prevention. The measures dis-
cussed here emphasize improved information  and regulation. They attempt 
precisely to deal with the international capital market imperfections  out-
lined above, which have played such an important part in causing recurrent 
currency crises.6 Because crises are so costly, not only to developing coun-
6. For an analysis of  betrcr crisis management, see, lor example, Griffith-Jones,  Ocampo, and Cail-
loux (1999) (also available at www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/Finance/inthn.html). 
tries, but also to the international financial  community, utmost priority 
needs to be given to crisis prevention measures. As in medicine, so in fi-
nance: prevention is much kinder, and more efficient,  than cure. 
The focus  of  the international community in the aftermath  of  the 
Asian crisis was on better information,  on the one hand, and strengthen-
ing the financial  system, on the other. This focus  was clearly illustrated by 
the working groups set up under the G-22, an ad hoc group made up of 
the Group of  Seven (G-7) and developing countries, which looked at three 
areas: enhancing transparency and the disclosure of  information;  strength-
ening financial  systems both in national economies and globally; and 
appropriate burden-sharing in the event of  international financial  crises. 
This section briefly  discusses the first  two areas and examines some 
stronger and possibly more effective  crisis prevention strategies. 
Transparency  and  Information  Disclosure 
One of  the areas initially defined  by the G-7 countries and the IMF 
as central for  future  crisis avoidance was enhancing transparency and the 
disclosure of  timely and reliable information,  basically on developing 
countries, and facilitating  its dissemination to market actors. A flurry  of 
activity in improving information  followed.  Some of  the key data gaps and 
deficiencies  identified  were information  on foreign  exchange reserves, in-
cluding undisclosed forward  positions; maturity and currency exposures of 
the public and private sectors; and the health of  the financial  system, in-
cluding information  on nonperforming  loans. 
A number of  steps have already been taken. The most significant  are 
the publication of  public information  notices (PINs) by individual coun-
tries and the IMF's strengthening of  the Special Data Dissemination Stan-
dard (SDSS), the information  standard that the IMF established in 1996 
after  the Mexican peso crisis. The PINs are prepared yearly by all countries 
after  their Article IV consultation with the IMF, and countries are encour-
aged to release them speedily. The IMF has also started a pilot program for 
voluntary release of  Article IV staff  reports. The strengthening of  the SDSS 
in the areas of  international reserves and external debt has been particularly 
important. Reports now incorporate full  details on reserves and any claims 
against them (for  all countries), a practice that was instituted in April 1999. 
In addition to information  standards, a number of  other standards 
have been defined  by the IMF and the BIS, in collaboration with institu-
tions like the World Bank and the Organization for  Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). The aim is to provide codes of  good practice. 
The IMF will promote the dissemination of  these standards by incorporat-
ing them as conditions for  IMF lending. The standards include creating 
codes of  good practice for  fiscal  transparency and for  monetary and financial 
policies, improving the quality of  banking supervision, and addressing is-
sues such as the functioning  of  financial  systems, bankruptcy, and corporate 
governance. 
Though the implementation of  these standards may have very posi-
tive effects,  such as strengthening financial  systems, two rather serious con-
cerns need to be raised. First, is the definition  of  desirable  standards  a 
sufficiently  participatory process, in which the developing countries that 
will be asked to implement the standards have had enough input in their 
definition?  Should developing countries just be encouraged to adopt these 
standards, rather than making their adoption a condition of  IMF support? 
These related concerns can be summarized in the phrase, no standardiza-
tion without participation. Second, will implementing these standards 
impose excessive administrative and other burdens on governments in 
developing countries, while not always generating clear benefits  for  their 
economies? 
l i m i t s o f  t h i s a p p r o a c h Improved information,  along the lines of  the 
changes described above, will clearly be very valuable and will contribute 
to better market performance.  By itself,  however, improved information 
on developing countries most probably will not avert crises. First, the in-
formation  available to financial  markets will never be perfect,  and infor-
mation asymmetries will always exist. Second, better information  alone is 
not sufficient  to ensure that financial  markets function  well, since the key 
issue is how market actors process and act on the available information. 
Phenomena such as euphoria and herding imply that bad news is ignored 
in periods of  boom and magnified  in periods of  bust, with the reverse 
being true for  good news.7 Third, better information  on developing coun-
tries has to be complemented by equally important improvements in in-
formation  on international financial  markets. 
With regard to the first  point, theoretical analysis and practical expe-
rience both clearly show that information  will continue to be imperfect 
and that this may cause or contribute to financial  crises. A clear forerun-
ner of  much of  the literature on imperfect  information  is Keynes, who 
7. See, for  example, Griffith-Jones  (1998). 
stresses "the extreme precariousness of  the basis of  knowledge on which 
our estimates of  prospective yields have to be made."8 More recently, 
Eichengreen rather strongly summarizes the limits of  improved informa-
tion for  crises prevention: relying excessively on improved transparency 
"underestimates the extent to which information  asymmetries are intrin-
sic to financial  markets. The advocates of  information-related  initiatives 
mislead when they assume the problem away."9 
Indeed, sophisticated and increasingly informed  financial  markets 
continue to be extremely volatile. This is the case even in some of  the most 
developed economies in the world. Serious problems and even crises have 
occurred in banking systems that had the highest ratings on transparency, 
as illustrated by the banking crises in Scandinavian countries. 
One very important reason for  imperfect  information  is that much of 
the relevant information  to which the market reacts comes only with a lag, 
and it depends on macroeconomic conditions not entirely known in ad-
vance. Increasing information  that may be relevant to improving microeco-
nomic market efficiency  may do little to reduce macroeconomic volatility.10 
Another source of  problems has to do with the processing of  informa-
tion. As pointed out above, the key issue is that investors (and lenders) are 
increasingly concerned not with what an investment is really worth to a 
person who buys it for  keeps, but with what its market value will be in a 
few  hours or days. To the extent that this is true, available information  on 
developing countries will be less important than how the average market 
participant is likely to perceive it. 
Microeconomic factors,  or how financial  firms  and banks operate, re-
inforce  such problems. This may be related to both costs and firm  organ-
ization. The board of  a financial  institution that is deciding whether to 
invest or lend to a particular country may not be able (or willing) to take 
account of  the rich information  available in the research departments of 
that same institution.11 Smaller banks, with small research departments, 
generally rely even less on their internal expertise, tending instead to fol-
low the decisions of  other banks. As a result, changes in the opinions of 
those investors that are considered ro be informed  may cause noninformed 
8. Keynes (1936, chap.12). 
9. Eichengreen (1999, p. 80). 
10. O campo (1999). 
1 1. A recent survey ot banks carried out by the Bank for  International Settlements shows that most 
banks take decisions without considering the information  available in research and other departments 
within their own bank. 
investors to overreact, since they rely on the formers'  lead to make their 
decisions. 
A key problem in this process is that changes in opinion can occur with-
out any significant  change of  underlying fundamentals.  Basically the same 
information  about a country may be interpreted totally differently  at differ-
ent times, because of  factors  such as the mood of  the markets, events in other 
economies, and so forth.  (This effect  occurs particularly when a country's 
economy is in a vulnerable zone.) A good analogy is that a glass may be 
deemed either half  empty or half  full,  depending mainly on the mood of  the 
viewer and not so much on how clean and transparent the glass is. 
A related issue is that of  rating agencies. The important weight of  sub-
jective factors  in rating agencies' risk analysis, together with the significant 
volatility that has characterized such subjective opinions in the past, has 
led to suggestions that these agencies could be regulated and that they 
could improve their risk evaluations. Moreover, the role of  these institu-
tions in sovereign ratings could be eliminated, substituting it with ratings 
made by the supervisory agencies of  the countries in which capital flows 
originate, according to internationally established parameters. This would 
imply that rating agencies' activities would be concentrated in the evalua-
tion of  private risks.12 
PROVIDING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON 
m a r k e t s As pointed out above, providing markets with better informa-
tion on developing countries has to be complemented by providing devel-
oping countries with better information  on international financial 
markets. During the crisis that started in Asia, in particular, policymakers 
in emerging countries (and specifically  central banks) encountered impor-
tant limitations in the essential information  available on the functioning 
of  international capital and banking markets.13 Authorities require more 
information  both on long-term structural changes in these markets and es-
pecially on day-to-day changes in the functioning  of  global and regional 
markets—and their key actors. 
Just as the IMF has led the process of  improving the collection and dis-
semination of  information  on emerging market economies, which is partic-
ularly useful  to markets, a parallel effort  needs to be undertaken to gather 
and provide timely information  on market evolution to policymakers in 
12. Ocampo (1999). 
13. Based on interviews and personal experience. 
emerging markets. This task should perhaps be led by the BIS and coordi-
nated by the newly created Financial Stability Forum, although inputs 
from  other institutions, such as the IMF and the private sector (perhaps 
through the Institute of  International Finance), would be very valuable. 
These data requirements relate not just to better statistics on international 
banks' exposures, but also to better information  on the international expo-
sures of  investment banks, hedge funds,  and other institutional investors, 
including pension funds  and mutual funds. 
The growth of  financial  innovations, such as over-the-counter deriva-
tives, have made financial  markets more complex and opaque. This has 
created difficulties  in monitoring patterns of  activity in these markets and 
the distribution of  risks in the global financial  system. The BIS has re-
sponded to this situation by drawing up a framework  for  the more regu-
lar collection of  statistics on over-the-counter derivatives markets. Such 
efforts  to improve transparency, particularly in relation to derivatives and 
highly leveraged institutions (such as hedge funds),  are widely welcomed, 
but far  greater frequency  is required. Major central banks and the BIS 
could improve the registration of  derivatives and institutions like hedge 
funds  by making it obligatory.14 In addition, developing countries should 
participate in the relevant working groups where information  needs are 
discussed and decided, so that their information  needs on markets are fully 
considered. In this sense, proposals by the Financial Stability Forum to im-
prove information  on hedge funds  and other highly leveraged institutions 
are positive. Their early implementation, which must include the so-called 
tax havens where access to information  is particularly limited, is crucial. 
Given the speed with which markets move, the frequency  with which 
relevant data are produced must be very high (and possibly higher in times 
of  market turbulence, when it becomes particularly crucial), and the in-
formation  must be disseminated immediately to all countries' central 
banks. In this regard, the BIS could provide a special additional service in 
which it would play the role of  a clearing house of  information.  Such an 
effort  would require not only that the BIS disseminate the information  it 
gathers directly from  markets, but also that the organization collect and 
centralize the data that individual central banks maintain on their markets 
and then use that data to compile an aggregate picture, which is outside 
the scope of  any individual central bank. Working via the Internet, the BIS 
could standardize information  requirements, collect the information,  ag-
14. Based on interviews. 
gregate it, and disseminate it rapidly to all central banks, as well as to other 
relevant institutions. 
Regulation  within  Capital-Receiving  Countries 
Though this study largely focuses  on changes in international finan-
cial arrangements, establishing appropriate policies in capital-receiving 
countries is clearly also of  great importance. Considerable responsibility 
for  discouraging excessive reversible inflows  lies with recipient economies. 
Recipient countries have the greatest degree of  freedom  for  policy-
making in the period of  excessive surges of  capital inflows.  Countercycli-
cal monetary and fiscal  policies are essential for  reducing the excessive 
growth of  domestic absorption or current account deficits  or both. The re-
cent experience and literature indicate that a tightening of  macroeconomic 
policies is particularly desirable when indicators of  vulnerability to finan-
cial and currency crises start to deteriorate quickly or pass certain thresh-
olds. This includes when current account deficits  start to grow rapidly, 
when the proportion of  easily reversible capital flows  in total flows  is high 
and rising, and, particularly, when liquid external liabilities grow rapidly 
and approach the level of  or even exceed foreign  exchange reserves. High 
levels of  foreign  exchange reserves and limits on the level of  short-term ex-
ternal liabilities are thus crucial for  currency crisis avoidance. 
A countercyclical approach should also be applied to the supervision 
and regulation of  the financial  system, especially the banking system. In 
boom times, the supervision and regulation of  banks—as well as banks' 
own credit decisions—should not simply be based on expectations of  a 
continued growth scenario among borrowers. Potential downside risks, in-
cluding a slowdown or reversal of  capital and a slowdown of  the economy 
slows, need to be considered in both credit decisions and supervisory eval-
uations of  loans. The risk that the value of  collateral, such as property, may 
fall  sharply in a possible future  crisis also needs to be considered in boom 
times. A possible measure for  regulators to use when asset prices have gen-
erally been rising fast  is to limit the value of  collateral, for  example, to an 
average of  the past three or five  years or to a certain percentage of  its value. 
This countercyclical approach would moderate booms in domestic bank 
lending, which often  exacerbate the impact of  excessive surges of  capital 
inflows. 
If  surges of  potentially reversible capital are excessive, it may also be 
appropriate for  recipient countries to take measures to discourage them 
temporarily. Some countries (for  example, Chile and Colombia) have im-
plemented measures such as taxes and nonremunerated reserve require-
ments on flows  during a fixed  period with this objective. Their aim has 
been threefold:  to change the structure of  capital inflows  by discouraging 
short-term and potentially reversible flows;  to increase the autonomy of 
domestic monetary policy; and to curb large overvaluation of  the exchange 
rate.15 There is growing evidence that such measures to discourage exces-
sive inflows  have contributed to a relatively more successful  management 
of  capital inflows  in countries that have applied them.16 Chile's measures, 
in particular, contain two attractive features:  they are market-based, rather 
than quantitative, and they apply to practically all short-term flows,  which 
simplifies  administrative procedures and reduces (though does not elimi-
nate) possibilities of  evasion. Other domestic measures that can be useful 
for  discouraging excessive short-term borrowing include modifying  taxes 
on companies' external borrowing. 
The major international financial  institutions now explicitly recognize 
that while they have some limitations and minor microeconomic disad-
vantages, market measures taken by recipient governments to discourage 
excessive short-term capital flows  can play a positive role if  they are part 
of  a package of  policy measures that includes sound macroeconomic fun-
damentals and a strong, well-regulated domestic financial  system. 
International  Regulatory  Measures 
Recipient countries clearly carry an important part of  the responsibil-
ity for  discouraging excessive reversible inflows,  as well as managing them. 
However, the large scale of  international funds—compared  to the small 
size of  developing country markets—leads to the question of  whether 
measures to discourage excessive short-term capital inflows  by recipient 
countries are sufficient  for  dealing with capital surges and the risk of  re-
versal. Source countries must take complementary action, for  three strong 
reasons. First, not all major recipient countries will be willing to discou-
rage short-term capital inflows,  and some may even encourage them. For 
instance, the tax and regulatory measures implemented in Thailand to en-
courage the Bangkok International Banking Facility encouraged short-
term borrowing. Second, even recipient countries that have deployed a 
15. Ffrench  Davis and Griffith-Jones  (1995). 
16. See Ffrench-Davis  and Tapia (in this volume). 
battery of  measures to discourage short-term capital inflows  have on occa-
sion found  these measures to be insufficient  for  stemming massive inflows. 
Third, if  major emerging countries experience attacks on their currencies, 
which result in difficulties  in servicing their debt, they will be forced  to 
seek large official  funding.  This fact  creates a clear need for  international 
or source country regulation that will discourage excessive reversible capi-
tal inflows  during booms. Without it, international private investors and 
creditors might continue to assume excessive risks, based on the euphoria 
during booms combined with the knowledge that they will be bailed-out 
if  the situation becomes critical. The latter is the classical moral hazard 
problem. 
The international financial  crisis provoked a serious debate on how the 
surveillance and supervision of  the international financial  system could be 
strengthened to help prevent economic crises of  this sort from  happening 
again in the future.  The key issues for  strengthening regulation were, first, 
to significantly  improve coordination and consistency of  prudential regula-
tion across financial  sectors and countries and, second, to fill  important 
regulatory gaps. The debate partly focused  on whether existing arrange-
ments should be extended and improved, or whether new institutions 
should be created to cope with the increasingly globalized financial  system, 
so as to achieve the necessary improvement of  international financial  regu-
lation and supervision. 
t h e f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i t y f o r u m  At the more institutionally radical end 
of  the scale, there have been proposals for  the creation of  a new international 
body such as a world financial  authority or a board of  overseers of  major 
international institutions and markets.1:7 Such a body would have wide-
ranging powers for  overseeing global regulation and supervision. A more 
moderate approach advocates expanding existing institutional arrange-
ments. Both the Canadian and British governments put forward  proposals 
based on this approach in 1998. In the fall  of  1998, Chancellor Gordon 
Brown and Secretary of  State Clare Short of  the United Kingdom proposed 
a standing committee for  global financial  regulation to coordinate the mul-
tilateral surveillance of  national financial  systems, international capital 
flows,  and global systemic risk. The proposed committee would bring to-
gether the World Bank, the IMF, the BIS-based Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, and other regulatory bodies on a monthly basis to develop 
17. Harwell and Taylor (2000). 
and implement ways to ensure that international standards for  financial  reg-
ulation and supervision were put in place and properly coordinated. 
In October 1998, the G-7 finance  ministers and central bank govern-
ors asked Hans Tietmever, then president of  the Deutsche Bundesbank, to 
develop the British proposal and more generally to consider the coopera-
tion and coordination between the various international regulatory and 
supervisory bodies and to recommend new arrangements. Tietmeyer's re-
port, which was released in February 1999, outlines areas in which current 
arrangements should be improved, but states that "sweeping institutional 
changes are not needed to realize these improvements."18 Instead, the re-
port proposes that a Financial Stability Forum be convened to regularly 
discuss issues affecting  the global financial  system and to identify  actions 
needed to enhance stability. The Forum was formally  endorsed by finance 
ministers and central bank governors from  the G-7 countries at their Feb-
ruary meeting in Bonn, and it met for  the first  time in April 1999. 
The Financial Stability Forum is currently limited in size to forty-seven 
members, in order to allow for  an effective  exchange of  views and decision-
making. Each G-7 country has three representatives on the Forum, from 
the finance  ministry, the central bank, and the supervisory authority.19 Aus-
tralia, Hong Kong, The Netherlands, and Singapore were also included in 
the Forum as members. Ci-7 representatives have stated that while the 
Forum will initially be limited to G-7 countries, they envisage that other 
national authorities, including from  emerging economies, will join the pro-
cess at some stage. The IMF and the World Bank have two representatives 
each, as do the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International 
Organization of  Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the International 
Association of  Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). The Bank for  International 
Settlements (BIS), the Organization for  Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), and the two BIS-based committees (the Committee 
on the Global Financial System and the Committee on Payment and Set-
tlement Systems) all have one representative on the Forum. 
The Forum will be chaired bv Andrew Crockett, general manager of 
the BIS, for  the first  three years, and it will have a very small secretariat in 
Basel. The Forum has initially met twice a year, beginning in 1999. One 
of  the key aims of  the Forum is to better coordinate the responsibilities of 
the main national and international authorities and supervisory bodies, 
18. Tictincver (1999, p. 5). 
1 9. The Croup of  Seven countries ,:re Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
and to pool the information  held by these various bodies, in order to im-
prove the functioning  of  markets and reduce systemic risk. Subsequent to 
its meeting in Washington on April 14, 1999, the Financial Stability 
Forum defined  three ad hoc working groups, which produced their first 
reports in April 2000. The objectives of  the three groups are as follows: 
—To recommend actions for  reducing the destabilizing potential of 
institutions employing a high degree of  leverage in the financial  markets 
of  developed and developing economies. This group is chaired by Howard 
Davies, Chairman of  the U.K. Financial Services. 
—To evaluate measures in borrower and creditor countries that could 
reduce the volatility of  capital flows  and the risks to financial  systems of 
excessive short-term external indebtedness. This group is chaired by Mario 
Draghi of  the Italian Treasury. Among developing countries, Chile and 
Malaysia participate. 
—To evaluate the impact on global financial  stability of  financial  off-
shore centers and to monitor the progress made by such centers in enforc-
ing international prudential standards and complying with cross-border 
information  exchange agreements. An assessment will be made of  the 
additional efforts  required to avoid underregulation or inappropriate dis-
closure in offshore  centers contributing to global financial  instability. This 
group is chaired by John Palmer, Superintendent of  Financial Institutions 
of  Canada. 
The working groups comprise officials  of  developed and developing 
market economies, international financial  institutions, and supervisory 
groupings, and they draw on work completed or under way in various pub-
lic and private forums.  It is interesting that senior officials  from  developing 
countries have been included and that their expertise is seen as particularly 
relevant. For example, the group that studies measures to cope with volatil-
ity of  capital flows  includes senior representatives from  Chile and Malaysia, 
two countries that have implemented measures to curb inflows  and out-
flows  (Malaysia for  both and Chile for  inflows). 
Setting up the Financial Stability Forum is clearly a positive first  step 
toward increasing the coordination and cooperation of  the various bodies 
whose objective is to improve the way markets function  in order to ensure 
global stability. The question lies, however, in whether the Forum, as it has 
been proposed, will be representative enough and strong enough to ad-
dress all the relevant issues. 
First, the omission of  any developing country authorities during the 
initial years of  the Forum appears to be a major error. It has increasingly 
been accepted, especially since the Mexican peso crisis and the interna-
tional financial  crisis that started in Asia, that developing countries are im-
portant actors in this globalized financial  system, and that currency crises in 
developing countries pose both systemic threats to the international finan-
cial system and threats to the development prospects of  the developing 
countries themselves. Systematic and formal  representation of  developing 
countries on the Forum would increase the legitimacy of  the body and ex-
pand its range of  expertise and perspectives. Developing countries could 
easily be included without making the new Forum too large. Representa-
tives (such as central bank authorities or regulators) could be chosen on a 
regional basis, for  example, with one Asian, one Latin American, and one 
African  participant. These representatives could be appointed for  a fairly 
short period (for  example, two years) and then rotated. This type of  repre-
sentation by developing countries has been working rather well in other 
contexts, as in the boards of  the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The Financial Stability Forum is a very important initiative that may 
be able to reduce vulnerabilities in the international financial  system by 
promoting coordination and cooperation among G-7 regulators, central 
banks, and international financial  institutions. Incorporating representa-
tion from  developing countries would add valuable insights to the Forum's 
work and also increase those countries' commitment to its aims. 
Second, doubts have been voiced over the institutional strength of  the 
new Financial Stability Forum. With a small secretariat in Basel, semian-
nual meetings, and no power of  enforcement,  will the Forum have the suf-
ficient  institutional muscle to deal with the tasks that have been identified? 
Setting up the Forum represents a significant  enhancement of  the system 
of  global regulation by agreement and peer pressure that has worked rea-
sonably well in the context of  the Basel committees. International cooper-
ation at the BIS has always been based on home country control: 
sovereignty remains at the level of  the nation-state, and agreements are 
reached through negotiation and then implemented, when necessary, 
through national legislation or regulation. Countries that are not repre-
sented at the Basel Committee have also adopted some of  their directives 
(most notably, the capital adequacy standards). In the medium term, how-
ever, and in a world of  open financial  markets, an international body with 
the power to make and enforce  policy may well be needed.20 This would 
point toward a body more akin to some kind of  world financial  authority, 
20. Eatwell (1999). 
which would be endowed with executive powers along the lines of  the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
In the meantime, however, the Financial Stability Forum is a very im-
portant step in the right direction. Time will tell whether this body is suf-
ficient  for  promoting international financial  stability and to filling  the 
important gaps in financial  regulation that undermine such stability. 
f i l l i n g  r e g u l a t o r y gaps There are three categories of  flows  to emerg-
ing markets and their associated institutions that may require additional 
regulation and supervision, whether internationally coordinated or under-
taken by the source country. All three types of  flows  are currently insuffi-
ciently regulated, and their surges, as well as outflows,  have played a 
particularly prominent role in triggering recent currency crisis, apparently 
because they are reversible. The three categories are short-term bank loans, 
which were particularly important in the Asian crisis; easily reversible port-
folio  flows  made by institutional investors such as mutual funds,  which 
were especially important in the Mexican peso crisis and also significant  in 
East Asia; and activities by hedge funds  and other highly leveraged insti-
tutions. 
International bank loans are already regulated in industrial countries 
by the central banks; these national regulations are coordinated by the 
Basel Committee. Existing regulations did not discourage excessive short-
term bank lending to several of  the East Asian countries, however. Short-
term bank loans and their reversal played a major role in the East Asian 
crisis. Everyone, including regulators, considered most of  these East Asian 
countries (and particularly countries like the Republic of  Korea) as credit-
worthy until just before  the crisis. Current regulatory practice also seems 
to have been an important factor.  For example, for  non-OECD countries, 
loans with a residual maturity of  up to one year have a weighting of  only 
20 percent for  capital adequacy purposes, while loans over one year have 
a weighting of  100 percent. This reflects  the fact  that it is easier for  indi-
vidual banks to pull out from  renewing short-term loans. As a result of  this 
rule, however, short-term lending is more profitable  for  international 
banks. 
A regulatory bias that encourages short-term lending is thus added to 
banks' economic preference  for  lending short-term, especially in situations 
of  perceived increased risk. An overall increase in short-term loans, however, 
makes countries more vulnerable to currency crises, which paradoxically 
makes banks more vulnerable, as well, to the risk of  nonpayment of  short-
term loans. International authorities need to rapidly examine whether the 
capital adequacy weighting differential  is too large in favor  of  short-term 
loans for  non-OECD countries, resulting in excessive incentives for  short-
term lending. 
A narrowing of  this differential  clearly seems desirable. Soon after  the 
Asian crisis, economic authorities, such as Alan Greenspan, proposed in-
creasing the capital charge for  short-term loans.21 No progress was made 
in this area for  a year, however. Only in 1999 was a consultative document 
issued, with proposals to address the issue. Actions have not yet been 
taken, although several recommendations support the changes. The issue 
thus involves not just the definition  of  appropriate technical measures for 
a new architecture, but also the development of  mechanisms for  speeding 
up the decisionmaking process, especially when basic agreement exists and 
institutional mechanisms are in place. 
With regard to portfolio  flows  to emerging markets, there is currently 
no international framework  for  taking account of  market or credit risks on 
flows  originating in institutional investors such as mutual funds  (and more 
broadly on flows  originating in nonbank institutions). This important reg-
ulatory gap needs to be filled  to protect retail investors in both developed 
and developing countries from  the negative effects  of  excessively large and 
potentially volatile portfolio  flows.22 
The East Asian crisis confirmed  what was very clear in the Mexican 
peso crisis. Institutional investors, such as mutual funds,  strongly contrib-
uted to these currency crises, given the very liquid nature of  their invest-
ments.23 Regulation should therefore  be introduced to discourage excessive 
surges of  portfolio  flows.  This could perhaps best be achieved by a variable 
risk-weighted cash requirement for  such institutional investors.24 These 
cash requirements would be placed as interest-bearing deposits in com-
mercial banks. Introducing a dynamic risk-weighted cash requirement for 
mutual funds  (and perhaps other institutional investors) is within the 
mainstream of  current regulatory thinking. It would require that standards 
be provided by relevant regulatory authorities or agreed internationally. 
The guidelines for  macroeconomic risk, which would determine the 
cash requirement, should take into account such vulnerability indicators 
as the ratio of  a country's current account deficit  to GDP, the level of  its 
21. Alan Greenspan, Financial  Times,  28 February 1998. 
22. Griffith-Jones  (1998). 
23. BIS (1998); Griffith-Jones  (1998). 
24. This proposal was elaborated in a joint study by Jane d'Arista and Stephany Griffith-Jones. 
short-term external liabilities net of  foreign  exchange reserves, the fragility 
of  the banking system, and other relevant country risk factors.25  The pro-
cess would require a sophisticated analysis to avoid stigmatizing countries 
unnecessarily through the use of  simplistic criteria. The views of  the na-
tional central bank and the treasury in the source countries, together with 
those of  the IMF and the BIS, should be helpful  in this respect. The se-
curities regulators in source countries would be the most appropriate in-
stitutions for  implementing such regulations, and their actions could be 
coordinated internationally by IOSCO. 
The fact  that the level of  required cash reserves would vary with a coun-
try's perceived macroeconomic risk would make it relatively more profitable 
to invest in countries with good fundamentals  and relatively less profitable 
to invest in countries with more problematic macroeconomic or financial 
sector fundamentals.  If  a country's fundamentals  should deteriorate, invest-
ment would decline gradually, which should force  an early correction of  pol-
icy and, in turn, stimulate a resumption of  flows.  Although a requirement 
for  cash reserves on the assets of  mutual funds  invested in emerging markets 
could increase the cost of  raising foreign  capital for  the funds,  the increased 
cost would be compensated by a more stable supply of  funds  at a more sta-
ble cost. Furthermore, this smoothing of  flows  should discourage the type of 
massive and sudden reversal of  flows  that sparked both the Mexican and the 
Asian crises, making such developmentally costly crises less likely. 
Given the dominant role and rapid growth of  institutional investors 
in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, 
the proposal for  a risk-weighted cash requirement on mutual funds  could 
be adopted first  in those countries, without creating significant  competi-
tive disadvantages. Subsequently, IOSCO would need to give urgent pri-
ority to harmonizing such measures internationally, so as to prevent 
mutual funds  from  channeling their investments through other countries 
and, especially, offshore  centers that did not impose the cash require-
ments.26 International guidelines would be formulated  through interna-
tional consultations similar to those employed by the Basel Committee in 
developing the Core Principles for  Effective  Banking Supervision. For that 
purpose, IOSCO could set up a working group consisting of  representa-
tives of  the national securities regulatory authorities in source countries, 
25. See Ffrench-Davis  and Ocampo (in this volume). 
26. The latter point draws on communication with the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, including a let-
ter from  Chairman Alan Greenspan. 
together with some representation from  developing countries. The new 
guidelines should take due account of  relevant existing regulations, such 
as the European Commission's Capital Adequacy Directive. The Financial 
Stability Forum, in which IOSCO participates, could facilitate  the imple-
mentation and coordination of  such prudential guidelines and ensure their 
consistency with the regulation of  other institutions (such as banks) and 
other potentially volatile flows. 
The third category of  flows,  namely, those associated with hedge funds 
and other highly leveraged institutions (HLIs), requires urgent study to 
detect and cover existing monitoring and regulatory gaps. The Financial 
Stability Forum report on this issue, mentioned above, represents a valu-
able first  step. Further careful  analysis—both technical and institutional— 
is required on how hedge funds  and other highly leveraged institutions 
operate and how they can best be regulated to reduce their impact on mag-
nifying  the volatility of  capital flows,  exchange rates, and stock markets in 
developing countries and thus minimize the negative effect  that this vola-
tility has on development and poverty. There is a growing consensus that 
HLIs can pose important risks both to direct creditors and, under certain 
market conditions, to the financial  system as a whole.27 The exact nature 
of  the impact of  HLIs on magnifying  volatility in developing countries is 
not yet fully  understood, l he role of  hedge funds  in the East Asian crisis, 
for  example, is a matter of  debate owing to insufficient  information  and 
differences  in interpretation. Measures designed specifically  to address the 
impact of  hedge funds  and other HLIs on magnifying  volatility in devel-
oping countries have not been given sufficient  priority on the regulatory 
agenda. However, policies for  managing the risks posed by HLIs to credi-
tors and the financial  system as a whole will also help reduce their nega-
tive impact on developing countries. 
The problem does not just relate to hedge funds,  but also encompasses 
other highly leveraged activities and institutions, such as proprietary desks 
of  investment banks. HLIs can be defined  as having three characteristics: 
they are subject to little or no regulatory oversight, as a significant  propor-
tion operate through offshore  centers; they are subject to limited disclo-
sure requirements, and their operations are often  very opaque; and they 
take on significant  leverage. 
Three sets of  responses can be used to address the risks posed by the 
27. This consensus is reflected,  for  example, in the Basel Committee's report on banks and HLIs 
(Basel Committee, 1999). 
HLIs. These actions are often  presented as alternatives, but it would be 
better to consider them as complementary. The first  response is indirect, 
attacking the issue through the major counterparties of  HLIs (mainly 
banks and securities houses). One possibility is to promote sounder prac-
tices in the way banks and securities houses assess risks when they deal 
with hedge funds  and other HLIs. However, further  actions by supervisory 
authorities also seem desirable. In particular, supervisors should impose 
higher capital requirements on lending or other exposures of  banks to 
HLIs, to reflect  the higher risks involved in such exposures as a result 
of  HLIs opaqueness, high leverage, and lack of  regulation. Supervisors may 
also need to formally  or informally  prohibit banks from  lending to a par-
ticular class of  risky counterparty. Such measures would not only protect 
banks, but may also stimulate HLIs to manage risks more responsibly. 
A second avenue, which is clearly complementary to the first,  is to in-
crease transparency on total exposures to HLIs by all financial  institutions. 
For example, the concept of  a credit register for  bank loans could be ex-
tended along the model of  the French central  des  risques,  which provides 
banks access to the aggregate amount of  bank lending to each company. 
Such a register would collect and centralize total exposures (both on and 
off  balance-sheet positions) of  different  financial  intermediaries to single 
counterparties, such as major hedge funds.  Counterparties, supervisors, 
and central banks in both developed and developing countries could then 
get information  about the total indebtedness of  such institutions, which 
would help them assess the risks involved more precisely. For this purpose, 
the information  would have to be both timely and meaningful,  especially 
to take account of  rapid shifts  in the positions of  HLIs. The register should 
probably be based at the BIS itself  or at the Basel Committee on the Glo-
bal Financial System (formerly  the Euro-currency Standing Committee), 
which already has experience in gathering similar information. 
A third avenue is to directly regulate hedge funds  and other highly lev-
eraged institutions. Such direct regulation could take a number of  forms, 
including licensing requirements, minimum capital standards, and mini-
mum standards for  risk management and control. In a recent report, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision argues that such a regulatory re-
gime should focus  on the systemic risk that is potentially generated by HLI 
activities owing to their excessive size and risk taking, which could endan-
ger financial  stability.28 If,  as seems probable, HLIs also increase the vola-
28. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999). 
tility of  exchange rates in developing countries, this concern should also 
be addressed in attempts at their regulation. 
The first  two forms  of  dealing with HLIs currently have more support 
than their direct regulation, even though the latter would deal with the 
problem more directly. The opposition to such direct regulation is based 
on practical grounds. For example, it is argued that HLIs could restructure 
themselves so as to escape any regulatory definition  that may be instituted. 
The most frequent  argument against direct regulation of  hedge funds  is 
that they would be able to circumvent such regulations, because they ei-
ther are located offshore  or could easily move offshore. 
The international community can either ignore this problem by ac-
cepting the absurd status quo (and incurring continued high costs from 
the risk of  major instability) or tackle it by raising the issue of  extending 
regulation, including possible regulation of  mutual funds,  to offshore  cen-
ters. If  global supervision and regulation is genuinely accepted as essential 
in today's world of  globalized financial  markets, then there is no justifica-
tion for  so-called no-go areas where such regulations can be evaded or 
undermined. It is essential that offshore  centers comply with international 
standards with regard to both the provision of  information  and the global 
regulation of  institutions such as hedge funds.  A political initiative in this 
respect could be both effective  and useful  if  it had the clear backing of  the 
G-7 countries, in particular, and support from  developing countries. The 
technical issues involved in applying provision-of-information  standards 
and regulation to offshore  centers require further  study so as to facilitate 
political decisions for  action in this sphere. 
The recent report by the Financial Stability Forum's working group on 
HLIs and offshore  centers contains positive proposals in this direction.29 
The existence of  this working group within the Financial Stability Forum 
provides the institutional mechanism for  urgent action in this field.  It is to 
be hoped that the recently suggested measures will be implemented soon. 
The focus  has thus far  been on better regulation of  financial  intermediaries, 
which is clearly essential. It is the function  of  financial  intermediation more 
broadly, however, that really should be regulated, including financial  inter-
mediation carried out by nonfinancial  firms,  such as suppliers (who provide 
credit) or international companies making direct investment. Unfortu-
nately, such intermediation activities are far  more difficult  to regulate. An 
essential first  step is acquiring a better empirical understanding of  the role 
29. Financial Stability Forum (2000). 
played by nonfinancial  intermediaries in channeling private flows,  particu-
larly volatile ones, to developing countries. 
More generally, further  empirical work is required on several issues, in-
cluding the recent changes in global credit and capital markets; the criteria 
used by different  categories of  market actors, such as banks, mutual funds, 
hedge funds,  and foreign  direct investors, for  entering and exiting coun-
tries; and the incentives behind particular patterns of  behavior that contrib-
ute to speculative pressures on individual countries and to cross-country 
contagion. A better understanding of  behavioral patterns and outflow 
trends would help policymakers design measures—to be implemented by 
individual firms,  by segments of  the financial  industry via self-regulation, 
by regulators, and by governments (for  example, via tax measures)—to dis-
courage market imperfections  such as disaster myopia and herding, which 
contribute to currency crises. 
A package of  measures is thus needed to make currency crises in 
emerging markets far  less likely and to ensure the efficient  operation of  the 
market economy in emerging markets, which should be a basis for  sus-
tained development. Avoiding crises seems to require some degree of  dis-
couragement or regulation of  excessive and potentially unsustainable 
short-term inflows.  Such measures will be most effective  if  they are applied 
by both source and recipient countries (although the main responsibility 
lies with recipient countries), if  they avoid discouraging more long-term 
flows  (which, on the contrary, need to be encouraged), if  they are simple 
in design and clearly targeted at unsustainable flows,  and, in particular, if 
they are complemented by good policies in the emerging economies. 
Conclusions 
The seriousness of  currency crises in developing and transition coun-
tries is a cause of  major concern. No one foresaw  the depth of  the crisis 
that started in East Asia, for  example, or the speed of  contagion. Conse-
quently, a sizeable proportion of  the world economy entered recession for 
a considerable period. This not only eroded impressive gains in poverty re-
duction in the most affected  countries, but also led to major increases in 
poverty. 
Steps need to be taken urgently to prevent future  crises and to manage 
them better if  they do occur. Some actions can be implemented either 
within existing institutional arrangements or with some development, ex-
pansion, and adaptation of  existing international institutions. These in-
clude improving information  on international financial  markets and filling 
regulatory gaps, in particular in relation to mutual funds  and hedge funds, 
as well as improving the regulation of  bank lending to help prevent excessive 
surges of  capital inflows.  It is also important, however, to envision—and 
start building—a new financial  architecture that would meet development 
needs in the context of  the new globalized economy. This includes moving 
toward the creation of  a world financial  authority, which would carry out 
prudential regulation of  capital flows  consistently across countries and fi-
nancial sectors. Such a world financial  authority could build on existing in-
stitutions, especially the new Financial Stability Forum. These measures 
need to be complemented by measures for  crises management.30 
Though international actions are crucial, individual countries must 
clearly adopt their own policies for  preventing currency crises. Relevant 
measures include more countercyclical macroeconomic and domestic reg-
ulatory policies, the strengthening of  domestic financial  systems, and more 
prudent opening of  the capital account, accompanied when necessary by 
market-based measures to discourage excessive surges of  capital inflows. 
References 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 1999. "Sound Practices for  Banks' Interactions 
with Highly Leveraged Institutions." Basel Committee Publications 46. Basel. 
BIS (Bank for  International Settlements). 1998. 68th  Annual  Report.  Basel. 
Eatwell, J. 1999. "Brown Achieves First Step towards Global Stability." The  Observer  (Feb-
ruary 28). 
Eatwell, J., and L. Taylor. 2000. Global  Finance  at  Risk.  New York: The New Press. 
Eichengreen, B. 1999. Toward  a New  International  Financial  Architecture:  A Practical  Post-
Asia  Agenda.  Washington: Institute for  International Economics (HE) 
Financial Stability Forum. 2000. Report  of  the  Working  Group  on Highly  Leveraged  Insti-
tutions.  Basel: Bank for  International Settlements. See www.fsforum.org/reports/rephli. 
html. 
Ffrench-Davis,  R., and S. Griffith-Jones,  eds. 1995. Coping  with  Capital  Surges:  The  Return 
of  Finance  to  Latin  America.  Lynne Reinner. 
Griffith-Jones,  S. 1998. Global  Capital  Flows.  Macmillan. 
. 2000. "Towards a New Financial Architecture: the Management of  Crises." In Fi-
nancial  Globalization  and  the  Emerging  Economies,  edited by J. A. Ocampo and others. 
Santiago: International Jacques Maritain Institute and United Nations Economic Com-
mission for  Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
30. See Griffith-Jones  (2000). 
Griffith-Jones,  S., J. A. Ocampo, and]. Cailloux. 1999. "Proposals for  a New International 
Financial Architecture, with Special Reference  on Needs of  Poorer Countries." Institute 
of  Development Studies. Mimeographed. 
Keynes, J. M. 1936. The  General  Theory  of  Employment,  Interest  and  Money.  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ocampo, J. A. 1999. "Reforming  the International Financial Architecture: Consensus and 
Divergence." Serie  Temas  de  Coyuntura  1. Santiago: United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for  Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
StiglitzJ. 1994. "The Role of  the State in Financial Markets." Proceedings  of  the  World  Bank 
Annual  Conference  on Development  Economics.  Washington: International Bank for  Re-
construction and Development (IBRD). 
Tietmeyer, H. 1999. International  Cooperation  and  Coordination  in  the  Area  of  Financial 
Market  Supervision  and  Surveillance.  Frankfurt:  Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Wyplosz, C. 1998. "Globalized Financial Markets and Financial Crises." In Regulatory  and 
Supervisory  Challenges  in  a New  Era  of  Global  Finance,  edited by J. J. Teunissen. The 
Hague: Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD). 
Contributors 
Manuel R. Agosin 




UN Economic Commission 
for  Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
Stephany Griffith-Jones 
Institute of  Development 
Studies, University of 
Sussex 
José Antonio Ocampo 
UN Economic Commission 
for  Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
Jaime Ros 
University of  Notre Dame. 
Heriberto Tapia 
UN Economic Commission 




Argentina: currency board in, 19; effect  of 
Mexican crisis in (1994-99),  18-19 
Balance of  payments: crisis in Mexico (1974-
76), 110; factors  precipitating crisis of,  53; 
Korean crisis of,  44, 46-47. See  also 
Capital account; Current account 
Bank for  International Settlements (BIS): 
actions to improve transparency, 151; 
potential role as information  clearing 
house, 151-52; representation in Financial 
Stability Forum, 155 
Banking system, Chile: crisis in (1981-86), 
87; prudential supervision of,  22, 87-90; 
role (1975-82),  68-78 
Banking system, Korea: interest arbitrage of, 
55; lending and debt practices (1997-98), 
46, 55-57; regulation and government 
guidance of,  50-52; transformation 
in, 62 
Banking system, Mexico: effect  of  capital 
surgeon, 126-27, 131; effect  of  financial 
crisis on (1994-95),  136-37; privatization 
in (1991-92),  110, 126 
Banking system, Taiwan: foreign  banks in, 51; 
prudential regulation of,  51-52 
Basel Committee: on Banking Supervision, 
162; Core Principles for  Effective  Banking 
Supervision, 160; on the Global Financial 
System, 162 
Brady agreement, 4, 107-10 
Brown, Gordon, 154 
Capital account: Chilean policy (1975-2000), 
21-22; effect  of  open, 26-27, 33; 
liberalization in Chile (1975-82),  68-78; 
liberalization of  Korean (1991-93), 
20-21, 39-40, 45-46, 54-56, 60-61; 
price-based regulation for,  33 
Capital Adequacy Directive, 161 
Capital flows:  associated with highly leveraged 
institutions, 161; causes, effects,  and costs 
of,  141-45; to developing countries, 
141-42; into East Asian economies, 2-3; 
effect  of  stability of,  30; lack of  controls 
on surges in, 11-16; needing regulation, 
158-64; with open capital account, 33; 
policy to sustain economic growth with 
volatile, 33-34; volume, composition, and 
use of  inflows,  5, 31-32. See  abo  Foreign 
direct investment (EDI); Portfolio  flows 
Capital flows,  Chile: composition of 
(1980-2000),  79-82, 92; exemptions 
from  controls on, 23, 89; inflows  (1990-
95),  78-90; inflows  (1970s),  66-67; net 
inflows  (1977-2000),  68-70; post-1997 
outflows  from,  91-92, 99; pre-1997 
inflows,  67; regulation of  flows,  22, 88, 
93-95, 101; restrictions on inflows,  68-70 
Capital flows,  Korea: inflows  (1990s),  20-21, 
41, 44, 55-56, 58, 62; outflows  (1990s), 
42, 44, 57-59 
Capital flows,  Mexico: inflows  (1989-94),  4, 
108-11, 114, 125, 127-28; outflows 
related to monetary policy, 131-37 
Capital flows,  Taiwan: control into and out of 
(1997-98),  57-58 
Capital formation,  31-32 
Capital inflows:  preceding financial  crises, 53 
Capital markets, international: imperfections  in, 
143; shock transmission from,  1, 28 
Central Bank, Chile: exchange rate policy 
(1995-97),  95-101; foreign  exchange 
intervention (1996-97),  23, 67; 
management of  capital flows  (1990-9$),  82-
90; restrictions on capital inflows  (1975-
82), 71 
Central Bank, Korea: hanking sector policy 
(1997),  52; monetary policy {1990s),  39-42 
Central Bank, Mexico: policy related to 
1994-95  crisis, 127-34; sterilization of 
foreign  reserve losses, 126-28, 130-31; 
withdrawal from  foreign  exchange market 
(1994-95),  133 
Central Bank, Taiwan: authority in, 51-52, 
57; strategy to defend  currency (1990s), 
47-48 
CETES (peso-denominated bonds), Mexico, 
125-26, 132 
Chile: capital account liberalization (1975-82), 
68-78; controls on capital flows,  22, 23; 
debt crisis (1982),  67; effect  of  Asian 
crisis in (1997),  91, 94-96, 99, 101; effect 
of  Mexican crisis on, 23; growth rate 
(1990s),  23 
Contagion: from  Brazilian crisis (1999),  136; 
effect  in Chile of  Mexican crisis, 67, 79-80; 
effect  in Korea (1997),  59-60; effect  in 
Taiwan (1997),  60; effect  of  Mexican crisis, 
24; from  Asian crisis (1997),  91, 141-42 
Crockett, Andrew, 155 
Currency: factors  influencing  Mexican peso 
appreciation, 11 5; Mexican depreciation and 
devaluation (1994-95),  131-37 
Currency board: in Argentina, 19; arguments 
for  and against, 28 
Currency crises: Brazil (1999),  136; European 
Monetary System (EMS) (1992),  130; 
methods to avoid, 1 52-53; models within 
speculative attack hypothesis, 129-30; 
second- and third-generation models, 130; 
self-fulfilling  attacks, 144-45 
Current account: deficit  and surplus in Korea, 
40-42, 46, 53; financing  deficit  in Mexico 
(1994-95),  128; surplus in Taiwan (1990s), 
40-42, 57-58 
Davies, Howard, 156 
Debt, external: of  Chile (1975-82),  68-78; 
Mexico's servicing of  (1991-92),  110-11, 
125; ofTaiwan  (1997),  58 
Developing countries: uses for  capital inflows, 
5, 31-32 
Developing countries: benefits  of  FDI in, 
141-42; capital flows  to (1950s,  1960s),  30; 
capital surges to (1970s,  1980s),  3-5, 
141-42; impact of  capital flows  on, 66; 
improved information  to, 147-52; needed 
regulation of  capital flows  to, 158-64. See 
also  Contagion; East Asian countries; Latin 
American countries 
Draghi, Mario, 156 
East Asian countries: capital inflows  (1992-97), 
10-16; effect  of  crisis (1997),  25, 38-39, 
142; effect  of  Mexican crisis on (1994-95), 
9; GDP (1971-2000),  6-7, 9-11. See  also 
Korea; Taiwan 
Emerging economies. See  Developing countries 
Exchange rate policy: change in Mexican 
(1994-95),  131-35; Chile (1975-82),  72— 
73; Chile (1982-95),  85-87, 100-01 
Exchange rate regimes: currency board, 1, 28; 
freely  floating,  29; intermediate, 28-29, 
33 
Exchange rates: Korea (1997-98),  46, 57, 60; 
risk associated with, 53; Taiwan (1997-98), 
47-48, 60 
Feldstein, M., 47 
Financial crises: causes of,  142; East Asian crisis 
(1997),  38, 91, 99, 142-45, 159; effect  in 
Chile of  Mexican crisis (1994-95),  9, 
79-82, 92, 97; methods to prevent, 145-64; 
Mexican crisis (1994-95),  2, 67, 107-08, 
128-32; recent and historical Latin 
American and Asian, 1-2. See  also 
Contagion; Currency crises 
Financial intermediation: of  capital inflows  in 
Mexico, 126-27; of  large capital inflows, 
115; need for  regulation of,  163 
Financial markets, international: complexity 
and opaqueness in, 151; effect  of  capital 
inflows  in Mexico, 11 5-18; effect  of  Latin 
American debt crisis on, 25; external 
liabilities in Mexican, 124; imperfections  in, 
144; information  available to, 148; need for 
improved information  in, 148-49; opening 
in Mexico, 111. See  also  Capital markets, 
international 
Financial Stability Forum: proposed functions 
of,  151, 154-58, 161; report on HI.Is and 
offshore  centers, 163 
Fiscal policy, Chile: effect  of  (1990-95),  82-90; 
expansionary {¡996—97),  98-99 
Foreign direct investment (FDI): benefits  to 
developing countries of,  141-42: as capital 
inflow,  31-32; in Chile, 79-82, 88-89, 
92-93, 96-97; deregulation of  Korean 
grecnfield,  20, 54; increases in (/99ft),  4; 
openness in Mexico to, 109-10; post-/997 
inflows  into Korea, 62; regulation in Chile 
(  1990—95),  84; Taiwan greenficld,  57 
Foreign exchange reserves: Korea. 41-42, 60, 
62; levels in Chile (1975-82).  71 ; levels in 
Mexico (1994-95),  128; need for  high levels 
of,  152; in speculative attacks on Mexican 
currency, 1 26-31 ; Taiwan (199^-98),  47-48 
Foreign Investment Laws, Mexico ( 1973, 
1993), 110-11 
Hedge funds:  capital flows  of.  161; proposed 
direct regulation of,  162-63: role in East 
Asian crisis, 161. See  also  Highly leveraged 
institutions (HLis) 
Highly leveraged institutions (HI.Is). 161; 
characteristics of,  161; proposed direct 
regulation of,  162-63; responses to risks 
posed by, 161-62 
Industrial sector, Korea: chaebol  foreign 
investment, 55; chaebol  response to East 
Asian crisis (1997),  49; restructuring of 
chaebol,  44, 46; unhedged borrowing by 
firms  in, 49-51, 61 
Information:  about hedge funds  and HI.Is, 151; 
BIS as potential clearing house for.  151-52; 
IMF collection and dissemination of,  147, 
150; need for  improved, 145-52: public 
information  notices, 147 
International Association oflnsurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), 155 
International Monetary Fund (IMF): codes of 
good practice, 147-48; conditional lending 
of,  52; financial  package and structural 
reforms  (1997-2000),  44, 46-4", 59; 
information  collection and dissemination by, 
147, 150; representation in financial 
Stability Forum, 155 
International Organization of  Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), 155, 160-61 
Investors: ceiling in Taiwan for  foreign,  57; 
contribution to currency crises, 159; ease of 
flight  when crisis occurs, 53; flight  from 
Korea, 55, 57; in Korea, 54. See  also 
Portfolio  flows 
Korea: current account balance (1992-99), 
40-42; effect  of  East Asian recessions on 
(  1998), 19; effect  ofThai  baht crisis on 
(1997),  39-48; GDP growth (1970s-
199(h),  38-39; pre-1997 GDP growth rates, 
38-42; real exchange rate (1992-97), 
40-41, 43; structural reforms  required by 
IMF (¡997-2000),  44, 46 
Latin American countries: bank lending as 
source of  financing  in, 25; capital inflows  to, 
3-4, 6, 8, 1 1-16, 108-09; effect  of  Mexican 
crisis in (1994-95),  16-19; GDP (1971-
2000), 6-8; investments in (1990s),  4-5, 
8-9. See  also  Argentina; Chile; Mexico 
Mexico: Brady agreement in, 4, 107-10; finan-
cial crisis and rescue ( 1994-95),  107-08, 
159; output, employment, and productivity 
(1988-97),  118-24; post-1994-95  perfor-
mance, 135-37; public debt, 110-11, 125-
26, 132-34. See  also  Capital flows,  Mexico; 
Central bank, Mexico; CETES; Tesobonos 
Monetary policy. See  Foreign exchange reserves; 
Prudential regulation and supervision 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAF'l'A): Mexican participation in, 136 
Organization for  Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OF.CD), 155 
Palmer, John, 156 
Pension funds,  Chile: authorized foreign 
investments (1995-97,  94-95; investments 
(1990-95),  84-85; post-1997capital 
outflows,  99 
Portfolio  flows:  into Chile (1990-95),  81-82; 
increase in (1990s),  4; inflows  to Latin 
American countries (1992-97,  11-16; into 
Mexico (1988-98).  111-14; into and out of 
Korea (1997-98),  54-57; post-/927into 
Korea, 62; proposed regulation of,  1 59-60 
Prudential regulation and supervision: absence 
in Korea {1997),  39-40; in Chile, 22, 75-90, 
87-88; in East Asian countries (1992-97), 
11 ; effect  on capital flow  volatility, 30-31 ; in 
emerging economies, 34; in Mexico, 22; in 
Taiwan (1997),  39^(0, 51-52 
Public debt, Mexico: crisis (1994-95),  133-34; 
dollarization of,  125-26, 132-34; Mexico's 
servicing of  (1991-92),  110-11, 125 
Public information  notices (PINs), 147 
Radelet, S„ 46 
Sachs, J., 46 
Short, Clare, 154 
Speculative attacks: currency crisis models 
within hypothesis of,  129-30; on Mexican 
currency (1994-95),  126-30; on Taiwan 
currency, 24 
Taiwan: capital controls in, 23-24, 39-40; 
current account balance (1992-97),  40-42; 
effect  of  Thai baht crisis on, 38, 39-48, 
47-48; GDP growth (1970s-1990s),  38-39; 
growth rate (1997-98),  47-48; pre-1997 
GDP growth rates, 38-42; real exchange 
rate (1992-97),  40-41, 43 
Telecommunications, Mexico, 110 
Tequila crisis (1994-95).  See Contagion; 
Financial crises; Mexico 
Tesobonos (dollar-indexed bonds), Mexico, 
125-26, 132-34 
Thai baht crisis (1997).  See  Contagion; East 
Asian countries; Financial crises 
Tietmeyer, Hans, 155 
Titelman, D„ 30 
Transparency: BIS actions to improve, 151; 
enhancing, 147-52 
Uthoff,  A., 30 
World Bank: codes of  good practice, 147-48; 
representation in Financial Stability Forum, 
155 
C E P A L 
E C L A C 
e c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r  l a t i n a m e r i c a a n d t h e c a r i b b e a n 
ECLAC is one of  five  United Nations regional commissions. All Latin 
American and Caribbean countries are members, as are a number of  devel-
oped nations in America and Europe with strong historical, cultural, and 
economic ties to the region. Since its founding  in 1948, ECLAC has pro-
moted economic and social development and cooperation between nations 
through training courses, technical assistance, and policy-oriented research 
projects. As well as providing general economic analysis, these projects also 
address the particular problems of  individual Latin American and Carib-
bean countries. In recent years, ECLAC has focused  its efforts  on the chal-
lenges faced  by the region in achieving sustained (and environmentally 
sustainable) growth among pluralist democracies. These democracies face 
very real demands as they find  ways to develop their economies in order to 
benefit  the majority of  the population. As a result, ECLAC's main focus  has 
been on helping countries improve economic growth and social equity si-
multaneously. ECLAC, with headquarters in Santiago, Chile, has two sub-
regional offices  in Mexico and in Trinidad and Tobago, together with 
national offices  in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and the United 
States. 

